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Prior research has identified several relationships between mood and executive functions.  
Very broadly, these findings generally suggest that positive moods are associated with enhanced 
cognitive performance, particularly in working memory and learning.  However, recent studies 
note that there are some instances in which negative moods may benefit select executive skills, 
such as those involved in divided attention and inhibition.  In sum, these findings indicate that 
positive moods favor top-down, heuristic, or relational processing, whereas negative trait moods 
favor bottom-up, detail-oriented processing.  However, a clear mechanism by which these effects 
occur has yet to be identified. 
The most compelling theories that may explain these findings include Bower’s Network 
Theory of Affect and Schwarz and Clore’s Cognitive Tuning Model.  While neither model 
accounts fully for these research findings, they share a common basis, which states that cognitive 
processes are informed by the expedient access of conceptual knowledge.  The present research 
study uses conceptual access (via measures of semantic network activity) as a basis to evaluate 
the contribution of this activity to the relationships between trait mood and executive functions. 
 
 v 
One hundred and twenty research participants were administered self-report mood 
surveys and standardized neuropsychological tests of executive and other cognitive functions.  
The entire study dataset was organized into 3 different models to evaluate the contribution of 1) 
positive trait mood alone, 2) negative trait mood alone, and 3) positive and negative trait moods 
together, to examine whether the effect of trait mood on various executive functions is mediated 
by semantic network activity.  Means comparisons in each model reliably found that more 
positive and less negative trait moods were associated with increased semantic network 
activation (via verbal fluency measures) and poorer inhibition performance, whereas less positive 
and more negative trait moods were reliably associated with reduced semantic network activation 
and enhanced inhibition performance.  No between-groups differences in semantic network 
access (i.e., naming), verbal learning and memory, verbal and non-verbal attention and working 
memory, psychomotor and visuolexical speed, or intellectual functioning were found.  Structural 
equation modeling in each model failed and was unable to identify a clear relationship between 
trait mood and executive functions via semantic network activity.  Correlation and canonical 
correlation analyses indicated that an indirect relationship between semantic network activation 
and inhibition performance exists across modalities and is most clearly identified when both 
positive and negative trait moods are considered together.  Specifically, increased semantic 
network activation was reliably associated with poorer inhibition performance, and reduced 
semantic network activation was reliably associated with enhanced inhibition performance in 
each study model.  The study model that considered both positive and negative trait moods 
together also provided some evidence of a weak, partial mediational relationship between 
inhibition and semantic network activation that neither the positive trait mood model nor the 
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Study Basis and Overview 
Mood has been shown to influence quality of life, health outcomes, and general 
wellbeing. Although this effect has been well known for quite some time, cognitive scientists 
have turned greater attention to the effect of mood on cognitive function only within the last 
three to four decades. The mood-cognition interaction has proven complex; some researchers 
previously suggested that these domains function independently (Zajonc, 1980, 1984), despite 
the current opinion that they are not only related, but inseparably intertwined, both in terms of 
phenomenology (Duncan & Barrett, 2007; ; Erickson & Schulkin, 2003; Lazarus 1981; Lazarus, 
1984; Schacter & Singer, 1962; Storbeck & Clore, 2007) and neuroanatomy (Allen, Kaut, and 
Lord, 2008; Dolan, 2002; Ghashghaei & Barbas, 2002; Oschner, Bunge, Gross, & Gabrieli, 
2002). 
In examining the interaction between mood and cognition, a broad body of 
neuropsychological evidence suggests that these systems are interactive and can at times be fully 
integrated (see Gray, 2004; Pessoa, 2008), suggesting that the whole (e.g., concerted activity of 
positive affect and verbal working memory systems together) is psychologically more efficient 
than the sum of its constituents (e.g., the non-concerted activity of positive affect and verbal 
working memory systems acting alone). Schwarz (2002) provided a classic example of the mood 
and cognition interaction, specifically that cognitive insight into extrinsic factors influencing 
negative moods may abate their persistence and sequelae. Conversely, intrinsic mood has been 
widely shown to influence cognitive performance on a range of tasks (Chamberlain & Sahakian, 
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2006; Landro, Stiles, & Sletvold, 2001; McAllister-Williams, Ferrier, & Young, 1998). 
Depression and subclinical depressive states that naturally occur have been associated with 
various cognitive effects on formal clinical testing, including reduced attention, working 
memory, initiation, concentration, generativity, and learning and memory (Chepenik, Cornew, & 
Farah, 2007). When negative moods are induced within a non-depressed population, induced 
negative moods generally hinder cognitive performance (Seibert & Ellis, 1991; Mitchell & 
Phillips, 2007; Park & Banaji, 2002; however, see Forgas, 2013 for a different perspective), 
whereas induced positive moods typically improve cognitive performance (Mitchell & Phillips, 
2007). 
A number of theories seek to explain these effects, which posit that positive moods must 
be associated with enhanced cognition, particularly, in alertness and insight, which are skills that 
may benefit creativity and overall cognition (Ashby, Isen, and Turken, 1999; Lyubomirsky, 
King, & Diener, 2005). However, select recent findings, run contrary to the notion that positive 
moods generally and very broadly benefit cognition; rather, the nature of these effects may be 
situation- or task-dependent. Positive moods may lead to increased reliance on heuristic 
processing, which in some tasks can result in more frequent errors due to bias and distractibility 
(Bless, Clore, Galisano, Rabe, & Wolk, 1996). For example, false memories are more likely to 
occur in individuals who report more positive moods (Kopelman, 1999; Pezdek & Lam, 2007) or 
who are induced into a positive mood (Storbeck & Clore, 2005). These findings suggest that 
positive affect is not always beneficial to cognition and memory.  
Few models have emerged to explain the mood-cognition interaction; however, these 
models presume a direct relationship, relying on mood as the basis for the resultant cognitive 
findings. Current models fare well in explaining the wealth of cognitive findings that have led to 
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the assumption that positive moods enhance cognition, but they struggle to account for the select 
unexpected findings in which negative moods appear to benefit some aspects of cognition 
(Andrews & Thomson, 2009), such as better memory accuracy in induced sad moods (Storbeck 
& Clore, 2005, 2011; Storbeck, 2013; Zhang, Gross, & Hayne, 2016). To rectify these disparate 
results, it has been suggested that negative moods exert an inhibiting effect on individuals in 
these states (for a review, see Baas, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008). This inhibiting effect presumably 
results in being “closed to experience,” which may be beneficial in some cognitive contexts (e.g., 
reduced distractibility and heightened attention to important, albeit minor, details due to a 
propensity for systematic, bottom-up processing). These models have been extended to describe 
greater analytic versus heuristic processing styles in negative mood states and a preference for 
heuristic over analytic processing in positive states, which offers a compelling explanation of the 
majority of cognitive findings (Huntsinger & Clore, 2007; Storbeck & Clore, 2007). Although 
these models can account for a variety of findings, they do not provide a clear mechanism 
(beyond “processing style”) for the phenomena observed when people are in positive or negative 
moods. This suggests that the relationship between mood and cognition is not only complex but 
that it may be less direct than assumed and, perhaps, mediated by a phenomenon that remains 
elusive. 
It is possible, then, that the field lacks a single model that fully integrates the breadth of 
findings in the mood-cognition literature because there may be an indirect relationship involving 
this third, unknown intermediary variable between mood and cognition. Additionally, while 
negative states may exert an “inhibiting effect” on individuals, exactly what the mechanism is 
that drives the inhibition and what this inhibition process affects remain unclear. Specifically, 
this unnamed variable may not only contribute to the mood-cognition interaction, but it may also 
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unify the seemingly paradoxical effects of specific mood states benefitting and, at the same time, 
hindering select aspects of cognition described in the literature. 
Semantic networks refer to the organization of stored conceptual (i.e., semantic) 
information, and their activity contributes greatly to linguistic functions, working memory (more 
specifically, phonological loop activity), and learning and memory (Collins & Loftus, 1975). 
Interestingly, differences in the organization and interconnectedness of stored conceptual 
information (i.e., the structure of semantic networks) may exist between materials of dissimilar 
emotional valence (Bless, Schwarz, & Wieland, 1996; Bower, 1981; Madigan & Bollenbach, 
1982; Yeh & Hua, 2009), and, therefore, may represent the intermediary variable between mood 
and cognition. Disparities in processing dissimilarly-valenced information have been 
investigated as the basis for differences in processing styles across the mood spectrum, which 
has yielded the expected conclusions already described: generally, happier moods are thought to 
engage greater cognitive resources leading to a propensity for top-down, heuristic processes, 
whereas depressed moods engage fewer resources allowing for bottom-up, detailed analytic 
processing. The processing style-centered focus in examining the mood-cognition interaction is 
complex and may neglect primary factors that could significantly contribute to these effects. 
Semantic network activity may potentially be one such factor acting as the intermediate process 
between mood and cognition, given its role in the various cognitive skills that appear to be 
affected by mood (Emmorey, 2002). Further, depressive neuropsychological profiles involve 
limited and ruminative thought content (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008; 
Segerstrom, Tsao, Alden, & Craske, 2000), reduced verbal output and generativity, and poorer 
phonological loop activity in verbal encoding (Daneman & Merikle, 1996). Thus, the “inhibiting 
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effect” could very well be centralized to inhibition of semantic network activity in such negative 
states. 
Prior research has failed to investigate the extent to which activity within semantic 
networks contributes to the mood-cognition interaction. Executive functions are a set of 
cognitive abilities that work to direct cognition, and, thus, represent an important starting point in 
examining mood-cognition relationships and the effects that semantic activity plays in them. 
Therefore, the goal of this study was to examine the role of semantic network activity in 
executive functions across basic trait mood states (i.e., positive or negative) in the general 
population.  A range of executive abilities were assessed via standardized neuropsychological 
tests in individuals reporting a range of mood symptoms, which categorized individuals into 
mood groups.  In addition, specialized analyses were applied to the results of an auditory naming 
task and a category fluency task to examine semantic network activity. To date, similar analyses 
have been used to describe populations with neuropsychiatric conditions that are non-remitting 
and usually progressive and/or severe (see Chan et al., 1993; Chan et al., 1995; Paulsen et al., 
1996). The findings of these procedures were entered into a statistical model to understand the 
extent to which semantic network activity drives the effect of mood on executive function in the 
general population. It is hoped that the results of this work will improve understanding of the 
mood-cognition interaction, and serve as the basis for future research of the utility of semantic 
network activity measures in cognitive science and clinical practice in conditions in which 
semantic network systems are affected. 
 
The Role of Emotions 
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 Emotions have eluded definition since well before James (1884) attempted to describe 
them. There remains recent discussion of the differences among emotion, affect, mood, and 
feelings (Barrett, 2006; Russell, 1980; Russell & Barrett, 1999); despite this distinction, these 
terms are generally used interchangeably throughout this document. 
Emotions represent discrete affective states. According to the circumplex model (Russell, 
1980), emotions are experienced along two dimensions: 1) valence (i.e., pleasantness), and 2) 
arousal. Emotions are, thus, thought to represent evolutionary signals that alert us to the 
attentional and behavioral demands of a situation. They give us important information used in 
decision-making (Wyer & Carlston, 1979) and act as alarms for when situations require action or 
when such situations resolve/no longer require action (Frijda, 1988). Emotions typically arise 
from a clear, distinct object or situation (e.g., feeling sad due to the death of a friend) (Clore & 
Ortony, 2000; Lazarus, 1980); however, emotions or their causes can be unconscious, making 
such attributions unnecessary or superfluous (Winkielman & Berridge, 2004). 
Moods, conversely, are traditionally defined as free-floating affective states that typically 
lack a clear identifiable object or situation, but importantly, can still convey informative value 
and influence cognitive processing styles (Clore et al., 2001). Specifically, moods, conscious or 
otherwise, tell us about our environments, the things we find in them, and the situations in them 
in which we find ourselves. In other words, we sometimes experience feelings or moods that 
appear objectless (e.g., when one can state “I am feeling sad today.”). Schwarz and Clore (1983) 
theorized in their “affect-as-information” hypothesis that the informative value contained in 
affective (mood) states, that is, how we feel about things, serves to influence our decisions, 
judgments, and future behaviors. The subjective “goodness” of things, experiences, and 
situations can be gleaned from our affective states, which informs us about our internal appraisal 
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processes of these things (Clore & Tamir, 2002). Given that moods may reflect these states and 
serve as the basis for consciously or unconsciously judging value, emotions work as motivational 
forces towards or away from action (Schwarz & Bohner, 1996). 
As such, it is clear that emotions and moods are very likely to affect cognitive skills, and 
vice versa. Indeed, both top-down and bottom-up processes have major roles in emotional 
experiences, and specific experiences likely have unique signatures involving differing 
proportions of top-down and bottom-up factors (Clore & Ortony, 2000). The effect of emotion 
on specific cognitive skills is described in the so-entitled subsection below. 
While emotions may represent universal signals for approach or avoidance, there may be 
great variability between specific affective states experienced within and between individuals.  
For example, the happiness experienced by winning a game of chess is likely to differ from that 
experienced by the same person after winning the lottery. Similarly, the sadness felt grieving a 
spouse is probably distinct between two different recently widowed individuals. This fact has 
been well characterized by Gohm and Clore (2002), who reported that the individual differences 
between emotional experiences are numerous and can be found between different aspects of 
emotional experiences, including their clarity, intensity, and expression. In the same vein, there 
must be similar variability within and between individuals regarding cognition and the 
contribution of mood to cognitive functioning. 
 Despite the variability in emotional experience, people generally have good insight into 
their affective states. Self-report has been shown to be effective in measuring emotional 
experience (Clore, 1994). However, it is important to note that this is not always the case. Self-
report may result in (inadvertently) biased reporting, as generating responses may depend on the 
accessibility of factors that are contributory to mood (Robinson & Clore, 2002). Similarly, 
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experimental evidence suggests that the experience of emotion may be confined by linguistic 
abilities and processes (Bann, 2012; Barrett, 2006; Lindquist, Barrett, Bliss-Moreau, & Russell, 
2006). These may be crucial aspects to understanding the interaction between emotion and 
cognition: 1) the semantic processes involved in conceptualizing emotion and cognitive thought 
(i.e., the factors that allow for appraisal of self, items, situations, and experiences), and 2) the 
accessibility of these emotional and cognitive factors. These aspects, in particular, as they relate 
to executive functions, served as main areas of study for this research. 
 
Models of the Mood-Cognition Interaction 
 A number of models have been put forth to describe the effect of mood on cognition. The 
two most comprehensive models emerged in the first half of the 1980s, however, they spawned 
differing lines of research. The first model, described by Bower (1981), is a theory reliant on 
semantic networks of stored conceptual knowledge, with much of the research focused on the 
effects of mood on memory. The second model, as already described in the section above, was 
put forth by Schwarz and Clore (1983), and it focuses on the informational value of moods and 
the effects they exert on judgments and decision-making, and has served as the basis of various 
derivatives of this kind of processing model that have been proposed, as well (see Bless, 2001; 
Forgas, 2005; Martin, 2001). These models, respectively, the Network Theory of Affect and the 
Cognitive Tuning model (which is heavily reliant on the affect-as-information hypothesis), are 
described in greater detail below.  
 The Network Theory of Affect (Bower, 1981) 
 Using prior theoretical discussions of semantic network as a structure of conceptual 
information, Bower (1981) attempted to describe the effect of mood on memory. Citing semantic 
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network models of memory (Quillian, 1967) and semantic processing (Collins & Loftus, 1975) 
that were derived by cognitive psychologists trying to understand how general information is 
mentally organized, Bower’s model assumes that activation of internalized concepts spreads 
throughout semantic networks from active concepts to associated, inactive concepts. His model 
further posits that the linguistic labels used to describe affective states represent nodes within 
semantic networks and that subjective affective experiences serve to activate these nodes and 
spread to closely related, mood-congruent nodes (i.e., within the proximate semantic 
neighborhood surrounding an emotion node). For instance, thinking about death may activate 
related semantic concepts, emotional memories, autonomic patterns, and expressive behaviors 
and may inhibit other emotional nodes (e.g., happiness). Bower, thus, expected two effects 
according to his model: mood-dependent retrieval and mood-congruent memory. 
 Mood-dependent retrieval refers to increased effectiveness in recalling memories when 
an individual’s affective state matches that originally experienced during encoding.    
Results from studies of mood-dependent memory research in adult and child populations are 
mixed (Blaney, 1986). For example, mood-dependent recall of positive and negative stimuli may 
be necessary for children’s social learning and their ability to regulate mood (Nasby & Yando, 
1982). There additionally exists some evidence that in adults, thoughts related to emotions are 
activated by positive moods but less so for negative moods, which may be related to emotion 
regulation (Mackie & Worth, 1989). However, it is assumed that mood regulation and social 
learning are mastered by adulthood, calling into question the need for mood dependence in 
adults. As demonstrated by Eich and colleagues (1989; 1994), mood-dependent memory may 
rely on internal versus external cues. In their studies, Eich et al. argued that after mood induction, 
external events and their outcomes are more likely to be remembered than internal events, such 
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as an individual’s affective state or reasoning processes. However, these researchers found that it 
was internal events that appeared to be more closely tied to mood and were possibly affected by 
mood induction-related arousal. It is, therefore, unclear whether the mood dependence 
phenomenon is due to mood rather than to arousal states (especially in less significant changes in 
mood), or to the interaction between mood and arousal. 
The second prediction according to Bower’s model, that is, mood-congruent memory, 
which presumes that current moods determine the affective association of memories recalled, has 
yielded stronger support. For example, mood congruent effects have been reported in the speed 
of recall for unpleasant or pleasant events after a mood-congruent induction (Teasdale & 
Fogarty, 1979). Thus, individuals induced into a positive affective state were faster to recall 
events that were positive than negative (or neutral). Unfortunately, instead of a perfect crossover 
interaction, in which positive moods would facilitate positive memories and negative moods 
would facilitate negative memories, inconsistent effects were often found. Namely, positive 
affect increased the recall of positive memories, but negative affect did not increase the recall of 
negative memories. Thus, these effects might be explained by non-mood factors and may be 
difficult to detect in everyday experiences, which is true in both clinical and healthy samples 
(Mayer, McCormick, & Strong, 1995). Alternatively, it is possible that because Bower’s 
Network model assumes that emotions function as nodes within the network that are at more 
regularly active than non-emotional nodes (Matthews & Southall, 1991), this leads to activity 
traces towards proximate, or more closely-related, nodes within the network as activity spreads 
(McClelland & Rumelhardt, 1981), potentially causing the blending of emotional to non-
emotional nodes (Ingram, 1984). These results also obscure Bower’s mood-congruent memory 
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predictions; as Bower (1987), himself, concedes in his commentary, via multiple lines of 
research, the Network Theory of Affect falls short. 
While support for the Network Theory is weak, this may reflect biases in the tasks used 
to assess this model. As pointed out by Lewis and Critchley (2003), semantic network models 
may have a neural basis, and emotional memory nodes must connect to various nodes (including 
the emotion itself, associated autonomic and overt behavioral responses, and other situations 
related to the emotion). Though it would be quite difficult to demonstrate that emotional 
memories interact with mood states or the directionality of the interaction as either positive or 
negative, as these authors suggest, it is possible that the field has relied too heavily on outdated 
predictions of this model. Specifically, the expectation of mood-congruent effects and mood-
dependent memory, and the assumption that emotions, themselves, represent active network 
nodes during subjective affective experience may be inaccurate. 
 Cognitive Tuning Model 
 The most compelling model that seeks to explain the interaction between mood and 
cognition involves a process known as cognitive tuning. Cognitive tuning refers to the belief that 
distinct, everyday situations require different processing demands. As such, situational demands 
influence our emotional responses to the situation and direct attentional/cognitive resources to 
deal with these demands (Rusting, 1998; Schwarz, 2002). More succinctly, as Schwarz (2002) 
explains, affective feelings alarm us to what situations require. Moreover, experienced feelings 
may precede cognitions (McLemee, 2003) and need not be cognitively attributed to the stimuli 
that elicit them (Schwarz & Clore, 2003). 
 An essential hypothesis of this model was described by Schwarz and Clore (1983) as 
“affect-as-information.” This view differentiates between effects on judgments and those on 
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cognitive processing. Judgment effects suggest that affective states serve as a basis for judging 
the way one feels about something, therefore, representing information regarding what is 
important/salient or not important/salient, liked or disliked, or valued positively or negatively 
(Clore & Palmer, 2009; Clore & Schnall, 2005). Processing effects suggest that affective states 
serve as information about how one is performing on a task, signaling whether the current 
processing style is either sufficient or problematic. Therefore, affective feelings provide 
feedback from appraisal processes that is contextually useful. This has been supported by studies 
of individuals with different feedback-integrating capacities: those adept at applying affective 
feedback demonstrate enhanced functioning (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2004), and individuals 
who are unable to integrate this feedback (e.g., due to brain damage) demonstrate impaired 
judgment and decision-making (Damasio, 1994). 
 Multiple lines of behavioral research have lent support to this hypothesis, as well. There 
is much evidence to suggest that affect regulates multiple cognitive domains. These include 
global/local processing (Gasper & Clore, 2002; Schwarz & Clore, 2007), semantic priming 
(Storbeck & Clore, 2005), heuristic “schema-based” memory (Bless, Clore, Galisano, Rabe, & 
Wolk, 1996), stereotyping (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994), and false memories 
(Storbeck & Clore, 2005). While these effects are readily seen in positive moods, non-
pathological sad moods, on the other hand, may not induce such noteworthy responses and may 
even reduce such common cognitive phenomena (e.g., reduce semantic priming; see Forgas, 
2013; Storbeck & Clore, 2007; and for a discussion of the effects of pathological sad moods, 
refer to the Depression subsection below). In sum, positive affect enhances dominant styles of 
processing resulting in broadened cognition (Frederickson & Branigan, 2005), flexibility (Ashby 
et al., 1999), and creativity (Erez & Isen, 2002; Fielder, 2001) and promotes heuristic or 
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relational processing, whereas negative affect promotes analytic or referential processing (Clore 
& Huntsinger, 2007; Gasper, 2000; Schwarz & Bless, 1991; Storbeck & Clore, 2007). 
While the Network and Cognitive Tuning models may appear disjointed in regard to their 
focus, they ultimately share a key feature: they describe the access of knowledge as it is affected 
by mood. Concept access appears to be influenced by mood, with positive moods increasing 
access and negative moods decreasing access, and may be crucial to our understanding of the 
interaction between mood and various cognitive skills. 
 
The Effect of Mood on Concept Access 
 The effect of mood on cognition has been well documented. Bower (1983) put forth three 
general conclusions that mood states 1) influence learning and memory systems, 2) direct 
attentional resources, and 3) affect a wide range of cognitive skills. These claims, in a very 
general sense, summarize and underscore findings from much of the mood-cognition literature 
published well before and well after Bower’s work: in specific contexts, information processing 
and a multitude of specific cognitive skills are influenced by mood (Friedman & Forster, 2010; 
Schwarz & Clore, 2007). 
 Easterbrook (1959) hypothesized that arousal states, which are an important component 
of emotional experiences, affect the scope of attentional focus. Various bodies of research have 
indicated that this hypothesis accurately predicts constricted, or the narrowing of, perceptual 
abilities across various modalities in high arousal/negative valence states (Burke, Heuer, & 
Reisberg, 1992; Cacioppo, Berntson, & Crites, 1996; Tyler & Tucker, 1981). This narrowing of 
attention is widely considered to be adaptive, as moderate levels of psychological stress may 
intensify motivation, recruit complex problem-solving resources (Andrews & Thomson, 2009), 
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and narrow focus to stimulus-based properties (i.e., identify and/or select dangerous entities in 
the environment). It is intuitive that arousal and, to a lesser extent, negative valence may signal 
potentially problematic situations (Schwarz, 1990), as they require narrowed focus at the expense 
of extraneous details or broadened attention, which shields one from distraction. However, there 
is recent debate and evidence for whether an emotion such as desire, which is marked by a 
positive valence and high arousal/intensity, can also narrow attention, suggesting that narrowed 
attention may not be specific to negative/high arousal states per se (see Harmon-Jones & Gable, 
2010) and that similar cognitive and attentional effects should arise in negative, high arousing 
states. Conversely, positive or low arousing affect may signal safety and exploration, which may 
allow for the broadening of attention and one’s scope of focus, as well as for updating mental 
representations (Friedman & Forster, 2010). An intriguing theory in support of this was put forth 
by Dreisbach and Goshcke (2004; 2006), who suggested that positive affect increases 
distractibility rather than attentional maintenance or perseveration.   
Indeed, positive mood states have been shown to broaden the scope of attention by 
focusing on the global rather than local features of a stimulus (Frederickson & Branigan, 2005; 
Gasper & Clore, 2002), as indicated by reduced peripheral suppression of visual stimuli (Rowe, 
Hirsch, & Anderson, 2007) and greater interference on a visual Flanker task in which 
respondents are asked to ignore peripheral stimuli (Rowe et al., 2007). Isen and her colleagues 
(1984, 1985, 1987) demonstrated that positive moods led to more inclusive categorization 
decisions in auditory semantic tasks and increased creativity in remote association tasks, both of 
which require greater accessibility of stored conceptual information (Dreisbach & Goshcke, 
2004; Nadler, Rabi, & Minda, 1995, 2010; Rowe et al., 2007; Schooler & Melcher, 1995) and/or 
facilitation of processing distant semantic relationships (Federmeier, Kirson, Moreno, & Kutas, 
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2001). As one might expect, the inverse was also demonstrated via the work of Mikulincer, 
Kedem, and Paz (1990), who showed that negative moods led to reduced category inclusion. 
Taken together, these studies suggest that mood states flexibly affect perceptual and cognitive 
performance and, perhaps, more importantly, conceptual activation (Huntsinger, 2013), while at 
the same time lending support to the processing-style effects described above (i.e., positive 
moods lead to relational processing while negative moods lead to referential processing). 
Conceptual activation, as Schwarz (1998) points out in his review, involves content called to 
mind and the ease at which this occurs, which functions as an important, albeit not completely 
understood, factor affecting cognition. The potential role of mood in conceptual access (i.e., 
target content called to mind) and activation (i.e., the spread of access to semantically-related 
content, including concepts that are proximal and those that are distal) serves as the basis of the 
semantic network activity-related hypotheses described in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, which is 
an extension of previously described models (Bower, Montiero, & Gilligan, 1978; Isen, Shalker, 
Clark, & Karp, 1978). 
 
The Effect of Mood on Specific Cognitive Functions 
 Multiple lines of research and decades of clinical findings have demonstrated that mood 
can significantly affect various cognitive functions. Among those most commonly described 
include the effects of mood on perception, memory, information processing, and 
frontal/executive functions; selected findings are discussed in the subsections below. 
 The Effect of Mood on Perception 
 Moods may affect sensory-perceptual processes. As Frederickson (2001) suggested, 
moods influence the attentional scope, which can influence perception. For example, cognitive 
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tasks, such as those described above, have shown that moods affect the global/local aspects of 
visual processing. This is further supported by EEG and fMRI studies reporting that the sensory 
encoding of visual stimuli may be facilitated by naturally occurring selective attention (Schupp, 
Junghofer, Weike, & Hamm, 2003). Moreover, fear (or high arousal states) appears to increase 
the perception of low spatial frequencies, which may benefit attention and navigation (Song & 
Keil, 2013; Susskind et al., 2008). However, perceptual effects are not limited to laboratory 
settings, as perception of the physical world appears to be susceptible to the effects of mood. 
Explicit judgments of hill steepness have been shown to be increased by mood following a sad 
mood induction (Reiner, Stefanucci, Proffitt, & Clore, 2003), hardship (such as the weight of a 
backpack; Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999), and fear (as induced by potential risk; Stefanucci, Proffitt, & 
Clore, 2005). Taken together, these findings suggest that affective reactions do indeed influence 
the manner in which sensory information is taken in and interpreted.  
The Effect of Mood on Memory 
 Mood has been shown to affect various forms of memory in both healthy individuals and 
individuals with depression. This section will review select findings of the effects mood exerts 
on explicit memory in healthy individuals. 
First, it is important to note that explicit memory involves the recall of information that is 
personal (i.e., autobiographical memory) and factual (i.e., semantic memory). Both systems 
appear to be influenced by mood, as dysphoric mood has been shown to reduce autobiographical 
and semantic memory, respectively, via autobiographical recall and lexical recognition memory 
paradigms (Ramponi, Barnard & Nimmo-Smith, 2004).  
 Autobiographical memory involves knowledge relating to the self, experienced events, 
and life episodes of varying duration. Various research paradigms have shown that this system is 
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clearly affected by mood. The Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 
1986) is a tool used to assess specificity in autobiographical memories and has been effective in 
demonstrating reduced episodic memory in sadder individuals (Yueng, Dalgleish, Golden, & 
Schartau, 2006). In addition, the content of autobiographical memories has been shown to be 
influenced by mood, as well. In a study of hypnosis-induced mood states, Natale and Hantas 
(1982) showed that negative moods led to increased negative and decreased positive 
autobiographical recall, whereas hypnosis-induced positive moods led to increased positive and 
decreased negative autobiographical recall. Though more recent findings suggest that induced 
negative moods often reveal no benefit of recalling positive or negative events, induced positive 
affect does lead to enhanced recall of positive, but not negative, events, thereby, revealing an 
asymmetric effect of mood on memory (see Blaney, 1986; Bower, 1987). These findings might 
suggest that the content of self-knowledge activated during recall and the clarity of that 
knowledge are influenced by mood. 
Semantic memory refers to learning and recall systems that deal with information that is 
factual and non-personal. While memory recall accuracy and performance speed typically do not 
reveal significant differences based on mood, there is some evidence of an effect of mood on 
semantic memory. In a study of learning brand names, Lee and Sternthal (1999) showed that 
individuals in positive moods demonstrated improved learning and clustering (i.e., relational 
processing). These authors suggest that novel information rehearsal may be enhanced in positive 
moods, which could be interpreted as improved phonological loop activity or a different effect 
that is not dissimilar to experiential openness or broadening in positive moods described above 
(or in Schwarz’s (2002) words, “playful exploration”). While this evidence may not be extremely 
powerful to suggest semantic memory is affected by mood, it is important to consider that mood 
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intensity and task demands are important in memory effects, and that low intensity moods, such 
as those that induction procedures typically yield, may exert minimally demonstrable effects 
(Ellis, 1985). 
Although semantic memory deals with facts that are known truths, insight as to how 
mood affects this system may be gleaned by examining errors. In particular, examining the 
literature related to the loss of known material (i.e., forgetting) and the construction of erroneous 
material (i.e., false memory) yield more evidence of such a relationship. Anderson, Bjork, and 
Bjork (1994) described retrieval-induced forgetting in characterizing prior list-learning studies 
that reported slower word recognition when participants were cued with semantically-related 
primes. This effect has been theorized as being due to suppression of unrelated words (i.e., 
within the same semantic neighborhood) or interference of a prepotent response to access words 
related to target semantic network nodes. Retrieval-induced forgetting has been shown to occur 
more frequently in positive moods as opposed to neutral or negative moods (Bauml & 
Kuhbandner, 2007), as has false memory construction (Storbeck & Clore, 2005). Reasonable 
arguments could be made that 1) the semantic memory system can be influenced by mood, and 
2) semantic network activity may contribute to this system’s functioning. These points have been 
supported by Storbeck and Clore (2005), who showed that music-induced negative moods led to 
reduced false memories in a Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, compared to 
individuals with induced positive or natural (i.e., non-manipulated) moods. These authors also 
suggest that this effect is a function of semantic access at encoding rather than enhanced 
monitoring during retrieval, which is a point further supported by event-related potential studies 
(for an example, see Kiefer, Schuch, Schenck, & Fielder, 2007) and semantic priming studies 
(Storbeck & Clore, 2008). While this does provide strong evidence that the semantic memory 
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system may be susceptible to mood effects, the results of the studies noted above should be 
approached cautiously. It is difficult to differentiate the influence of valence versus arousal, and 
in fact, the latter has been previously suggested as the most important factor in generating false 
memories in DRM paradigms, regardless of whether valence is positive or negative (Corson & 
Verrier, 2007). 
The Effect of Mood on Frontal/Executive Functions 
Frontal/executive functions comprise various cognitive skills, including attentional 
control, working memory, planning, decision-making, code switching, inhibition, error-
detection, and cognitive control. These functions clearly are quite mixed, and, as could be 
expected, research results pertaining to the effect of mood on these abilities are similarly mixed 
(and, at times, contradictory). However, a wealth of evidence supports the general conclusion 
that there is, indeed, an effect of mood on these skills (Chepenik, Cornew, & Farah, 2007; 
Oaksford, Morris, Grainger, & Williams, 1996; Phillips, Smith, & Gilhooly, 2002). One issue 
underlying inconsistent results is that investigations using clinical samples may be 
overrepresented. The studies discussed in this subsection focus on non-clinical samples; those 
involving clinical depression are discussed in the Depression subsection below. 
 Attention is generally considered a basic frontal lobe function. It involves sustained 
awareness and orientation to stimuli deemed important to task demands. It, therefore, likely 
contributes to a number of executive abilities, particularly those related to goal-oriented 
behavior. In examining the effect of mood on attention, McConnell and Shore (2011) used a 
musical mood-induction technique in addition to the Attention Network Test (Fan, McCandliss, 
Sommer, Raz, & Posner, 2002). Their findings suggest that both emotional arousal and 
emotional valence affect attention systems, though arousal appeared more important in directing 
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participants’ attention. This is intuitive if arousal is considered to be a signal of the urgency of a 
stimulus; situations involving threat of immediate harm demand immediate attention for survival. 
Because these situations are threatening, high arousal contexts are most probably associated with 
negatively valenced emotions. 
 Working memory involves holding and manipulating or using information in short-term 
storage. A variety of findings indicate an effect of mood on working memory. Gray (2001) 
showed a double dissociation between spatial and verbal working memory using equivalent 2-
back tasks. Specifically, he found enhanced spatial and impaired verbal working memory after 
induced negative states and impaired spatial and enhanced verbal working memory after induced 
positive states, arguing that emotion prioritizes the active goals that are maintained in working 
memory. Gray, Braver, and Raichle (2002) later presented imaging evidence supporting 
prefrontal integration of mood and working memory in a similar cognitive task. Their findings 
were interpreted to reveal the interconnectedness of emotional and cognitive task demands, such 
that the integration of these factors reflects the psychological load necessary to maintain and 
address these demands. Similarly, Storbeck and colleagues (2015) used mood induction and a 2-
back task to expand on the negative-spatial/positive-verbal effect. They showed that emotion and 
task incompatibility (i.e., positive/spatial & negative/verbal) required greater cognitive effort and 
increased behavioral control and that they may have led to increased negative affect. Thus, there 
appears to be a clear link between emotion, working memory, and cognitive control processes 
involved in addressing situational demands. Cognitive control refers to the processes that direct 
information-processing flexibly (Posner & Snyder, 1975), which functions to regulate attention, 
working memory, inhibition, and self-monitoring. One way in which control is assessed is via 
tasks that require working memory abilities while preventing interference (Conway et al, 2005), 
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such as the operation span task (OSPAN; Turner & Engle, 1989).  Research involving these tasks 
has shown that working memory capacity involves greater attentional control (in general, and 
when necessary, to resist interference), as opposed to memory storage (Engle, 2002; Kane & 
Engle, 2000; Unsworth & Engle, 2005). Generally, cognitive control is believed to be enhanced 
in positive mood states (Yuan et al., 2011). For example, positive moods may enhance verbal 
(Yang, Yang, & Isen, 2012) or spatial working memory span (Storbeck & Maswood, 2016). 
These between-domain differences can be interpreted to demonstrate that the effects of mood 
influence cognitive control rather than specific frontal abilities. This supports Gray’s (2001) 
claim that cognitive resources that are typically dedicated to control functions may be allocated 
differentially depending on present mood states. For example, Martin and Kerns (2011) reported 
that while controlled working memory storage may be reduced in positive states, inhibitory 
processes assessed using Stroop (Stroop, 1935) and Flanker (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) tasks may 
not. Others, however, have found positive moods to lead to greater Stroop interference (Philips, 
Bull, Adams, & Fraser, 2002). This finding is similar to those cited in studies mentioned above, 
in that positivity has been shown to induce relational processing, whereas negative moods appear 
to favor item-specific processing (Storbeck & Clore, 2005). Thus the affect-as-information 
perspective may be useful in understanding the effects of mood on working memory and 
cognitive control: broadened processing may benefit verbal tasks, and narrow, detail-oriented 
processing may benefit spatial tasks, and congruity between affective states and task demands 
may play an important role in effort, performance, and subsequent affect (i.e., that which is 
reactive to task difficulty, performance, etc.). 
The effects of negative emotional states on cognition are varied and generally task- 
and/or context-specific. As above, negative moods can impair cognitive skills, such as the type 
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of flexible thinking involved in solving syllogisms (Radenhausen & Anker, 1988), the skills 
involved in integrating environmental feedback and self-monitoring (Davis & Nolen, Hoeksema, 
2000), and the skills involved in verbal generativity (Bartolic, Basso, Schefft, Glauser, & 
Titanic-Schefft, 1999). However, although some of these abilities may play a role in executive 
control, evidence exists to suggest that negative moods exert minimal effects on executive 
control (Mitchell & Phillips, 2007), which may be on par with neutral moods in tasks requiring 
proactive or reactive control (Dreisbach, 2006; Martin & Kerns, 2011). On the other hand, 
negative moods have been shown to improve performance on tasks requiring reactive control 
after errors are made (Kuhbander & Zehetleitner, 2011; van Steenbergen, Band, & Hommel, 
2010), which would be consistent with the idea that negative affect works to signal that 
something is wrong in the environment and that processing must be slowed (or inhibited) to 
identify and further understand whatever problematic aspects of the environment exist. Thus, the 
influence of negative affect should be considered nuanced, as these states may, at times, exert 
little to no effect on executive functions, and at other times, enhance or impair select aspects of 
these functions (Storbeck & Maswood, 2016). 
Verbal generativity is of particular interest and has reliably been shown to be affected by 
mood. Generally speaking, negative moods typically result in poorer performance on semantic 
fluency tasks (Baker, Frith, & Dolan, 1997). However, these results should be examined closely 
to appreciate the scope of what is meant by the term “fluency.” Prior work has shown that 
individuals in negative moods may perform no differently than individuals in positive or neutral 
moods on letter fluency tests (Carvalho, 2008; Clark, Iverson, & Goodwin, 2001) and better on 
figural fluency tasks (Bartolic et al., 1999). It would, therefore, appear that negative moods are 
not necessarily associated with retrieval difficulties, but rather with reduced access to the 
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semantic concepts required in category fluency tasks. As previously suggested, semantic 
processing plays an important role in cognitive functions, especially in the skills assessed via 
lexical tasks (Ellis, Thomas, & Rodriguez, 1984). As Seibert and Ellis (1991) argued, positive 
moods lead to greater activation of mood-salient, but task-irrelevant concepts. This would be 
consistent with the proposed model stating that semantic network activity contributes to the 
interaction between mood and executive function. Specifically, positive moods may lead to 
broadened, relational processing via greater semantic concept activation, whereas negative 
moods may lead to narrowed, analytic processing via restricted semantic activation, which has 
major implications for executive abilities. 
 
Greater Detail on the Importance of Executive Functions to Cognition 
Executive functions refer to a set of specific cognitive abilities generally believed to be 
related to goal-directed behaviors, which exert a supervisory role in overall cognition (Gilbert & 
Burgess, 2008). These include planning and executing behaviors, judgment, abstract reasoning, 
cognitive/task set-shifting, inhibition, problem-solving, and working memory (Brandt et al., 
2009; Huizinga, Dolan, & van der Molen, 2006; Miyake, Freidman, Emerson, Witzki, & 
Howerter, 2000). Although these skills are unified in a global cognitive context, they are thought 
to be diverse and potentially separable. Despite this potential separability, executive function is 
greater than the sum of its discrete parts, especially in dealing with conceptual information, as 
indicated by recent meta-analyses (Alvarez & Emory, 2006; Carpenter, Just, & Reichle, 2000). 
If these skills must act in concert, what exactly do they do? Despite varied theories of 
executive function, there is good conceptual overlap as to their purpose. Many of these theories 
posit that executive functions activate schemas in routine and non-routine mental processes. In 
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other words, these abilities direct attentional resources to meet the demands of a situation (and 
when necessary, do so above the demands of one’s inner mental or emotional state, or other 
“local” considerations), to organize complex thought and prioritize goals (Bull, Phillips, & 
Conway, 2007; Miller & Wallis, 2009). As Miller and Wallis (2009) stated, executive functions 
“take charge” of cognition to coordinate lower-level (e.g., sensory and motor functions) and 
higher-level cognitive functions (e.g., memory and planning) as an intermediary and arbitrator 
between these processes. Specifically, executive functions should be considered paramount, out 
of all the abilities that cognition comprises, to tuning and directing cognitive resources, thoughts, 
and behaviors for successful adaptation to the environment. 
Evolutionarily and developmentally, these notions are crucial. In studies of early 
childhood, executive functions are reliably found to be necessary for intact social function and, 
specifically, in perspective-taking and selection (Qureshi, Apperly, & Samson, 2010). Further, 
this allows for learning and integrating information, both experientially and socially, to be 
applied in future novel situations (Zelazo, Craik, & Booth, 2004). A Piagetian perspective shows 
that these abilities develop to control action; “embodied cognition” (i.e., information learning in 
the sensorimotor period) leads to procedural learning and affects semantic memory acquisition 
(Best & Miller, 2010; Koziol, Budding, & Chidekel, 2012). Later stages of cognitive 
development in childhood deal with the organization and integration of this knowledge and are 
characterized by the emergence of skills related to working memory and inhibitory control 
processes, which may continue to develop well into adulthood (Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002; 
Steinberg, 2007). Further, inhibitory control over thoughts and actions has been implicated in 
studies using a “Less is More” reward-based decisional paradigm, in which individuals shown 
two quantities are instructed to point to the smaller quantity in order to receive the larger quantity 
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as a reward. In studies using this paradigm in preschool-aged children, results suggest that 
performance may represent a function of the semantic processing of the symbolic distance of the 
key points of the task instructions (i.e., choosing the smaller quantity to receive the larger 
quantity requires processing the disparity between wanting the larger quantity but choosing the 
smaller quantity, and inhibiting prepotent behavioral responses to indicate that the larger quantity 
is desired). This processing is believed to be akin to verbal abilities related to internal-state 
language used in inner reasoning skills, beyond what would be expected based on vocabulary 
size alone (Carlson, Davis, & Leach, 2005; Carlson, Mandell, & Williams, 2004). Thus, early 
development may be characterized as a period in which the links between executive functions, 
linguistic abilities, and other cognitive functions are established. 
 These links, however, may break down or disintegrate in late-life development. For 
instance, fronto-striatal age-related changes may reduce executive abilities, yielding reduced 
memory and cognitive reserve in late life (Alvarez & Emory, 2006; Buckner, 2004; Gunning-
Dixon & Raz, 2000; Volkow et al., 1998). Indeed, executive functions have been found to be 
more powerful predictors in elderly functional decline and mortality than overall cognition 
(Johnson, Liu, & Yaffe 2007), and they appear to be the most greatly affected cognitive ability in 
aging (Treitz, Heyder, & Daum, 2007). Specifically, executive decline may be used to 
psychometrically predict various changes that occur in aging, such as: 1) gait dysfunction and 
postural instability, 2) global cognition and memory decrement (to the level of differentiating 
healthy, impaired, and demented individuals who are similarly aged), and 3) the conversion of 
Mild Cognitive Impairment to frank dementia (Brandt et al., 2009; Ijmker & Lamoth, 2012; 
Mugas, Reed, & Kramer, 2003; Yogev, Huasdorff, & Giladi, 2008). 
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In sum, executive functions are important and critical to successful goal completion. 
They are state-dependent, as shown in behavioral and neurochemical investigations (see Robbins 
& Arnsten, 2009), and have major implications for individuals’ functioning. This is highlighted 
throughout various fields of research: these skills are compromised in various clinical 
syndromes, including schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, depression, substance abuse disorder, and 
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and they may be the strongest predictors of independence 
and health outcomes (Banich, 2009; Hanks, Rapport, Millis, & Deshpande, 1999; Snyder, 2013; 
Watkins & Brown, 2002; Wells & Matthews, 1996). 
 Given these findings, their role in situationally-based cognitive tuning, and potential 
linguistic aspects, executive functions were chosen as the focus for the current research. While 
much of the following material in this chapter discusses the interaction between mood and 
overall cognition, the reader’s attention should be oriented to the leading role played by 
executive function. 
 
The Relationship of Language to Mood and Cognition 
 As noted in the Overview above, it is believed that mood and cognition are inseparable. 
Language and thought are viewed by many as inseparable as well (Carruthers, 2012; Chomsky, 
1997; Perlovsky, 2009; Seleskovitch, 1978). A number of essential questions exist related to 
language and cognition. Do we think in words? Are semantic labels representative of our 
thoughts or reflective of communicative needs? Does semantic meaning change as cognition 
matures? These enduring questions are beyond the scope of this work, but they reflect 
philosophical questions posed even since ancient times. 
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Language acts as a bridge between the self and the world and the self and others. 
Information is taken in from the world, and in an effort to understand, or more simply, organize 
this information, it becomes linguistically labelled. Semantic labels have personal meanings, 
which may be idiosyncratic; however, on the whole, language is consensual (Rosch, 1973; 
Tversky, 1977). Language allows for the understanding of inner needs, thoughts, beliefs, and 
feelings, and it allows these things to be communicated to other individuals, who are able to 
understand the communication because they have independently internalized corresponding 
conceptual information and applied similar semantic labels to it. 
Language, like emotion, is powerful and can affect cognition. It can affect visual 
(Davidoff, 2001; Lucy, 1997; van Brakel, 1993) and spatial perception (Levinson, 1996; 
Pederson, Danziger, Wilkins, & Senft, 1998), as well as cognitive concept formation and 
organization (Steels & Belpaeme, 2005; Zhang & Nisbett, 2004). Language also can influence 
the understanding of phenomenological experience, such as our affective states (Pons, Lawson, 
Harris, & De Rosnay, 2003; Wellman, Harris, Banerjee, & Sinclair, 1995). Emotions are abstract 
and their linguistic processing requires accessibility and/or imaginability. As such, a number of 
research studies have examined emotional words and the ways in which they affect cognition. 
 Emotional words are processed differently than concrete words (Altarriba & Bauer, 2007) 
and they can, therefore, lead to unique priming effects. Lexical decision tasks have been used to 
show that controlled and automatic priming and encoding of emotional words are affected by 
various factors, including mood (Matthews, Pitcaithly, & Mann, 1995). In a series of studies 
using lexical decision tasks, it was found that semantic evaluation precedes affective evaluation, 
and affective information may be a subset or subordinate category within the semantic network 
(Storbeck & Clore, 2007; Storbeck & Robinson, 2004; Storbeck, Robinson, Ram, Meier, & 
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Clore, 2004), suggesting that these processes share a similar mechanism (Kemp, Wheeler, & 
Hill, 1992; Klauer & Musch, 2002). As suggested by Storbeck and Clore (2007), identification 
should be necessary to retrieve evaluative information, as identification must tap into semantic 
knowledge for accurate processing and emotional responding. Moreover, inductions of positive 
states may facilitate both semantic and affective priming (i.e., accessibility to semantic/affective 
concepts), whereas induced negative states may reduce such forms of priming (Storbeck & 
Clore, 2008).  
As evidence from prior research supports, linguistic processing is crucial to cognitive and 
emotional experiences. Linguistic priming has been shown to affect cognitive processing of 
others’ emotions (Lindquist, Feldman Barrett, Bliss-Moreau, & Russell, 2006). This is intuitive 
from a basic priming standpoint; activated (i.e., primed) concepts should affect downstream 
conceptual access as activation spreads to related concepts. Perrig and Perrig’s (1988) research 
on encoding and retrieval of novel semantic information yielded similar findings. They 
stimulated moods, using linguistic procedures rather than typical mood induction procedures, 
and found mood-congruent memory effects as originally predicted by Bower (1981).  Further, 
mood-congruent effects have been found in emotional Stroop tasks after mood-induction 
procedures as well (Gilboa-Schechtman, Revelle, & Gotlib, 2000). Thus, affective biases may 
underlie differences in mood-congruity findings in the mood-cognition literature, especially on 
tasks involving linguistic components. Additionally, these findings, together, suggest that 
specific cognitive concepts may be associated with emotional states and that these states may be 
essential to our understanding of abstract concepts. These ideas are further supported by fMRI 




 Much of these findings, at least partially, support predictions of the Network Theory of 
Affect, but were actually reported well after that model had largely fallen out of favor. Given 
these findings and the apparent interconnectedness of emotion, cognition, and language, a 
semantic network-based model of the emotion-cognition interaction is plausible. Bower’s 
original theory, however, failed to appreciate the breadth of cognitive functions that are 
linguistically based and affected by mood. Another fatal shortcoming of his model was the 
assumption that emotional experiences represent semantic network nodes. Although one may 
have internalized cognitive concepts surrounding emotions, the phenomenological experience of 
emotion may not necessarily activate these concepts. For example, one might cognitively know 
that sadness is associated with crying and anhedonia, but when feeling sad, these may not be 
subjectively experienced nor conceptually accessed. This idea has been previously argued by 
Wenzlaff, Wegner, and Klein (1991) in their study using musical mood induction in a cognitive 
thought-suppression paradigm. Their findings revealed that thoughts and moods may become 
bound to each other, both in experience and expression, further suggesting that emotions are a 
phenomenological experience that can call up concepts, as opposed to acting as singular 
conceptual nodes themselves as in Bower’s semantic network model. 
 
Semantic Networks: Organization, Activity, and their Assessment 
 Semantic networks reflect theoretical systems that store factual information and 
conceptual knowledge. Their structure is both hierarchical and associative, such that activated 
nodes (i.e., concepts that are accessed) can direct switching and clustering of cognitive concepts 
(Goni et al., 2011; Scott, 1962). Switching and clustering reflect increased levels of 
sophistication in thought and language use throughout childhood, as individuals build and 
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explore these internalized semantic networks (Sauzeon, Lestage, Raboutet, N’Koaua, & 
Claverie, 2004). 
Language is learned through assimilation and accommodation processes similar to 
Piaget’s concept formation in the late sensorimotor stage (Piaget, 1954). Semantics refers to the 
language-specific linguistic labels that are given to these concepts. They are believed to be 
constructed into a network that is held together by associations between them that including 
similarity (i.e., synonymy), dissimilarity (i.e., antonymy), and gradation (i.e., qualitative 
similarity and dissimilarity). Specific concepts are likely to have unique neurological signatures, 
like perceptions and actions, because the thoughts that access them involve specific activity 
patterns across neural networks. Additionally, concepts can be activated combinatorially and, 
perhaps, more importantly, associatively, because the emergence of thoughts involves 
combinations of existing concepts (Marupaka, Iyer, & Minai, 2012). 
The organization of semantic networks differs between individuals. For one, semantic 
network organization is influenced by culture (Slobin, 1991). In an analysis of dissemination 
style of important figures’ transcripts in addressing groups, Jang and Barnett (1994) were able to 
differentiate American and Japanese speakers with complete accuracy. Similar results were 
obtained in a study of native Danish second-language learners’ understanding and use of English 
adjectives, as measured by categorization tasks (Haastrup & Henriksen, 2000). In addition, the 
idiosyncratic organization of semantic networks differs between individuals, regardless of 
culture. Using a divided visual-field task to examine laterality in emotion word-processing, 
Atchley, Ilardi, and Enloe (2003) found that depressed and previously depressed individuals 
were faster to correctly categorize negative words than were never-depressed participants. 
According to these authors, this finding suggests that the organization of semantic networks 
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differs between individuals varying in affective experience. Integrity of these structures is 
necessary for controlled spread of semantic network activity, which is essential to cognitive 
functioning, both in human and computer models (Chan, Salmon, & De La Pina, 2000; Cohen & 
Kjeldsen, 1987). 
The organization of semantic networks is important because it guides activity within 
these networks. Because activity is associative and propagative, it should be characterized as 
having at least two major mechanisms. The first of which is termed semantic network access 
throughout this work, and it refers to the selection of specific, target conceptual nodes. If a 
concept is necessary to a task, activity should spread selectively toward it from related active 
concepts, so that the target node itself will become active. Conversely, the second mechanism, 
termed semantic network activation throughout this work, refers to the non-selective spread of 
activity away from activated (i.e., accessed) concepts to related, inactive concepts. Semantic 
network activity, as characterized by measures of semantic network access and activation, is of 
particular interest and served as the basis for exploratory analyses between mood and executive 
functions in the current research. 
Semantic Network Access 
Access to specific concepts involves selection of symbolic, lexical representations (i.e., 
semantic network nodes) (Bock, 1982; Bock & Levelt, 1994; Caramazza, 1997). Within 
semantic networks, lexical representations are encoded to produce a hierarchical structure, which 
can be syntactically modified to resolve grammatical meaning (Garrett, 1992). Studies of 
semantic versus syntactic distinction latencies indicate that syntax represents lexical, as opposed 
to semantic, knowledge (Bowers, Vigliocco, Stadthagen-Gonzalez, & Vinson, 1999). This 
suggests that conceptual knowledge has broad mental representations within linguistic semantics, 
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in which this knowledge can be syntactically modified to alter its idiosyncratic meaning as 
opposed to its global meaning. Therefore, the utility of semantic network nodes lies in their 
symbolic, global meaning and associated conceptual aspects (e.g., physical form, functionality, 
living versus non-living, etc.). 
Semantic network access can occur through guided search of a target concept given 
associated cues. fMRI studies of lexical retrieval tasks have shown that broad bilateral activity 
occurs to identify targets (e.g., the spread of activation from disambiguating nodes from cues 
such as “an animal with humps that lives in the desert” should lead to access of the target node, 
“camel;” Assaf et al., 2009). This mechanism is important as it involves selection of specific 
conceptual information, as opposed to random spread of activation. According to the affect-as-
information approach, affective responses provide evaluative appraisal information. As argued 
by Storbeck and Clore (2007), affect is neither automatic nor primary, but rather it is probably an 
inherent set of associations within the semantic network. It is, therefore, possible that the 
appraisal processes underlying affective responses rely on, or at least take into account, accessed 
conceptual knowledge.  
Semantic Network Activation 
Semantic network access likely occurs spontaneously and/or due to the targeted spread of 
activity to specific concepts, whereas semantic network activation describes the non-targeted and 
spontaneous spread of activity from one accessed concept to other conceptual nodes. As 
described by Caramazza (1997), once a concept within a semantic network is accessed, activity 
spreads of varying strengths to related concepts, which is based on models of declarative 
memory and language processing put forth decades prior (Anderson & Pirolli, 1984; Collins & 
Loftus, 1975; Quillian, 1967). Given that the spread of semantic network activation may underlie 
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cognitive priming in categorization tasks, including those that are affective (De Houwer, 
Hermans, Rothermund, & Wentura, 2002), it is reasonable to assume that emotion may affect 
semantic network activity (see Storbeck & Clore, 2008). For example, false memory effects 
observed by Storbeck and Clore (2005) relied on spreading activation, such that presented words 
(e.g., bed, pillow, wake, rest, etc.) resulted in greater reporting of related, non-presented “critical 
lure” words (e.g., sleep); this effect was minimized following an induced negative state, 
suggesting reduced activation of the non-presented critical lure. 
Semantic network organization reflects hierarchical class, subclass, and subordinate 
structures. Because of this organization, the spread of activation is essential in concept retrieval 
and cognitive flexibility (for a review, see McClelland & Rogers, 2003). Researchers who have 
modelled information retrieval systems using psycholinguistic theory have postulated that 
activation is selective rather than random. Activation requires processing of individual features 
of the initially accessed node and salient situational characteristics (Crestani & van Rijsbergen, 
1993), and it eventually dissipates from one node to another as semantic distance increases (den 
Heyer & Briand, 1986; Ratcliff & McKoon, 1981).  These factors have been implicated in 
declarative memory recall, as they may induce priming effects at encoding and may also use 
available cognitive resources involved in search during retrieval (Nelson, Kitto, Galea, McEvoy, 
& Bruza, 2013). This finding is interesting because it may be interpreted in two ways. The first 
interpretation could suggest mood-congruent and/or mood-dependent effects as originally put 
forth in Bower’s (1981) model, especially if mood state and/or affective content are salient in a 
given situation. The second interpretation may characterize a semantic network-based model 
explaining the interaction of mood and memory (which is similar to the theoretical basis of this 
work, as applied to executive function as opposed to memory). Specifically, if positive moods 
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are assumed to enhance semantic network activation (i.e., relational processing), priming and 
categorization cues should benefit encoding, which has previously been supported (Lee & 
Sternthal, 1999; Storbeck & Clore, 2008). Similarly, increased network activation in positive 
moods may represent a mechanism for the false memory effects described above; automatic 
semantic activation may lead to suprathreshold activation strengths to endorse lures that are 
related to targets but were never presented (Storbeck & Clore, 2005). Along similar lines, it has 
previously been suggested that false memories may be arise via semantic network activation 
(Roediger, Balota, & Watson, 2001) according to fuzzy trace theory, which dissociates reasoning 
and memory accuracy. These systems involve understanding the 1) gist and 2) specifics of the 
event recalled in parallel (and erroneously in false memories; see Brainerd & Reyna, 2002; 
Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). These elements, however, are represented symbolically in semantic 
networks; it thus stands to reason that activity between associated nodes may lead to false 
memories. 
Semantic networks and their activity likely have a neuroanatomic basis. A recent review 
of 120 fMRI studies showed that the neuroanatomy of the semantic system appears to be left-
lateralized and that it includes the cingulate gyrus as well as cortical prefrontal, 
parahippocampal, and inferior temporoparietal areas (Binder, Desai, Graves, & Conant, 2009; 
Vigneau et al., 2006). These areas are associated with explicit and implicit memory systems 
involving conceptual knowledge (Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997; Wiggs, Weisberg, & Martin, 
1999), and they intersect sensory, motor, and emotional processing centers (Binder & Desai, 
2011). These findings provide anatomic evidence for relationships between the semantic system 
and cognition, perception, and emotion. Functional imaging has also indicated anatomic 
structures involved in semantic network activity. fMRI studies have demonstrated that unique 
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semantic relationships are differentially processed, specifically in areas of the anterior temporal 
lobe (ATL) and language-related frontal areas (Kotz, Cappa, von Cramon, & Friederici, 2002). 
This suggests that semantic processing functionally spreads within semantic space to delineate 
relationships between concepts, which may remain flexible and dependent on neural activity. 
Fronto-temporal cortical activity may also reflect semantic priming, effortful processing, and 
manipulation of meaning (Lau, Phillips, & Poeppel, 2008), and the ATL may act as a broad 
semantic meaning hub where activity spreads conceptually and anatomically to fronto-temporo-
parietal association cortices (Patterson, Nestor, & Rogers, 2007). The ATL network has been 
further implicated in PET studies assessing knowledge of associations between concepts 
(Shaywitz et al., 1995; Vandenberghe, Price, Wise, Josephs, & Frackowiak, 1996) and TMS 
studies disrupting activity in critical areas of the ATL network (Whitney, Kirk, O’Sullivan, 
Lambon Ralph, & Jefferies, 2010). Disruption of the ATL hub has also been implicated in 
clinical disorders involving impaired semantic network activation, such as Alzheimer’s disease 
and related dementing syndromes, stroke, and herpes simplex virus encephalitis (Patterson et al., 
2007).  
Semantic Network Space can be Scaled 
Semantic network space refers to the conceptual representation of linguistically labelled 
knowledge. It has been studied for decades in cognitive science, as well as computer science, to 
develop understanding of knowledge systems in humans (Anderson, 2000; Brown, 1958a; 
Brown, 1958b; Carey, 1978; O’Rielly & Munakata, 2000) and artificial intelligence (Brachman 
& Schmolze, 1985; Lehmann, 1992; Schank, 1975; Sowa, 1987), respectively. These theoretical 
models share a major aspect in that they represent conceptual knowledge itself (i.e., contained in 
network nodes), as well as the associative similarity between semantic concepts (i.e., links of 
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varying distances between semantic nodes). These models are typically represented in vector 
space with hierarchical small-world structure demonstrating strong, short-path local clustering of 
highly interrelated concepts (i.e., semantic neighborhoods), forming larger scale constellations 
with more distantly related concepts (Steyvers & Tenenbaum, 2005). Such a structure of the 
semantic network space has been derived using computational methods and psycholinguistic 
principles (Johanssen & Pina, 2015; Kozima & Ito, 1996). 
The key principles involved in scaling semantic space are conceptual similarity and 
concept clustering, as they are crucial to the hierarchical organization of semantic networks. 
Because of this, these principles have been examined in individuals using a wide range of tasks, 
including semantic fluency, free association, lexical triadic comparison and sorting tasks, and 
confrontation naming (for an example, see Chan, Salmon, & Pena, 2001). The most effective 
methods involve clustering analyses to evaluate semantic structure by examining similarity (or 
dissimilarity) between juxtaposed exemplars in fluency tasks (Sung, Gordon, & Schretlen, 2016). 
Such analyses act as a measure of the organization and distance between concepts in semantic 
network space and have been successfully applied to healthy individuals and various clinical 
groups, including Alzheimer’s and Huntington’s diseases (Chan et al., 1993) and schizophrenia 
(Prescott, Newton, Mir, Woodruff, & Parks, 2006). Although triadic comparison tasks have 
remained popular in cognitive research, the structure of the task limits spontaneous semantic 
network access as it relies exclusively on the spread of semantic network activation and may 
better represent a cognitive priming paradigm. 
Multidimensional scaling (MDS) is a data-visualizing, dimension reduction technique 
that compares the similarity of data points in a distance matrix (Torgerson, 1958). Chan and 
colleagues (1993) used MDS and clustering analyses to demonstrate that semantic fluency data 
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could be used to scale semantic network space and yield cognitive maps of healthy elderly and 
clinical populations. They also demonstrated that disorganization and atypical clustering in 
semantic networks could be detected using this method. It should be noted that this method has 
been criticized previously for not addressing the temporal component of fluency tasks (e.g., 
output “in spurts”), the likelihood of semantic clustering during performance (Verheyen et al., 
2016; Voorspoels et al., 2014), and potentially inadequate model fit in scaling techniques 
(Storms, Dirikx, Saerens, Verstraeten, & De Deyn, 2003). However, these claims have been 
largely refuted (see Chan & Ho, 2003; Hout & Goldinger, 2016; Sung et al., 2016). As such, 
Chan et al.’s (1993) MDS techniques are accepted as useful to scale semantic network space. 
 Semantic Network Activity can be Quantified 
 Just as fluency tasks can be used to scale semantic network space, they can also be used 
to quantify semantic network activation as it spreads from node to node (Whiteside, Kealy, 
Semla, Luu, Rice, Basso, & Roper, 2015).  Doing so relies on spreading activation models which 
indicate juxtaposed exemplars reflect the activation of closely related concepts as network space 
is explored to produce responses (Kenett & Thompson-Schill, 2017).  Activation is typically 
described to occur within a given semantic neighborhood until concepts within that 
neighborhood are exhausted, and activation then extends to include broader or dissimilar 
semantic neighborhoods (Patra, Bose, & Marinis, 2020). 
This differs from Chen et al.’s (1993) technique because their MDS method restricts the 
lists of words generated by respondents to scale semantic distance between pairs of the twelve 
words that are most frequently produced.  Recognizing the need to evaluate the spontaneous 
spread of activation between network nodes that is not restricted (i.e., not just the activation 
between most commonly produced words), researchers have developed several computational 
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models (Christensen & Kenett, 2020; Kenett, Levi, Anaki, & Faust, 2017; Pakhomov, Hemmy, 
& Lim, 2017).  The most successful of these techniques uses fluency data to estimate semantic 
network structure and activation within these structures (Zemla & Austerweil, 2018; Zemla, 
Kenett, Jun, & Austerweil, 2016) and has been used to develop an automatic analysis tool: the 
Semantic Network and Fluency Utility (SNAFU; Zemla, Cao, Meuller, & Austerweil, 2020). 
SNAFU is unique in that it applies criteria to category fluency data that goes beyond the 
traditional total number of exemplars produced.  Specifically, SNAFU allows for the assessment 
of word clusters, in which subcategories of exemplars may be used to define semantic 
neighborhoods (Abwender, Swan, Bowerman, & Connolly, 2001), as well as when switches 
between semantic clusters occur (Hills, Jones, & Todd, 2009, 2012). Further, SNAFU accounts 
for nested static and fluid clusters that are produced as responses are generated according to 
techniques described by Hills and colleagues (2009; 2012).  Static clusters are defined as 
contiguous exemplars that belong to the same primary category and subclass, whereas fluid 
clusters include related words belonging to the same primary category only.  For example, 
respondents might produce the list of words “cat, dog, rabbit, zebra, giraffe, dolphin, manatee…” 
which would describe the fluid cluster for mammals, but would contain nested static clusters for 
mammalian house pets (i.e., “cat, dog, and rabbit”), jungle mammals (i.e., “zebra and giraffe”), 
and marine mammals (i.e., “dolphin and manatee”).  This method is extremely useful to fully 
assess semantic network activation, because it generates several measurements, such as the total 
number of exemplars produced, number of clusters explored (i.e., semantic neighborhoods, both 
fluid and static), and the size of within-semantic neighborhood “runs” (i.e., the number of 
exemplars produced within each cluster, both fluid and static).  As such, these variables were 
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generated using SNAFU criteria to analyze the category fluency data and assess semantic 
network activation for the current project, as described in the Method section below. 
  
Clinical Disorders and the Semantic Network-Cognition Connection 
 A wide range of cognitive deficits is associated with various neurologic and psychiatric 
conditions. As understanding of psychiatric disorders has improved over the last half century, so 
has the refinement of sensitive, psychometrically-sound neuropsychological assessment 
instruments. This has led to extensive characterizations of cognitive profiles associated with 
different neuropsychiatric diagnoses. Disorder-related cognitive profiles are clinically useful in 
diagnosis, treatment planning, and prognosis, and may offer insights into the mood-cognition 
interaction in healthy individuals. Because the theoretical basis of this research relies on the 
interactions among mood, semantic network activity, and cognitive abilities (specifically, 
executive functions), evidence from select literature concerning this interaction is reviewed in 
depression, Alzheimer’s disease, and schizophrenia below. 
Depression 
 Major depressive disorder (MDD) is among the most common occurring psychiatric 
conditions (Authors, 2013) and is characterized by persistent sad or depressed mood and is 
impairing across functional domains. MDD is also commonly associated with loss of interest and 
pleasure, low self-esteem and energy, and changes in psychomotor behavior, sleep, appetite, and 
libido (NIMH, 2016).  
Initial models of neuropsychological impairments in depression reflected reduced effort 
as a mediating force (Cohen, Weingartner, Samllberg, Pickar, & Murphy, 1982). While effort 
may be affected in depression, the condition is also associated with a range of cognitive deficits 
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in several domains that is both striking and likely beyond the effects of reduced effort alone 
(Elliott, 2002). MDD has been associated with short-term memory (Breslow, Kocsis, & Belkin, 
1980; Colby & Gotlib, 1988) and long-term memory deficits (Whitehead, 1974), verbal 
processing changes (Horan, Pogge, Borgaro, Stokes, & Harvey, 1997), and reduced working 
memory, motor and processing speed, executive function, and problem-solving (Channon, 
Baker, & Robertson, 1993; Harvey, Le Bastard, Pochon, Levy, Allilaire, & Dubois et al., 2004; 
Nebes, Butters, Mulsant, & Pollock, 2000; Weiland-Fielder et al., 2004). Given these findings, 
the cognitive profile of depression is consistently described as one that is “frontal-subcortical,” 
which is supported by early PET studies reporting hypofrontal activity in MDD patients (Baxter, 
1991; Bench, Friston, Brown, Scott, & Dolan 1992; Drevets, Videen, Price, Preskorn, 
Carmichael, & Raichle, 1992; Mayberg, Lewis, Regenold, & Wagner, 1994). It has been 
previously suggested that the effects this profile comprises are so wide-ranging in their presence 
and severity between cognitive domains, that it, alone, can be used to differentiate depression 
from other psychiatric conditions. However, this complexity hinders understanding of the 
underlying mechanism between depression severity and these effects (Hartlage, Alloy, Vazquez, 
& Dykman, 1993; McClintock, Husain, Greer, & Cullum, 2010). 
 Depression comprises features that are affective, cognitive, and behavioral. For example, 
patients may feel sad (e.g., emotional), believe they have no self-worth (e.g., cognitive), and 
socially isolate themselves (e.g., behavioral). In their severest form, non-affective depressive 
symptoms may resemble frank dementia (for a review of depressive pseudodementia, see Kang 
et al., 2014). In many patients, especially those who are otherwise healthy, the affective features 
of depression precede cognitive and behavioral symptoms (Keyes, 2002; Pruessner, Hellhammer, 
Pruessner, & Lupien, 2003). It is therefore possible that depressive mood states result in non-
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affective depression symptoms. That being said, it is unclear whether the development of 
affective and non-affective symptoms share a common mechanism, develop independently of 
each other, or whether depressive symptoms that emerge later in the disorder are reactive to 
those that were initially present (e.g., reduced self-worth, which is a cognitive symptom, may be 
reactive to poor task completion over time due to reduced energy and/or enjoyment, which are 
behavioral and affective features).  
As described by Sedikides (1992), sad moods lead to avoidant behaviors, in addition to 
thinking that is egocentric, but also problem-focused and ruminative. The latter two points may 
be critical to understanding the interaction between mood and cognition. From the affect-as-
information perspective, depressive states should signal dangerous or problematic situations, 
which lead to systematic, detail-oriented processing (i.e., Sedikies’ “problem-focused” thinking), 
as opposed to internal knowledge-based, heuristic processing. However, the details that are 
emphasized in negative mood-related analytic processing may be restricted due to the ruminative 
qualities of depressive states. Rumination has been reported to impair concentration 
(Lyubomirsky, Kasri, & Zehm, 2003), which may also affect the ability to update working 
memory. This was demonstrated by Joorman and Gotlib (2008), who used a lexical category 
membership task to show that depression was associated with difficulty removing irrelevant 
material from working memory, which they theorized was related to rumination. These authors 
later extended their work using negative affective priming tasks and concluded that depressed 
patients indeed ruminate more than others and that they, additionally, exhibit a lack of inhibition 
in processing negative material. These effects may contribute to depressive cognitive symptoms 
because they result in reduced cognitive reappraisal (Joormann & Gotlib, 2010) and working 
memory interference (Joormann, Levens, & Gotlib, 2011). This is controversial, as some suggest 
 
 42 
that the process of updating working memory (i.e., executive control) reduces its own capacity, 
independent of mood (Schmeichel, 2007). Therefore, the question of rumination warrants close 
examination. Interpreted differently, rumination may reflect a propensity to focus on specific 
thoughts or ideas in daily life (i.e., restricted concept access/semantic network activity) and 
during select cognitive tasks, which may lead to increased, though restricted, phonological loop 
activity (i.e., likely beneficial to various goal-oriented behaviors). In its most severe form, 
however, rumination may lead to perseveration (which is likely detrimental to various goal-
oriented behaviors that require cognitive and/or behavioral flexibility). This is somewhat 
inconsistent with generally accepted findings that working memory is reduced in depressive 
states but that it remains congruent with the reduced distractibility findings described above (e.g., 
increased small-detail focus and reduced likelihood to report false memories). It stands to reason 
that cognitive skills may be situationally tuned by mood as put forth by Schwarz (2002), but that 
an important mechanism for such tuning involves semantic network activity as suggested by 
Bower (1981). 
 The frontal-subcortical profile described in depression involves not only working 
memory, but also systems responsible for memory and cognitive control. Autobiographical 
memory tends to be reduced and overgeneralized in depression (Moore, Watts, & Williams, 
1988). This has been replicated using the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT) by Dalgleish 
and colleagues (2007), who, in a series of studies, showed that reduced autobiographical 
specificity reflected issues of accessing relevant information. They further suggested that this 
effect represents reduced cognitive control to exert the necessary attention to complete AMT 
tasks. In a Stroop-like task using visual stimuli depicting words superimposed on neutral faces 
and negative visual imagery, Padmala, Bayer, and Pessoa (2011) showed that irrelevant, negative 
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stimuli reduced cognitive control. These authors interpreted their findings to indicate that 
behavioral adjustments to environmental demands are affected by negative entities. It should be 
noted that this study was conducted in non-depressed individuals; however, it is reasonable to 
extend these findings to depressed individuals considering that affective and cognitive 
experiences are often biased toward negative material. Stated differently, feelings and thoughts 
experienced by depressed individuals are likely troubling (i.e., signal danger and serve as a 
cognitive-tuning function), repeated (i.e., via rumination), and restricted (i.e., limited as to the 
conceptual information accessed and taxing on cognitive control systems that work to increase 
adaptive functioning). 
Clearly, the effects of depression on cognitive functioning are varied. Because the 
organization and activity of semantic networks are argued to be essential to various cognitive 
skills, these effects must be: 1) somewhat persistent, because semantic network organization is 
likely less variable than mood states, and 2) present in skills involving language. 
As to the persistence of these effects, it must be noted that some have reported that the 
cognitive effects of depression are state-dependent (Austin, Mitchell, & Goodwin, 2001). 
However, there is a wealth of evidence suggesting that depression-related deficits do persist, 
even after remission of the disorder (Grant, Thase, & Sweeney, 2001; Marcos, Salmero, 
Gutierrez, Catalan, Gasto, & Lazaro, 1994; Tham, Englebreckston, Mathe, Johnson, Olsson, & 
Aberg-Wisted, 1997). For example, Paelecke-Habermann, Pohl, and Leplow (2005) 
demonstrated sustained deficits in attention and executive functions on three separate tests from 
each domain in individuals with remitted depression. Similarly, they reported a dose-dependent 
relationship such that the greatest impairments were exhibited by patient groups with the most 
severe depression prior to remission. This suggests that the mechanism acting between mood 
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disturbance has long-lasting effects and that there is a direct relationship between depression 
severity and cognitive impairment severity. The latter was further supported in a recent meta-
analysis indicating that depression severity was associated with the severity of impairment in 
episodic memory, executive functions, and processing speed (McDermott & Ebmeier, 2009). 
Regarding the effect of depression on linguistic skills, a body of research indicates that 
there is indeed an interaction. A commonly replicated finding in studies of the neuropsychology 
of depression is reduced verbal fluency (for a review, see Henry & Crawford, 2005) and slowed 
semantic processing (Abdullaev, Kennedy, & Tasman, 2002; Iakimova et al., 2009). These 
effects are quite common and persistent. In their longitudinal study of patients with MDD, 
Schmidt and colleagues (2011) found prolonged semantic fluency deficits, even after significant 
symptom reduction. Similarly, melancholic depressed patients have been shown to exhibit 
greater difficulty on language-based tasks, including tests of fluency and basic vocabulary, 
compared to their non-melancholic counterparts, suggesting that poorer information processing, 
word retrieval, and reduced language output may be associated with negative moods (Naismith et 
al., 2003). These findings, in sum, suggest the involvement of semantic networks in depression, 
however, the exact mechanism remains unclear. Semantic networks may be affected in terms of 
their organization, their activity, or both (Gotlib & McCann, 1984). Specifically, there may be 
several mechanisms that account for this in depression, such as reduced concept accessibility via 
network disorganization, limited access and activation due to depression-related semantic 
network activity suppression, or automatic semantic activation of negative thoughts shifting 
accessibility weights toward negative rather than positive or neutral material, as previously 
reported (Scott, Mogg, & Bradley, 2001; Weintraub, Segal, & Beck, 1974). Although the exact 
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mechanism for these findings remains elusive, select evidence from the neuroanatomy literature 
may support such a conclusion. 
 Several neuroanatomic models of depression have emerged. Many of these state that 
differences in regional brain activity are likely associated with the range of symptoms in 
depression, including those that are affective, cognitive, and behavioral (for a review, see Shenal, 
Harrison, & Demaree, 2003). Generally speaking, a number of studies has reliably shown that 
the left hemisphere appears to be associated with positive affect and approach motivation (Allen 
& Kline, 2004; Cacioppo, 2004; Davidson, 1998; Davidson, Ekman, Saron, Senulis, & Friesen, 
1990), whereas the right hemisphere is associated with negative affect and withdrawal 
motivation (Allen & Kline, 2004; Cacioppo, 2004; Davidson, Ekman, Saron, Senulis, & Friesen, 
1990; Heller & Nitschke, 1998; Lee et al., 2004; Speilberg, Stewart, Levin, Miller, & Heller, 
2008). Interestingly, the left prefrontal cortex and left hemisphere are important for verbal 
working memory and semantic accessibility, respectively (D’Esposito et al., 1998; Gray, 2001; 
Martin & Chao, 2001; Petrides, 1995). Moreover, approach behavior is crucial to openness, 
curiosity, interest, and creativity (i.e., the “broadened” aspects of cognition in healthy positive 
moods). These findings are, therefore, consistent with the literature suggesting a link between 
positivity, semantic and verbal accessibility, and exploration as described by Schwarz (2002) and 
Frederickson (2004). Conversely, these authors discuss that withdrawal plays a role in becoming 
closed to experience and exhibiting narrowed mindsets. These hemispheric differences also 
underlie global versus regional attentional focus (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008), further 
supporting the connection between positivity, semantic accessibility, cognitive broadening, and 




 Beyond hemispheric differences, specific brain regions have been implicated in 
depression. These include the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), prefrontal cortex (PFC; in 
particular, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, or DLPFC), and the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). The 
ACC is involved in many roles, including attention, self- and situational monitoring, and error 
detection (Carter, Botvinick, & Cohen, 1999; Carter, Braver, Barch, Botvinick, Noll, & Cohen, 
1998). Given these roles, the ACC is believed to represent a key area to cognitive control and 
error processing. An fMRI study by Mitterschiffthaler and colleagues (2008) investigated non-
medicated MDD patients’ response latencies during an emotional Stroop task and found that 
latency was positively correlated to ACC activity, both of which were significantly greater in 
patients than in healthy controls. These findings suggest that the ACC is relevant to stimuli 
selection or conflict. Likewise, the ACC is directly involved when conflict arises in semantic 
accessibility and language. Peterson and colleagues (1998) observed increased ACC activation 
when people were asked to name a verb that corresponded to a noun and indicated that these 
effects were thought to be related to semantic selection (Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999). Thus, the 
interference effect and semantic selection involves ACC activity and may involve a similar 
mechanism that exists in reduced working memory capacity and propensity towards rumination 
in depression. Interestingly, the ACC may also be involved in aspects of speech production, 
particularly volitional emotional intonation (Jurgen & von Cramon, 1982). In other words, the 
ACC could be considered an area contributing to executive processes, which may include speech 
directed towards the self (i.e., rumination and/or internal self-appraisals) and others. This is not 
surprising given imaging literature proposing functional overlap between the ACC and DLPFC, 
as these areas are strongly activated in language processing and emotional regulation (Klumpp & 
Deldin, 2010; Rogers et al., 2004).  For example, an fMRI study of depressed patients indicated 
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that activation in these areas (as well as the amygdala, which shares both numerous and strong 
reciprocal connections with the ACC and indirectly to the DLPFC via the medial PFC or MPFC; 
see Eden, Schrieber, Anwander, Keuper, Laeger, & Zwanger, 2015; Ray & Zald, 2012) was 
correlated with semantic processing deficits and depression severity (Sass, Habel, Kellerman, 
Mathiak, Gauggel, & Kircher, 2014). The DLPFC appears to be particularly important to 
linguistic function as well, as DLPFC lesion patients exhibit difficulties on neuropsychological 
measures requiring language comprehension and production, whereas MPFC lesion patients 
show no such deficit (Wallesch, Kornhuber, Kollner, Haas, & Hufnagl, 1983). Further, the 
DLPFC has been implicated in language switching in bilinguals in studies using fMRI and 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (Hernandez, Dapretto, Mazziotta, & Bookheimer, 2001; 
Hernandez, Martinez, & Kohnert, 2000; Nardone, De Blasi, Bergmann, Caleri, Tezzon, & 
Ladurner et al., 2011). This area may also be critical to working memory function involving 
material rehearsed in the phonological loop, but not the visuospatial sketchpad (Aoki et al., 
2011), as well as a host of other executive processes, including those that may be compromised 
in depression (Koenigs & Grafman, 2009). These findings, together, present sizeable functional 
overlap between the ACC and DLPFC in emotion, language, and cognition.  
The OFC may share similar functional overlap as it is densely connected to both the ACC 
and DLPFC (and amygdala). Regional cerebral blood flow studies after induced elated or 
depressed moods have implicated the OFC in representing emotion and underlying cognitive 
deficits in depression, including reduced verbal fluency, and mental and motor speeds (Baker, 
Frith, & Dolan, 1997). In addition, an fMRI study of never-medicated, recovered depressed 
patients by van Wingen and colleagues (2010) implicated that the amygdala, ACC, PFC, and 
OFC were important in encoding and retrieval of emotional stimuli, as had been previously 
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suggested by others (Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999; Bush, Luu, & Posner, 1999; Rolls, 1999). 
Thus, the ACC, PFC, and OFC may represent a suite of frontal areas that act to process 
emotional information, contribute to cognitive and linguistic skills, and aid adaptive responding. 
A review by Phillips, Drevets, Rauch, and Lane (2003) confirmed reduced regional blood flow in 
the ACC, DLPFC, and OFC in acute depression, as well as increased metabolism and blood flow 
in these areas following recovery from depression. Further, these authors indicate that 
postmortem studies report significant neuronal loss in these frontal areas as well as the 
amygdala, further suggesting their involvement in depression. The ACC-DLPFC-OFC-amygdala 
complex is vastly interconnected, and it shares very strong dopaminergic connections with the 
ATL hub that has been associated with semantic network activity (Ashby et al., 1999; Goschke 
& Bolte, 2014; Mohedano-Moriano et al., 2015; Moll, Eslinger, & de Oliveira-Souza, 2001; 
Pessoa, 2015). Indeed, depression may result from compromised dopaminergic and serotonergic 
neurotransmitter systems (Mitchell & Phillips, 2007). In depression, reduced activity within 
these areas may alter executive control processes important in emotion regulation (Fox, 1994; 
Wang et al., 2008), and these activity patterns may differentiate non-pathological sad from happy 
moods (Habel, Klein, Kellermann, Shah, & Schneider, 2005). In sum, there is a wealth of 
evidence to suggest a neuroanatomical interaction between mood and the frontal-executive and 
linguistic deficits that may be present in depression. 
 Alzheimer’s Disease 
 Alzheimer’s disease (AD) is a neurodegenerative disorder characterized by cortical 
atrophy (Terry, Peck, DeTeresa, Schecter, & Horoupian, 1981) and increased presence of 
cortical amyloid plaques and neurofibrillary tangles (Terry & Katzman, 1983). Pathological 
studies have shown that the areas most affected by the disorder include the mesial temporal lobe 
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structures, the hippocampus and entorhinal cortex, as well as fronto-temporo-parietal association 
cortices (Hyman, van Hoesen, Damasio, & Barnes, 1984). Significant neuronal loss has also 
been found in the nucleus basalis of Meynert and locus coeruleus, which compromises 
subcortical-cortical cholinergic and adrenergic systems (Bondareff, Mountjoy, & Roth, 1982; 
Mann, Yates, & Marcyniuk, 1984; Whitehouse, Price, Struble, Clark, Coyle, & DeLong, 1982). 
Affective and behavioral changes are not uncommon in AD, however, cognitive symptoms tend 
to be the most striking feature of the disorder. Given enough time, disease progression will 
eventually lead to dementia, which is proposed by some to be diagnosable by the presence of at 
least two of the following three symptoms: memory impairment disproportionate to age, aphasia, 
and apraxia.  
 Given these diagnostic criteria, a range of cognitive deficits has been described in AD. 
These include memory impairments, characterized by poor encoding and rapid forgetting, which 
result from mesial temporal lobe and basal forebrain involvement. Poor visuospatial construction 
and ideational abilities to plan and execute everyday tasks have been noted as well, which 
suggest conceptual difficulties (Ochipa, Gonzalez-Rothi, & Heilman, 1992). A range of 
linguistic changes are common in AD, too, including poor confrontation naming, reduced 
semantic fluency (in normative between-groups semantic fluency comparisons and non-
normative, within-subject semantic versus phonemic fluency differences), and in very severe 
cases, complete loss of semantic knowledge (Cummings, Benson, Hill, & Read, 1985; Faber-
Langendoen et al, 1988; Seines, Carson, Rovner, & Gordon, 1988; for a discussion of semantic 
dementia, see Hodges, Patterson Oxbury, & Funnell, 1992). Conceptual and linguistic 
impairments are most likely due to temporoparietal pathology and cholinergic dysfunction 
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(Muramoto, Sugishita, & Ando, 1984), and are of particular interest in understanding the 
connection between language and cognition. 
 Several lines of research have suggested disorganization and disintegration of semantic 
networks, even in the early stages of AD (Butters & Heindel, 1990; Martin, 1987; Smith, 
Murdoch, & Chenery, 1989). While degradation of semantic network access (and potentially 
subsequent mental slowing) may occur in healthy aging (Cerella & Fozard, 1984), reduced 
semantic activity is significant and functionally impairing in AD. It had been previously 
theorized that this mechanism results in the characteristic naming and fluency deficits seen in 
AD, but earlier studies were limited by a lack of specific analyses to examine semantic network 
organization and activity (Grober, Buschke, Kawas, & Fuld, 1985; Martin, 1987; Smith, 
Murdoch, & Chenery, 1989). 
 Using these earlier findings as a theoretical base, Chan and colleagues used MDS and 
pathfinder analyses to visualize degradation of semantic networks in AD patients when engaged 
in semantic fluency tasks (Chan, Butters, Paulsen, Salmon, Swenson, & Maloney, 1993; Chan, 
Butters, Salmon, & McGuire, 1993). In these studies, they showed that conceptual information 
was atypically organized in AD patients compared to healthy controls and other neurologic 
groups. These findings were crucial to show the effect of semantic network disorganization in 
AD, but failed to address the progressive nature of AD. Because the cognitive symptoms of AD 
worsen over time, it is essential to demonstrate that semantic network changes are similarly 
progressive to argue that they play a key role in cognition. Chan, Butters, and Salmon (1996), 
again, used MDS and pathfinder analyses but focused on disease stage and employed a linguistic 
triadic comparison task. They found that as the disease worsens, AD patients exhibited 
progressive loss of abstraction in using attributes to categorize concepts, suggesting that there 
 
 51 
were fewer and weaker associations between semantically linked concepts. These analyses also 
reproduced evidence of semantic network disorganization in AD, which was later found to be 
highly correlated with global cognitive decline (Salmon, Butters, & Chan, 1999). It is, therefore, 
reasonable to argue that AD represents a disorder of conceptual knowledge, and it is plausible 
that semantic network disorganization and dysfunction underlies these cognitive symptoms. 
Specifically, encoding deficits may reflect an inability to store and organize novel information 
into semantic networks effectively, and reduced naming, fluency, and praxis may additionally 
represent reduced semantic network activity. 
 The clinical presentation of AD is varied, however, and symptomatology may overlap 
with other progressive and non-progressive dementing disorders common in mid- and late-life. 
The symptoms that are frequently reported by patients and their collaterals, even in the earliest 
disease stages of AD, include cognitive slowing and memory difficulties that resemble retrieval 
deficits to those who are untrained (e.g., repeating questions, misplacing items, and forgetting 
appointments; Swainson et al., 2001). However, numerous research studies have demonstrated 
that AD reflects a true loss of semantic knowledge, as opposed to retrieval deficits or mental 
slowing. Naming difficulties suggest loss of semantic meaning and semantically-related concepts 
represented by nearby semantic network nodes, accessed either visually in confrontation naming 
tasks or via responsive auditory tasks (Bayles & Tomoeda, 1983; Hodges, Salmon, & Butters, 
1991; Huff, Corkin, & Growdon, 1986; Moreaud, David, Charnellet, & Pellat, 2001; Rasmusson, 
Carson, Brookmeyer, Kawas, & Brandt, 1996). As for fluency measures, increased latency and 
poorer performance in semantic fluency versus letter fluency in AD patients suggest difficulties 
accessing semantic meaning, as opposed to deficits in lexical search (Rohrer, Salmon, Wixted, & 
Paulsen, 1999). Similarly, fluency studies indicate that there is a loss of knowledge related to the 
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attributes shared by exemplars belonging to semantic categories, which would be expected to be 
preserved if conceptual information were truly spared (Grober, Buschke, Kawas, & Fuld, 1985; 
Martin & Fedio, 1983; Troster, Salmon, McCullough, & Butters, 1989). In semantic priming and 
lexical decision tasks, abstract conceptual knowledge over concrete information appears to be 
degraded (Chertkow, Bub, & Seidenberg, 1989), except for emotional semantic concepts, which 
appear intact until later stages of the disorder (Giffard, Laisney, Desgranges, & Eustache, 2015). 
These findings are consistent with the notion that concrete words and abstract semantic 
information are processed differently (Altarriba & Bauer, 2007). Taken together, the results of 
these studies demonstrate that semantic network disorganization and dysfunction are heavily 
contributory to the cognitive symptoms of AD. 
 Schizophrenia 
 Schizophrenia is a psychological disorder of atypical thinking and perception, which is 
characterized by a number of symptom categories. These include positive symptoms, such as 
delusions and hallucinations, and negative symptoms, such as anhedonia, avolition, abulia, and 
alogia. Disorganized speech and behavior and atypical affective experiences are common 
symptoms as well. Additionally, a core feature, and likely the best predictor of patient 
functioning, is cognitive dysfunction (Bozikas & Andreou, 2011; Goldberg, Keefe Goldman, 
Robinson, & Harvey, 2010). 
 Cognitive impairments in schizophrenia affect attention, working memory, declarative 
memory, and linguistic skills (Cirillo & Seidman, 2003; Kurtz, Moberg, Gur, & Gur, 2001; Tan, 
2008). There appears to be some overlap between the schizophrenia and AD literature in terms of 
changes in memory and, perhaps more importantly, verbal skills to suggest that semantic 
networks may be similarly involved in schizophrenia. For example, investigations of verbal 
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fluency have evidenced that semantic fluency is reduced in schizophrenia. Importantly, 
individuals with schizophrenia have been found to exhibit reduced semantic fluency without 
increased intrusion responses (Allen & Frith, 1983). This implies that reduced fluency is not due 
to atypical thoughts or intellectual or attentional deficits, but rather, conceptual deficits. Thus, as 
in AD, poor semantic organization and conceptual access could be a feature of schizophrenia. 
Investigations specific to semantic network activity in verbal fluency in schizophrenia have 
implicated degraded hierarchical semantic organization via reduced subordinate class exemplar 
production (Rossell, Rabe-Hesketh, Shapleske, & David, 1999). In addition, these authors noted 
that slower output during fluency tasks likely suggests disorganization and, importantly, poor 
semantic network access (but not activation, as activity appeared to spread at rates similar to 
those observed in healthy controls). The latter represents a key feature of semantic network 
activity in schizophrenia: access appears affected, whereas activation may be spared. This is 
further supported by studies reporting no impairments of letter verbal fluency (Gourovitch, 
Goldberg, & Weinberger, 1996) or design fluency (Phillips, James, Crow, & Collinson, 2004). 
Curiously, the design fluency studies reported by Philips et al. (2004) showed that patients 
produced less nameable designs versus unnamable designs compared to controls, suggesting 
deficits in cross-modal semantic access to psychomotor and visuospatial sketchpad activity. A 
study of the effects of auditory and visual priming using lexical decision tasks conducted by 
Surguladze and colleagues (2002) further demonstrated that cross-modal semantic 
representations may result in language impairments observed in the disorder. However, these 
authors argued that increased cross-modal (semantic) activity is responsible for these deficits. 
These findings must be carefully considered as they offer a window into a potentially 
important mechanism in schizophrenia. Increased semantic network activation is a plausible 
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cause of semantic processing deficits (Rossell & David, 2006; Rossell, Rabe-Hesketh, Shapleski, 
& David, 1999), as well as formal thought disorder. Formal thought disorder (FTD) refers to 
disorganized thinking and speech, which may occur in schizophrenia, as well as other 
psychological disorders such as depression and mania (Yudofsky & Hales, 2003). As originally 
put forth by Maher, Manschreck, Hoover, and Jenkins (1987) and Spitzer, Braun, Hermle, and 
Maier (1993), FTD may be conceptualized as aberrant over-activation of semantic nodes (i.e., 
“hyperpriming”). More recent studies of semantic priming tasks found that schizophrenic 
patients with FTD demonstrated greater indirect priming in unrelated word conditions, 
supporting excessive automatic spread of semantic network activation (Mortiz, Woodward, 
Kuppers, Lausen, & Schickel, 2003). Similarly, verbal triadic comparison tasks have also yielded 
findings to support semantic over-activation in schizophrenic FTD patients (Tallent, Weinberger, 
& Goldberg, 2001). 
Abnormally increased semantic network activity may underlie many FTD symptoms, 
especially those common in schizophrenia. These include thought-blocking, derailment, 
incoherence, perseveration, tangentiality, and paraphasic and neologistic speech (Videbeck, 
2008). Semantic network over-activity likely represents a mechanism that reduces signal-to-
noise ratios in conceptual activation. When this occurs, distantly related concepts may be co-
activated leading to tangential and disorganized thought patterns. Significantly reduced noise 
suppression may result in overloaded network activity, leading to derailment and thought 
blocking, as well as delusional thinking (Rossell & David, 2006), press of speech, and flight of 
ideas similar to that observed in acute mania (Ryu, An, Ha, Kim, Ha, & Cho, 2012). Poor noise 
suppression may also contribute to negative schizophrenia symptoms, and in extreme cases, lead 
to a catatonic presentation (Taylor 1990).  
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Beyond theoretical discussion, evidence exists to indicate that semantic networks 
contribute to schizophrenia symptoms. Analyses of verbal fluency data, including MDS analyses 
similar to those applied to AD patients discussed above, have evidenced disorganized semantic 
systems, leading to production deficits beyond severity of poverty of speech (Aloia, Gourovitch, 
Weinberger, & Goldberg, 1996; Bowie, Reichenberg, Rieckmann, Parrella, White, & Harvey, 
2004; Harvey & Keefe, 1997a). In addition to degraded semantic networks, fluency studies have 
also demonstrated atypical spread of conceptual activation, which researchers have argued 
underlies tangential, circumstantial, and illogical thinking in schizophrenia-related FTD (Harvey, 
Sukhodolsky, Parrella, White, & Davidson, 1997; Paulsen, Romero, Chan, Davis, Heaton, & 
Jeste, 1996; Sumiyoshi, Matsui, Sumiyoshi, Yamashita, Sumiyoshi, & Kuachi, 2001). 
Neurobiological investigations have further implicated a semantic network contribution 
to the cognitive symptoms observed in schizophrenia. Electrophysiological studies involving 
lexical decision tasks have shown enhanced N400 signals in patients compared to healthy 
controls (Condray, Siegle, Cohen, van Kammen, & Steinhauer, 2003). Because N400 relates to 
processing meaningful stimuli, in particular, semantic processing of words (Kutas & Hillyard, 
1980), these findings are indicative of automatic and aberrant spread of semantic network 
activation. Klumpp and colleagues (2010) also reported enhanced N400 in a semantic processing 
task involving emotionally-valenced words, which was interpreted as abnormal interactions 
between semantic networks and emotion processing systems. Together, these findings suggest a 
link between emotion, semantic network activity, and cognition in schizophrenia. From an 
anatomic standpoint, PET studies have reliably reported reduced blood flow and glucose 
metabolism in prefrontal structures important to working memory, declarative memory, and 
cognitive control (Carter et al., 1998; Hill et al., 2004). Critically, hypofrontality has been 
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observed in areas with sizeable overlap between those implicated in depression studies, including 
the ACC and DLPFC (Glahn et al., 2005), as well as inferior temporoparietal areas similar to 
those implicated in the AD literature (Andreasen et al., 1997). Reduced metabolic activity in 
these areas is associated with negative symptoms, such as anhedonia and abulia (Wolkin et al., 
1992), which are also common in depression, and has previously been correlated with 
dopaminergic dysfunction (Weinberger & Berman, 1988). This is important as dopamine has 
also been implicated in mood disturbances seen in both depression and schizophrenia (Brown & 
Gershon, 1993; Swerdlow & Koob, 1987). Further, intact dopaminergic function is critical to 
maintaining cortical signal-to-noise ratios (Winterer & Weinberger, 2004), which are necessary 
for affective processing (Wentura, 1999) and semantic network activation calibration (Kischka et 
al., 1995). In sum, the neurophysiological, neuroanatomic, and neurochemical evidence is 
compelling and suggestive of an interaction between affect, semantic network activity, and 
executive and other cognitive functions in schizophrenia, similar to findings reported in the 
literature pertaining to clinical disorders of mood and semantic network function. 
 
Summary of the Theoretical Basis of the Current Research 
 Emotions represent responses to stimuli that inform us of appraisal processes and 
influence behavior and cognition. Mood effects have been observed across various cognitive 
domains, including perception, attention, working memory, learning, and memory formation. In 
sum, positive affect generally favors relational processing, which relies on heuristic, top-down 
processes. This leads to increased openness, creativity, semantic accessibility, and enhances a 
majority of cognitive skills. Conversely, negative moods favor analytic processing involving 
detail-oriented, bottom-up processes, which may hinder many cognitive abilities, except for a 
 
 57 
significantly smaller subset of abilities that appear to be enhanced. Much of the variability in 
these mood-related effects on cognition may largely be due to effects on the cognition-
controlling set of abilities known as executive functions, which are the main areas of focus of 
investigation. 
 Multiple models have been proposed to explain the effects of mood on cognition. The 
cognitive tuning model involving Schwarz and Clore’s (1983) affect-as-information hypothesis 
is effective in describing many cognitive research findings, but it focuses heavily on processing 
style effects. Because processing style and many cognitive abilities are affected by (and assessed 
via methods relying on) linguistic functions, language may also play a role in the mood-
cognition interaction. Bower’s (1981) earlier theoretical model examining the mood-cognition 
relationship emphasized the role of semantic networks, which are essential to organizing and 
accessing conceptual knowledge. His Network model did not find much initial research support 
due to theoretical limitations and has largely fallen out of favor. However, more recent studies of 
healthy and clinical populations have shown that mood affects concept organization and activity 
within semantic networks and that these aspects of semantic networks are significantly 
contributory to a wide range of cognitive skills, including those known to be influenced by 
mood. Additionally, converging neuroanatomic, neurophysiological, and neurochemical 
evidence further suggests that semantic network activity plays a role in the interaction between 
mood and executive function, as well as cognition, overall. 
 




The current study was designed to examine whether semantic network activity is a 
significant mediator in the relationship between trait mood and executive function in the general 
population. Such an investigation is important given that mood disorders are among the most 
commonly occurring psychological conditions (Steel, Marnane, Iranpour, Chey, Jackson, & Patel 
et al., 2014) and that clinical and subclinical negative moods (i.e., depressive states) are 
associated with reduced functioning and poorer health outcomes (Naicker, Galambos, Zeng, 
Senthilselvan, & Colman, 2013). Further, in older groups, despite descriptions of a frontal-
subcortical “depressed” neuropsychological profile, differential diagnoses between neurologic 
and psychiatric disorders often remain difficult, and the effects of these conditions, when co-
occurring, may be poorly differentiable (Downing, Caprio, & Lyness, 2013). Thus, investigating 
semantic network activity as a factor that may drive the relationship between mood and 
executive function may serve as the basis for future research, novel interventions for mood 
disturbance, and further clarification of potential subtypes of depression (i.e., depressive states 
that predominantly affect mood, behavior, or cognition). Additionally, because most 
investigations of semantic network activity describe function in individuals with clinical 
conditions in which these systems are impaired, a gap exists in our understanding of semantic 
networks in healthy individuals and their contribution to executive functions. Therefore, 
examining the effects of mood on semantic networks and the role these networks play in 
executive abilities in the general population is essential. 
Study Aims 
 The main goal of the current study was to identify a theoretical mechanism that unifies 
seemingly disparate findings from the mood-cognition literature, which explores semantic 
network activity as a key mediator variable in the interaction between mood and executive 
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functions. The current study is innovative in that it applied techniques to assess semantic 
network activity to the general population that were developed recently or which, to date, have 
typically been used in clinical samples. Most studies of semantic network activity have failed to 
fully characterize that of healthy individuals, generally, and, specifically, the differences in this 
activity that exist between individuals as a function of mood. Differences in semantic network 
activity are universal and associated with cognitive functioning broadly, and thus their 
investigation must be addressed. To accomplish this goal, the following study aims and a priori 
hypotheses were developed: 
 
Aim 1: To examine the effects of trait mood on executive and other cognitive skills, 
including attention, working memory, inhibition, verbal fluency, naming, and verbal 
learning and memory in a healthy population. 
Hypothesis 1: It was hypothesized that negative mood traits would account for a 
proportion of variability in neuropsychological measures assessing select 
frontal/executive functions (i.e., attention, working memory, and verbal fluency). This 
was based on evidence that depressive symptomatology is associated with reduced 
initiation, attention, working memory, and semantic fluency, frequently described as the 
frontal-subcortical neuropsychological profile described above (Chepenik et al, 2007). 
Furthermore, many of these cognitive skills have been shown to be impaired in 
individuals with significant depressive disorders throughout the lifespan, importantly, 
above and beyond expected cognitive changes that occur in healthy aging. Select 
emotion-cognition literature posits a benefit of reduced mood to a small subset of 
executive functions, including distraction tolerance (i.e., a form of inhibition) and 
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familiarity judgment (i.e., recognition memory search and access). Other aspects of 
cognition, such as general intellect, vocabulary, and visual confrontation naming, remain 
preserved regardless of mood (Basso, Miller, Estevis, & Combs, 2013). Thus, negative 
mood features were not expected to significantly contribute to variability in measures of 
intellectual function, vocabulary knowledge, and basic visuospatial skills. However, 
congruent with a majority of the mood-cognition literature, poorer performance on tests 
of basic attention, working memory, and verbal fluency (i.e., a subset of executive 
function skills) in individuals reporting more negative moods was expected. These 
individuals were also expected to perform better on inhibition and focused attentional 
tasks, which is congruent with the literature. 
 
Aim 2: To examine the effects of trait mood on semantic network activity 
(operationalized as semantic network access and semantic network activation) in the 
general population using validated test instruments and specialized analyses previously 
developed to assess these functions in various clinical samples. 
Hypothesis 2: Semantic network activity (defined as semantic network access and 
semantic network activation) was assessed in individuals reporting different mood states 
(i.e., negative and positive mood symptom self-report), by applying tests of speeded 
verbal skills and/or specialized analyses of performance on these tests. Specifically, a 
timed auditory naming test was used that was originally developed to assess language 
function in surgical epilepsy patients to investigate semantic network access. Individuals 
reporting more negative moods were expected to demonstrate reduced semantic network 
access, as evidenced by greater naming latencies on this task. Additionally, semantic 
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network activation was described by applying analyses to a category fluency measure, 
which are similar to those previously used to examine semantic network organization. 
We expected individuals reporting more negative trait moods to exhibit reduced semantic 
network activation. This result was expected to occur in one and/or two ways. 
Specifically, participants reporting more negative moods were expected to produce 
exemplars that were either 1) restricted to fewer semantic neighborhoods, and/or 2) 
limited in number within any given neighborhood. The former result may indicate a 
paucity of inter-neighborhood network search, and the latter may indicate of a paucity of 
intra-semantic neighborhood search. This hypothesis was consistent with previous 
findings that less negative and/or more positive moods increase semantic activation, 
processing speed, and phonological loop activity (Storbeck, 2013), which may underlie 
positive mood-related improved verbal learning and memory (via phonological loop 
rehearsal) and verbal generativity. 
 
Aim 3: To examine the role of semantic network activity on executive skills as a function 
of trait mood via structural equation modeling and exploratory analyses. 
Hypothesis 3: Trait mood was expected to be directly correlated with semantic 
network activity, such that more negative trait moods would be associated with greater 
restriction of semantic network activity (i.e., poorer performance on measures of 
semantic access and activation from Hypothesis 2 above). Further, restricted semantic 
network activity was expected to mediate the relationship between trait moods and 
executive function test performance. Specifically, more negative self-reported trait moods 
were expected to be associated with greater between-group differences on measures 
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involving linguistic/semantic elements (i.e., tasks involving actual words with semantic 
meaning) than on those that lack these elements (i.e., tasks recruiting visuospatial 
sketchpad rather than phonological loop resources). This was based on findings reported 
in the literature summarized above across various clinical populations demonstrating a 
correlation between atypical semantic network activity and poorer performance on a 


























 This study was conducted as a new research study with original data collection. Human 
Subjects Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval, consistent with Queens College and City 
University of New York IRB policies, was granted on June 12, 2019. Informed consent was 
obtained from each participant prior to their participation, and relevant demographic information, 
such as age, gender identity, racial/ethnic identity, and subjective English language proficiency 
was collected via a brief demographic questionnaire. All participants were asked to complete two 
self-report mood questionnaires, as well as a battery of seven standardized neuropsychological 
measures, each of which is described below. Following completion of the study procedures, 
participants were debriefed and compensated for their participation with 2.0 Psychology 101 
research credits. 
All data were collected in a Queens College laboratory setting. Data were secured and 
analyzed to yield descriptive measures and between-group comparisons for responses on the 
demographic and mood questionnaires and the neuropsychological test instruments.  Measures of 
semantic network activity were additionally entered into a mediation model to assess whether 
semantic network activity was a significant mediator of the relationship between mood and 





Participants included English-speaking Queens College students aged 18-35 years. A 
total of 122 participants were recruited for the study, and 120 participants were retained for data 
analyses.  Two participants were excluded from the analyses due to poor English language 
proficiency. All participants were recruited via the Queens College Human Subjects Pool of 
Introductory Psychology (Psychology 101) students, who are asked to participate in research 
studies as a course requirement. As participants were recruited from the Queens College Subjects 
Pool, it was expected that the sample may be somewhat unevenly distributed in terms of gender, 
because females are overrepresented in college psychology courses (Gregor & O’Brien, 2015), 
and age, due to the general age range of the student population enrolled in 100-level courses. 
However, the sample was expected to otherwise approximate the general population of American 
adults relatively well, given the size of the Psychology major at Queens College, which is an 
urban public college.  Inclusion criteria for the study included: 1) enrolled as a Queens College 
student, 2) aged 18 to 35 years, 3) fluent in English (by age 13 or earlier), 4) normal color vision, 
and 5) no history of neurological disorder, head injury, or psychiatric disorder.  Participants who 
did not satisfy all of the inclusion criteria were excluded from the study. 
 
Research Procedure 
 As described in the Overall Design section, participants completed one demographic 
information questionnaire, two self-report mood questionnaires, as well as a battery of seven 






Participants completed a brief paper-and-pencil demographic questionnaire.  The 
questionnaire contained 7 items, with a single question each related to self-reported 
characteristics including: 1) gender, 2) age, 3) native language, 4) racial/ethnic identity, 5) 
handedness, and 6) college major.  The final item on the questionnaire asked participants to self-
rate their English proficiency relative to a typical Queens College student on a 7-point Likert-
type scale. 
 
Mood Self-Report Measures 
 Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS-X) 
The PANAS-X (Watson & Clark, 1994) is a 60-item self-report paper-and-pencil 
questionnaire that independently assesses positive and negative affective features and was 
developed as an expanded version of the original 20-item PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988). The underlying assumption of the PANAS is that positive and negative affect are 
orthogonal dimensions, and, thus, each contributes variance to understanding how positive and 
negative affect guide cognition and behavior. Participants were given a list of 60 emotion words 
and phrases and asked to rate the extent to which they felt or experienced each, in general, using 
a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (very slightly/not at all) to 5 (extremely strongly). The 
PANAS-X has shown excellent reliability and validity and is only modestly influenced by 
demographic factors (Crawford & Henry, 2004).  
 
Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II) 
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The BDI-II (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) is a 21-item paper-and-pencil self-report 
measure with strong psychometric properties that assesses the presence and severity of a range of 
depressive symptoms.  The BDI-II has shown excellent reliability and validity in both clinical 
and nonclinical samples and measures unique aspects of depressive syndromes (via multiple 
factor analyses, generally a Cognitive-Affective symptom cluster and a Somatic-Vegitative 
symptom cluster are retained across different populations; see Whisman, Perez, & Ramel, 2000; 
Wang & Gorenstein, 2013). An item related to suicidality was removed from the BDI-II form 
that was administered to participants in this study to reduce the possibility that imminent 
intervention would be needed during the research procedure.  Participants rated the remaining 20 
BDI-II items using a scale ranging from 0 (symptom not experienced) to 3 (symptom 
experienced with great severity).  
 
Neuropsychological Test Battery 
 The neuropsychological test battery included the following seven standardized 
assessment instruments.  
 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale - Fourth Edition (WAIS-IV): Digit Span Subtest 
The WAIS-IV (Wechsler, 2014) is an intellectual function test that generally involves the 
administration of 10 subtests, each test loading onto 1 of 4 specific cognitive indices (i.e., 3 
Verbal Comprehension Index subtests, 3 Perceptual Reasoning Index tests, 2 Working Memory 
Index tests, and 2 Processing Speed Index tests). One subtest from the WAIS-IV was used for the 
proposed study: Digit Span. 
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Digit Span is a Working Memory Index subtest that includes 3 separate trials.  
Participants completed each trial by verbally reproducing strings of numbers in a certain order 
after the numbers were orally presented by the examiner. The first trial is a Digits Forward trial 
in which participants reproduce strings of digits in the same order they were presented and was 
used as a measure of basic auditory attention. The remaining two trials, Digits Backward and 
Digit Sequencing, were completed by reproducing strings of digits in the reverse order of their 
presentation and reproducing strings of digits in order from lowest to highest, respectively; these 
portions of the task were used as a measure of auditory working memory. 
 
Controlled Oral Word Association Test (COWAT) 
The COWAT (Benton, 1969) is a timed measure of verbal fluency in which examinees 
were prompted with a letter cue in 3 trials (i.e., F, A, and S) and asked to give as many unique 
words as possible beginning with the cued letter in 60 seconds per trial.  Participants were 
instructed to exclude proper nouns and variations of exemplars they produce with an identical 
semantic meaning differing by word suffix prior to completing each trial. The letter cue trials 
were followed by a single, 60-second category fluency trial in which examinees were asked to 
name as many animals as possible, regardless of the letter beginning its name. The COWAT was 
used to make between-group comparisons of both letter and semantic verbal fluency. 
The category fluency portion was also used to measure semantic network activation, as is 
considered appropriate from multidimensional scaling (MDS) analyses pioneered by Chan et al. 
(1993). These authors theorized that the serial position of exemplars produced on a category 
fluency task is informed by the spread of activation between juxtaposed semantic network nodes. 
As above, however, these methods rely on assessing semantic distance between all possible 
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contiguous combinations of only the most commonly produced exemplars. Because this method 
does not consider all exemplars produced by any given participant, SNAFU criteria, recently 
described by Zemla et al. (2020), was used to analyze semantic fluency responses.  This method 
analyzed the entire list of animals generated by each participant, such that each exemplar was 
coded as belonging to a specific semantic neighborhood, as defined by either animal type (e.g., 
exemplars, such as “poodle, cocker spaniel, or welsh corgi,” were coded together as belonging to 
a dog-related semantic neighborhood) or degree of relatedness (e.g., exemplars, such as “dog, 
cat, or mouse,” were coded together as belonging to a related, domesticated mammalian semantic 
neighborhood).  This allowed the number of semantic neighborhoods explored by each 
participant, as well as the average number of exemplars belonging to each neighborhood that a 
given participant produced, to be quantified.  In addition, this allowed the average continuous 
run size within each semantic neighborhood to be measured. These results were entered into 
analyses independently across participants to make between-group comparisons of semantic 
network activation (i.e., total number of semantic neighborhoods accessed, total number of 
exemplars produced within each neighborhood, and total number of exemplars produced during 
a within-neighborhood run) between trait mood groups. 
 
Auditory Naming Test (ANT) 
The Auditory Naming Test was originally developed by Hamberger and Seidel (2001, 
2003) to examine the differences between auditory and visual naming abilities and to examine 
their anatomic dissociation in temporal lobe epilepsy patients. This test has good psychometric 
properties and involves 50 timed auditory responsive naming trials for concrete nouns, which are 
based on brief verbal descriptions (e.g., “a house pet that purrs” should yield the response “cat”). 
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Examinees were allowed 20 seconds to name the item before a phonemic cue would be provided. 
Three scores are typically derived from this test: 1) total correctly named items, 2) mean 
response time for correct responses (within the 20-second time limit), and 3) total tip-of-the-
tongue responses (i.e., the sum of correct responses requiring 2 or more seconds and correct 
responses after a phonemic cue is provided).  
The Auditory Naming Test was used to assess both naming ability (i.e., total number 
correct), as well as semantic network access (i.e., mean correct response latencies) according to 
Collins and Loftus’ (1975) theory of semantic processing (e.g., the provision of disambiguating 
words activate semantic network nodes to narrow semantic search traces to the target word, as in 
“a house pet that purrs” leads to the access of the target node, “cat,” apart from all other possible 
house pets), which is also consistent with prior research procedures using naming latencies to 
characterize semantic network activity (Warren, 1977). For the analyses, only the total number 
correct and latency scores were considered. The tip-of-the-tongue response score was not 
considered, because semantic network access was operationalized as latency to produce the 
target word for each item, regardless of the duration of time required to generate the correct 
response. 
 
Wechsler Memory Scale – Fourth Edition (WMS-IV): Symbol Span Subtest 
The WMS-IV (Wechsler, 2014) is an instrument that assesses various aspects of memory 
functioning. It comprises 7 subtests, loading onto 5 memory index scores (i.e., Auditory 
Memory, Visual Memory, Visual Working Memory, Immediate Memory, and Delayed 
Memory). The Symbol Span (SSp) subtest is a Visual Working Memory index test involving 
multiple immediate recall trials of series of abstract figures and their sequence after a 5-second 
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presentation of each series. SSp was the only WMS-IV subtest administered in this study, and it 
served as a measure of non-verbal (i.e., visual and non-semantic) working memory.  
 
North American Adult Reading Test (NAART) 
The NAART (Blair & Spreen, 1989) is a reading test of 61 irregularly pronounced words, 
which assesses examinees’ familiarity with the test words and their ability to phonetically 
decipher unfamiliar irregular words. The NAART has been shown to provide reliable and valid 
estimates of verbal intelligence across age groups and exhibits excellent concurrent validity with 
other measures of verbal intellect. The NAART was administered to participants to estimate 
intellectual functioning by instructing participants to read the words on the NAART form aloud.  
They were additionally instructed to attempt to mentally sound out any unfamiliar words before 
providing a verbal response for those words.  Responses were compared to accepted 
pronunciations of each word to determine whether each response was correct. 
 
Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System (D-KEFS): Color-Word Interference Test and 
Trail Making Test 
The D-KEFS (Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001) is a comprehensive set of nine stand-alone 
tasks meant to assess various executive functions. Two tasks from the D-KEFS were used for the 
purpose of this study: the Color-Word Interference Test and the Trail Making Test. 
 Color-Word Interference Test 
 The Color-Word Interference Test is a variation of the Stroop Color-Word Test involving 
four trials. The first trial involves identifying swatches of colors printed in an array (i.e., a color 
identifying/naming trial), the second involves reading printed color names (i.e., a word-reading 
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trial), the third involves naming the color of the font in which a disparate color name is printed 
(i.e., an inhibition trial), and the fourth involves switching between identifying the disparate font 
color or reading the disparate color name (i.e., an inhibition and code-switching trial). The Color-
Word Interference Test was administered to participants, and the time to complete each trial was 
recorded. 
 Trail Making Test 
 The D-KEFS Trail Making Test is a variation of graphomotor speeded sequencing (i.e., a 
processing speed) and switching (i.e., cognitive flexibility) tasks introduced in the U.S. Army 
Individual Test Battery (US Army, 1944) and the Halstead-Reitan Battery (Reitan, 1955) of the 
1940s and 1950s. The D-KEFS version involves five trials, which involve a speeded visual 
scanning and cancellation trial, a number-sequencing trial, a letter-sequencing trial, a number-
letter sequencing trial, and a motor speed trial in which participants trace a dashed line as quickly 
as possible. Participants were directed to complete each trial according to the Administration 
Manual, and the time to complete each trail successfully was recorded. 
 
Deese-Roediger-McDermott Paradigm (DRM) 
 The DRM (Roediger & McDermott, 1995) is an adaptation of a single-trial, free recall, 
verbal list-learning task developed by Deese (1959).  The task was designed to assess false 
memory formation by examining the number of false-positive intrusion responses for related 
non-list items (i.e., “critical lures”) on a list of highly related words. The Stadler, Roediger, and 
McDermott (1999) modification involves a single presentation of 18 non-inter-related word lists 
of 15 highly intra-related words each, followed by immediate free recall trials between list 
presentations.  The 18 word lists used for this study were those identified by Stadler and 
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colleagues (1999) as the lists of words most frequently inducing false memories (i.e., participants 
reporting the specific critical lure associated with a given list’s trial) upon immediate recall of 
the word list.  Participants were read each of the 18 lists of words at a rate of 1 word per 2 
seconds by the examiner and instructed to provide all of the words from the list that they could 
recall.  The number of correctly recalled words and false-positive responses (i.e., produced 
critical lures; operationalized as aberrant semantic network activation) were recorded.  
 
Data Analyses  
Descriptive Statistics 
Data collected via the demographic questionnaire, mood assessment questionnaires, and 
neuropsychological test battery using methods described above were analyzed using SPSS 
version 25 and Microsoft Excel version 15.19.1. For each result collected on the measures 
described above, descriptive statistics were calculated for the entire sample.  The descriptive 
statistics calculated included the mean, standard deviation, median, and minimum and maximum 
values to better understand the range and distribution of the values obtained. 
Identifying Participant Groups for the Basis of Between-Groups Comparisons 
The first aim of this study was to examine the effect of trait mood on several executive 
functions, therefore, two participant groups were identified using mood questionnaire results.  
The PANAS-X positive and negative affect scale scores were used as the study independent 
variables and to define participant groups. Three different models were created according to 
methods used to define groups as described in the Results section below.  Briefly, the first model 
assessed between-group differences of “high positive” and “low positive” trait mood groups, 
using only the PANAS-X positive scale score to assess the contribution of positive trait moods to 
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executive functions and semantic network activity (termed the Positive Trait Mood Model). The 
second model considered only the PANAS-X negative scale score to define “high negative” and 
“low negative” trait mood groups to assess the contribution of negative trait mood to executive 
function and semantic network activity (termed the Negative Trait Mood Model). The third 
model considered both the PANAS-X positive and negative scale scores to define a “negative” 
trait mood group (i.e., participants whose difference between positive and negative affect scales 
fell below the median difference of the entire study sample) and a “positive” trait mood group 
(i.e., participants whose difference between positive and negative affect scales fell above the 
median difference of the entire study sample). The third model, termed the Difference Model, 
therefore, allowed the contribution of both positive trait mood and negative trait mood to be 
considered, as well as the degree to which the disparity between positive and negative trait 
moods contributed to the findings. 
Between-Groups Comparisons 
For each model, once participant groups were identified, the first study aim to compare 
executive function test results across trait mood groups was addressed.  Because the entire study 
sample was divided into two participant groups in each model, independent samples t-tests were 
applied to each model to compare means and identify significant between-groups differences on 
all of the neuropsychological measures collected.  All tests were 2-tailed and applied at the 0.05 
alpha-level of significance.   
Assessing Semantic Network Activity 
The second and third aims of the study were to examine the effects of trait mood on 
semantic network activity, via measures of semantic network access and activation, and to 
examine potential effects of semantic network activity on the relationship between trait mood 
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and executive function.  Semantic network access was operationalized as the average response 
latency on the Auditory Naming Test, and independent samples t-tests were applied to compare 
Auditory Naming Test response latencies between the two trait mood groups in each model (2-
tailed test at 0.05 alpha-level).  Semantic network activation was operationalized as the COWAT 
category fluency (i.e., Animal Naming) results using SNAFU criteria.  Analyses of the COWAT 
category fluency data compared total number of exemplars produced between trait mood groups 
for each model, as well as the mean number of semantic neighborhoods searched, the mean 
number of exemplars produced within each neighborhood, and the mean number of exemplars 
produced in contiguous neighborhood runs (according to the coding scheme described in the 
COWAT section above; independent samples t-test, 2-tailed, alpha=0.05).  Any significant 
between-group differences identified in semantic network access (i.e., Auditory Naming Test 
latency results) and/or semantic network activation (i.e., COWAT category fluency total 
exemplars, mean semantic neighborhoods, mean exemplars per neighborhood, and mean 
exemplars in neighborhood runs) were entered into a structural equation model using ALSCAL 
in SPSS 25. Post-hoc analyses using these data were explored via mediation analysis using 
Preacher and Hayes’ (2004) bootstrapping method in SPSS 25 through Haye’s PROCESS 
version 3.5 macro (i.e., Model 4, simple mediation model; Hayes, 2017).  Post-hoc canonical 
correlation analyses were also applied to each model to identify the most useful of the three 
models and to further explore relationships between executive function and semantic network 












The sample included 120 subjects, which was calculated to yield sufficient power via a 
power analysis in GPower (Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996; effect size R2 = .20,  = 0.05, 
number of tested predictors = 1, and total number of predictors = 7; 1- = 0.8). 
 
Participant Characteristics of the Entire Study Sample and the 3 Models’ Samples 
Demographic Questionnaire data were analyzed to examine participant characteristics for 
the entire study sample and the samples produced for each of the 3 study models. The 3 study 
models were generated to assess the effect of: 1) positive trait mood alone on semantic activity 
and executive functions, 2) negative trait mood alone on semantic activity and executive 
functions, and 3) positive and negative trait moods together on semantic activity and executive 
functions.  The entire study dataset included all 120 retained participants.  The Positive Trait 
Mood model (i.e., the Positive Model) included 117 participants, the Negative Trait Mood model 
(i.e., the Negative Model) included 115 participants, and the Positive and Negative Trait Mood 
model (i.e., the Difference Model) included 112 participants.  The study models differ in sample 
size because the criterion used to classify participants into comparison groups differed in each 
model.  For the Positive Model, participants from the study dataset were classified into High and 
Low Positive Trait Mood groups using the median PANAS-X Positive Affect score (i.e., the 
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High Positive trait mood group included participants with scores above the median Positive 
Affect score, and the Low Positive trait mood group included participants with scores below the 
median Positive Affect score).  For the Negative Model, participants from the study dataset were 
classified into High and Low Negative Trait Mood groups using the median PANAS-X Negative 
Affect score (i.e., the High Negative trait mood group included participants with scores above 
the median Negative Affect score, and the Low Negative trait mood group included participants 
with scores below the median Negative Affect score).  For the Difference Model, difference 
scores between PANAS-X Positive Affect and Negative Affect scores were generated, and the 
median difference score was used to classify participants from the study dataset into Positive 
(i.e., participants with difference scores above the median Positive Affect-Negative Affect score 
difference score) and Negative (i.e., below the median Positive Affect-Negative Affect score 
difference score) trait mood groups.  Because a median score was used to identify groups in each 
model, individuals whose scores fell at the median score for that model criterion were excluded 
from the analysis of that model, leading to differing sample sizes between the study models.  
Demographic Questionnaire data for the entire study dataset and the 3 study models are 
summarized in Table 1 below.  A two-way ANOVA was applied to participants’ age and self-
reported English language proficiency, and a Kruskal-Wallis test was applied to all categorical 
variables; no significant differences were observed between any samples (refer to Table 5 below 
for mood survey and neuropsychological test results for the entire study sample). 
Notably, participants, on average, indicated that they were as proficient or slightly more 
so than the entire Queens College student population (ratings of 4 indicate ratings of “As 
proficient” in English compared to the average student at Queens College).  Participants’ trait 
moods were evaluated using results from the BDI-II and PANAS-X.  On the BDI-II, all 
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participants in each sample obtained a non-depressed score (range=0-9), and because these 
results were so tightly clustered, BDI-II data were not used to define participant groups in any of 
the three study models.  The BDI-II results were highly unusual, but likely reflected adequate 
pre-screening procedures as the exclusion criteria included the presence of any mental disorder, 
such as depression.  As above, PANAS-X affect score data were used to define participant 
groups in all 3 models.  The PANAS-X scoring system yields a positive emotion scale score and 
a negative emotion scale score, which are independent of each other, as specific survey items 
load onto either scale (i.e., no PANAS-X items load onto both the positive and negative scales).  
Consistent with published normative data (Watson & Clark, 1994), participants tended to rate 
themselves higher on the positive scale than on the negative scale in the entire study sample and 
in each of the 3 model samples. Because the PANAS-X positive and negative affect scales are 
independent of each other, three models were generated: 1) a model that considered the effect of 
positive moods only (i.e., using the PANAS-X positive affect scale score); 2) a model that 
considered the effect of negative moods only (i.e., using the PANAS-X negative affect scale 
score); and 3) a model that considered the combined effect of positive and negative trait moods 
(i.e., using the PANAS-X positive and negative mood scale scores).  Results obtained in each of 
the 3 study models are described in the subsequent sections below. 
Table 1. Descriptive and Statistical Demographic Data for the Total Study and 3 Mood Model Samples 


















  M        SD 
 
 
  M        SD 
 
   
M         SD 
 
 
 M        SD 
 
 20.38    3.29 20.29    3.22 20.58    3.51 20.35   3.28 F(3, 460) = 
0.112; p=0.89 
Gender 
                                   n        %             n        %             n           %    
 
 n          % 
 
      Male 51   42.50 51    43.59 50      43.48 48      42.86 Kruskal-Wallis 




                                    n        % 
 
 n         % 
 
 n           % 
 
 n           % 
 
     Caucasian 44     36.67 44     37.61 44       38.26 42       37.50  
Kruskal-Wallis 
p=0.78 
     African 
        American 
17     14.17 17     14.53  17       14.78 16       14.29 
     Asian 38     31.67 35     29.91 34       29.75 34       30.36 
     Hispanic/ 
        Latinx 
21     17.50 21     17.95 20       17.39 20       17.86 
Handedness 
                                     n        % 
 
n           % 
 
n          % 
 
n            % 
 
      Right 103    85.83 101     86.32 99      86.09 96       85.71 Kruskal-Wallis 
p=0.22       Left 17      14.16 16       13.68 16      13.91 16       14.29 
Native Language 
                                    n         % 
 
n           % 
 
n         % 
 
n           % 
 
      English 96      80.00 93      79.49 92    80.00 91      81.25 Kruskal-Wallis 






 M       SD 
 
 
 M       SD 
 
 
 M       SD 
 
 
 M       SD 
 
 4.57    0.95 4.58    0.97 4.55    0.94 4.56    0.95 F(3, 460) = 
0.00326; p=1.00 
College Major 
                                    n          % 
 
 n          % 
 
 n         % 
 
 n        % 
 
      Psychology 77      64.17 74      63.25 74     64.35 71    63.39 Kruskal-Wallis 
p=0.34       Undecided 19      15.83 19      16.24 18     15.65 18    16.07 
      Other 24      20.00 24      20.51 23     20.00 23    20.54 
*No statistically significant differences between all samples observed 
 
Model 1: The Positive Trait Mood Model (Positive Model) 
Positive Model: Participant Groups 
 To address Aims 1 and 2 of the study and evaluate the contribution of positive moods to 
measures of executive function and semantic network activity, participant groups were defined 
using PANAS-X positive scale scores (median=29).  A single median-split was performed on the 
entire study dataset to identify two groups: 1) a high positive trait mood group, and 2) a low 
positive trait mood group.  Participants whose PANAS-X positive scale scores were greater than 
the median were assigned to the high positive trait mood group, and participants whose PANAS-
X positive scale scores were less than the median were assigned to the low positive trait mood 
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group. Three participants from the entire study sample were excluded from the Positive Model, 
because their PANAS-X positive affect scale score fell at the median score of 29 and they could 
not be assigned to either the high positive trait mood or low positive trait mood group.  Refer to 
Table 1 for demographic information pertaining to the Positive Model. 
Positive Model: Mood Survey and Neuropsychological Test Results 
 Descriptive statistics pertaining to the mood survey and neuropsychological test results 
are summarized in Table 2 below.  Independent samples t-tests were applied to compare means 
across the high and low positive trait mood groups across these variables and are also reflected in 
Table 2.  The implications of the results are described below. 
Table 2. Positive Trait Mood Model Mood and Neuropsychological Descriptive and Statistical Data 












< 29; n=58) 
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    Affect 
29.62 8.42 36.52 4.40 22.5 4.86 115 16.36 <.001* 
BDI-II 3.93 3.57 3.42 3.06 4.30 3.88 115 1.36 0.18 
NAART IQ 102.77 8.78 102.97 9.14 102.57 8.53 115 0.24 0.81 
ANT     
    Total Correct 49.80 0.63 49.71 0.82 49.90 0.31 115 1.65 0.10 
    Latency 1.32 0.25 1.29 0.24 1.33 0.23 115 0.92 0.36 
COWAT     
    FAS 44.34 5.47 44.81 5.86 44.26 5.31 115 0.53 0.60 
    Animals     
        Total 24.00 4.15 26.58 4.17 21.33 3.35 115 7.50 <.001* 
        Number 
          Neighborhoods 
4.61 0.55 4.70 0.56 4.53 0.70 115 1.45 0.15 
        Neighborhood 
          Exemplars 
6.73 0.66 6.87 0.78 6.66 0.69 115 1.54 0.13 
        Neighborhood 
          Run Size 
4.12 0.58 4.17 0.75 3.82 0.72 115 2.57 0.01* 
DRM     
      Total Correct 138.64 30.56 138.16 34.30 136.20 29.05 115 0.33 0.74 
      Critical Lures 7.12 3.36 7.45 2.66 5.93 3.21 115 2.79 0.006* 
D-KEFS Color-Word     
      Color Naming 26.48 3.37 26.71 3.50 26.17 3.10 115 0.88 0.38 




 BDI-II: Participants in the high positive trait mood and low negative trait mood groups 
did not differ significantly on their self-rated depressive symptomatology. 
NAART: Estimated verbal IQ on the NAART was not significantly different between 
groups, suggesting that participants in the high positive trait mood group and the low positive 
trait mood group demonstrated similar intellectual functioning. 
ANT: There were no statistically significant differences in participants’ ANT total and 
latency scores, suggesting that the ability and speed at which words could be identified based on 
their verbal descriptions (i.e., semantic network access) was similar across mood groups. 
COWAT: Participants in the high positive trait mood and low negative trait mood groups 
produced a similar number of exemplars on the letter fluency task which were not significantly 
different.  Participants in the high positive trait mood group produced significantly more animal 
names than did participants in the low positive trait mood group on the category fluency task 
(Animal Naming), which suggested that a higher trait positive mood was associated with greater 
semantic network activation.  Participants in the high positive trait mood group also produced 
significantly more consecutive within-semantic neighborhood animal names than did those in the 
      Color-Word 51.21 7.56 52.68 8.32 49.13 6.18 115 2.62 0.01* 
      Switching 60.88 7.63 63.58 7.90 56.67 5.26 115 5.56 <.001* 
D-KEFS Trail Making     
      Scanning 21.60 3.32 21.33 3.39 21.90 3.33 115 0.92 0.36 
      Number 
          Sequencing 
30.94 4.28 30.55 4.72 31.03 4.06 115 0.59 0.56 
    Letter Sequencing 30.29 4.16 30.23 3.80 30.33 4.29 115 0.13 0.89 
    Number-Letter 
          Sequencing 
72.48 7.64 76.48 7.10 67.17 5.29 115 8.03 <.001* 
    Speed 20.64 2.04 20.29 1.94 20.87 1.96 115 1.61 0.11 
WAIS-IV DS     
    Total 27.80 2.59 27.77 2.58 27.83 2.55 115 0.13 0.90 
    DSF 10.81 1.55 10.98 1.57 10.70 1.32 115 1.04 0.30 
    DSB 7.87 2.70 7.45 2.69 8.43 2.86 115 1.91 0.06 
    DSS 8.38 1.46 8.16 1.39 8.47 1.54 115 1.14 0.26 
WMS-IV SSp 27.61 4.36 27.42 4.51 26.80 4.12 115 0.78 0.43 
*Statistically significant result at alpha-level = 0.01 
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low positive trait mood group, which also suggested that more positive moods are associated 
with greater semantic network activation (and in particular, greater sustained intra-neighborhood 
search).  There were no significant between-groups differences in the number of semantic 
neighborhoods explored, or the total number of exemplars produced in each neighborhood. 
 DRM: The number of target words produced on the DRM were not statistically 
significant between the high positive trait mood and low negative trait mood groups, indicating 
similar verbal list-learning and memory between groups.  However, participants in the high 
positive trait mood group produced significantly more critical lures on the DRM than did 
participants in the low positive trait mood group, which, additionally, suggested that higher 
positive trait moods are associated with greater semantic network activation/poorer inhibition of 
this activation (in particular, activation that is aberrant as reflected by generating conceptually 
proximal non-target words). 
 D-KEFS: Color-Word Interference Test: There were no significant between-groups 
differences for the Scanning, Color Naming, Word Reading, or Speed trials.  However, 
participants in the low positive trait mood group required significantly less time to complete the 
D-KEFS Color-Word inhibition trial than did participants in the high positive trait mood group, 
which suggested that lower positive trait moods are associated with more efficient inhibition of 
prepotent responses.  Participants in the low positive trait mood group also required significantly 
less time to complete the D-KEFS Color-Word Switching trial compared to participants in the 
higher positive trait mood group, further suggesting that low positive trait moods are associated 




 Trail Making: There were no significant between-groups differences in sequencing 
numbers, letters, or alternating between these stimuli while sequencing them.  However, 
participants in the low positive trait mood group required significantly less time to complete the 
D-KEFS Trail Making Number-Letter Switching trial than did participants in the high positive 
trait mood group, which also suggested that lower positive trait moods are associated with better 
inhibition and code-switching abilities in a visuo-graphomotor paradigm. 
 WAIS-IV Digit Span:  There were no significant between-groups differences across 
DSF, DSB, DSS trails or the total DS score, suggesting auditory attention and working memory 
between groups was similar. 
 WMS-IV Symbol Span:  WMS-IV SSp performance was not significantly different 
between the high positive trait mood and low positive trait mood groups, suggesting that non-
verbal working memory was similar between groups. 
Positive Model: Structural Equation Model 
To address Aim 3, structural equation modelling (SEM) was attempted using ALSCAL in 
SPSS 25.  The PANAS-X positive affect scale score was used as the sole grouping variable, and 
the COWAT Animal Naming variables were entered as predictor variables.  BDI-II scores were 
not entered as a grouping variable nor were ANT variables entered as predictor variables, due to 
non-significant between-group differences on these measures.  SEM failed, and a structural 
equation could not be produced. 
Positive Model: Post-Hoc Analyses 
 Because the Positive Model SEM was unsuccessful, post-hoc analyses were applied to 
address Aim 3, to explore relationships between variables in the dataset, and to examine any 
influence exerted by semantic network activity in the mood-executive function relationship. 
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 Positive Model: Correlation Analyses 
 Given failure of the SEM procedure, correlation analyses were conducted between all 
mood and neuropsychological variables in the dataset to explore any relationships among them.  
See Appendix 1.1 for all Positive Model correlation analysis results.  Correlations that were 
statistically significant are highlighted below. 
 The PANAS-X positive affect scale score was moderately correlated with BDI-II scores, 
such that participants who reported higher positive trait moods on the PANAS-X also reported 
less depressed moods on the BDI-II.  This result indicated that participants reliably reported their 
moods across the study mood measures and, to a lesser extent, suggested the existence of a single 
negative-positive mood dimension as assumed in the study design.  Participants also appeared to 
reliably report their English language proficiency, as higher self-ratings were weakly, albeit 
positively, correlated with better single-word reading performance on the NAART, and faster 
word identification on the ANT when given definitions of the target words. 
 The PANAS-X positive affect scale score was moderately correlated with the total 
Animal Naming score such that participants reporting higher positive trait moods produced more 
animal names, suggesting that positive moods were associated with increased semantic network 
activation.  In addition, PANAS-X positive affect scale scores were weakly associated with 
Animal Naming average neighborhood run size, such that participants reporting higher positive 
trait moods demonstrated greater sustained intra-neighborhood semantic activity.  Similarly, the 
PANAS-X positive affect scale score was moderately correlated with total DRM critical lures, 
such that participants reporting higher positive trait moods produced more critical lures than 
participants reporting less positive trait moods, suggesting increasingly positive moods to be 
associated with greater (aberrant) semantic network activation and poorer inhibition of this 
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activation.  This was additionally supported by a weak correlation between BDI-II scores and 
DRM critical lures such that participants reporting less depressed moods produced more false-
positive DRM responses. 
 The PANAS-X positive affect scale score was weakly correlated with the D-KEFS Color-
Word Switching scores such that higher positive trait moods were associated with greater 
latencies to complete the reading inhibition and code switching visuo-lexical task (i.e., poorer 
inhibition performance).  The PANAS-X positive affect scale score was also moderately 
correlated with the D-KEFS Trail Making Number-Letter Switching, indicating higher positive 
trait moods were associated with poorer inhibition, notably, within a different modality (i.e., 
visuographomotor). 
 Animal Naming total scores were moderately correlated to D-KEFS inhibition tasks (i.e., 
D-KEFS Color-Word Switching and D-KEFS Trail Making Number-Letter Switching), such that 
participants who produced more exemplars in a category fluency task demonstrated poorer 
inhibition performance.  Animal Naming mean neighborhood run size was also moderately 
correlated with DRM critical lures, which indicated that participants who exhibited greater intra-
neighborhood semantic network activation also demonstrated greater aberrant semantic network 
activity in a verbal learning and memory task.  DRM critical lure responses were also moderately 
correlated with these D-KEFS inhibition tasks, further suggesting that greater semantic network 
activation is associated with poorer inhibition. 
 Positive Model: Factor Analyses 
 Exploratory factor analyses were conducted to describe the Positive Model variability, 
given the significant correlations noted above.  Factor analysis was applied to identify the initial 
 
 85 
factor solution and determinant; the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test and Bartlett’s test of sphericity 
were applied. Extractions were made using eigenvalues > 1, and varimax rotation was applied. 
The first exploratory factor analysis was conducted using every mood and 
neuropsychological variable in the Positive Model to assess all components within the model.  
This factor analysis failed as the degree of dissimilarity between the variables was too great for 
successful modeling (determinant=1.48E-6; Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO)=0.476).  The analysis 
retained 8 factors which explained 72.23% of the model variance.  Although the number of 
factors retained was fewer than the total number of individual variables entered into the matrix, it 
was greater than the total number of independent measures used in the study protocol, further 
supporting model failure. 
Because the all-variables model failed, a second exploratory factor analysis was applied 
to a restricted set of variables, which included the 6 variables with significant between-group 
differences described above. Specifically, these were the significant semantic network activation 
variables (i.e., Animal Naming total and Animal Naming average neighborhood run size) and the 
significant inhibition variables (i.e., D-KEFS Color Word Interference Test Color-Word trial, D-
KEFS Color Word Interference Test Switching trial, D-KEFS Trail Making Number-Letter 
Switching trial, and DRM critical lures).  The 6-variable restricted factor analysis was successful 
(determinant=0.337; KMO=0.591, p=0.001) with no multicolinearity observed (r for all variables 
in matrix < 0.520).  The analysis retained 2 components which accounted for 57.75% of the 
model variance.  The rotated factor solution converged in 3 iterations and showed the 
components to be strongly related to semantic network activation (Component 1; Animal 
Naming total factor loading=0.584 and Animal Naming neighborhood run size factor 
loading=0.569) and inhibition (Component 2; D-KEFS Color-Word trial factor loading=0.824, 
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D-KEFS Switching factor loading=0.776, D-KEFS Number-Letter Switching trail factor 
loading=0.794, and DRM critical lures factor loading=0.688). 
 Positive Model: Mediation Analyses 
 Because of the apparent strong dichotomy between components identified by the 
restricted 6-variable factor analysis, post-hoc mediation analysis was conducted to assess 
potential mediation of mood to inhibition (X-Y, c` path) through semantic network activity (via 
M; a1, b1 path) using the same 6 variables.  Analyses were applied using Hayes’ PROCESSv3.5 
SPSS macro in SPSS 25. 
 A 3x3 matrix was generated to test all 9 possible combinations of the semantic network 
activation variables as mediators of each inhibition variable regressed onto the independent 
variable mood group, and the inhibition variables as mediators of each semantic network 
activation variables regressed onto the independent variable mood group.  Although DRM 
critical lures loaded on the “inhibition” factor, it was entered into the mediation analysis as a 
semantic activation variable due to the generative nature of the DRM task and the fundamental 
difference between critical lure provision and the explicit, effortful response suppression 
required in the D-KEFS inhibition tasks.  Every iteration of the simple mediation model failed 
(all bootstrapped confidence intervals for all a1 to b1 paths included 0). 
 Positive Model: Canonical Correlation Analyses 
 Because the SEM procedure and mediation analyses failed, an ad-hoc post-hoc analysis 
was applied to evaluate canonical correlations between the inhibition and semantic network 
activation variable sets that produced the successful restricted-variable factor analysis. 
 Canonical correlation analysis indicated that on the basis of positive trait moods, 
semantic network activation was generally positively correlated with greater inhibition 
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interference (i.e., poorer inhibition performance; Wilks lambda=0.39; p=0.001).  The canonical 
correlation coefficient (r=0.49) explained 82.10% of the variance with an eigenvalue of 1.08, 
demonstrating good model fit.  The primary canonical root was significant (F=4.29; p=0.001).  
Moderate-to-strong positive correlations were observed between the inhibition variables and the 
primary canonical correlate, such that greater inhibition interference was observed with greater 
semantic network activation, especially as task demands increased to include code switching (rD-
KEFS Trail Making Number-Letter Switching=0.59; rD-KEFS Color Word Interference Color-Word=0.25; rD-KEFS Color Word 
Interference Switching=0.62; rDRM Critical Lures=0.65).  Moderate-to-strong positive correlations were 
observed between the semantic network activation variables and the primary canonical correlate, 
such that semantic network activity increased over the duration of a spontaneous list-generating 
task (rAnimal Naming Total=0.62), but less so in focused intra-neighborhood search strategies that 
excluded inter-semantic neighborhood switches (rAnimal Naming Neighborhood Run Size=0.41). 
 
Model 2: The Negative Trait Mood Model (Negative Model) 
Negative Model: Participant Groups 
 To address Aims 1 and 2 of the study and evaluate the contribution of negative trait 
moods to measures of executive function and semantic network activity, a second model was 
generated using the entire study sample.  Participant groups were defined using the median 
PANAS-X negative affect scale score (median=23).  A single median-split was again performed 
on the entire study dataset to identify two groups: 1) a high negative trait mood group, and 2) a 
low negative trait mood group.  Participants whose PANAS-X negative affect scale scores were 
greater than the median were assigned to the high negative trait mood group (PANAS-X negative 
affect scale score>23; N=58), and participants whose PANAS-X negative affect scale scores 
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were less than the median were assigned to the low negative trait mood group (PANAS-X 
negative affect scale score<23; N=57). Five participants were excluded from the Negative Model 
analyses, because their PANAS-X negative affect scale score fell at the median score of 23 and 
they could not be assigned to either the high negative trait mood or low negative trait mood 
group.  Refer to Table 1 for demographic data pertaining to the Negative Model dataset.   
Negative Model: Mood Survey and Neuropsychological Test Results 
Descriptive statistics pertaining to the mood survey and neuropsychological test results 
are summarized in Table 3 below.  Independent samples t-tests were applied to compare means 
across the high and low negative trait mood groups on these variables and are also reflected in 
Table 3.  The implications of the results are described below. 
Table 3. Negative Trait Mood Model Mood and Neuropsychological Descriptive and Statistical Data 
 Entire 
Negative 







































   Affect 
22.42 7.08 27.83 4.41 15.88 2.86 113 17.21 <.001* 
BDI-II 4.82 3.68 5.00 3.62 4.30 3.64 113 1.03 0.30 
NAART IQ 103.53 8.87 102.45 8.48 104.83 9.14 113 1.45 0.15 
ANT     
    Total Correct 49.83 0.61 49.82 0.60 49.83 0.64 113 0.09 0.93 
    Latency 1.33 0.25 1.34 0.22 1.32 0.24 113 0.47 0.64 
COWAT     
    FAS 44.49 5.50 44.83 5.83 44.08 5.17 113 0.73 0.47 
    Animal Naming       
        Total 23.59 4.26 21.47 3.08 26.21 4.04 113 7.08 <.001* 
        Number 
           Neighborhoods 
4.25 0.60 4.48 0.68 4.28 0.67 113 1.59 0.12 
        Neighborhood 
           Exemplars 
6.50 0.71 6.63 0.68 6.76 0.75 113 0.97 0.33 
        Neighborhood 
            Run Size 
3.82 0.81 3.11 0.72 3.87 0.77 113 5.47 <.001* 
DRM     
    Total Correct 136.64 32.33 136.24 31.11 137.13 34.42 113 0.15 0.88 




BDI-II: No significant difference was observed in the self-reported depressive 
symptomatology of the high negative and low negative trait mood groups. 
NAART: No significant difference was observed between the high negative trait mood 
and low negative trait mood groups’ single word reading, suggesting intellectual functioning 
between groups was similar. 
ANT: No significant differences were observed between the high negative trait mood and 
low negative trait mood groups’ ability and speed to identify words based on their verbal 
descriptions, suggesting semantic network access was similar between groups. 
COWAT: Letter fluency (FAS) was not significantly different between the high and low 
negative trait mood groups.  However, participants in the low negative trait mood group 
produced significantly more animal names on Animal Naming than did participants in the high 
negative trait mood group, which suggested that less negative trait moods are associated with 
greater semantic network activation.  Participants in the low negative trait mood group produced 
significantly more consecutive within-semantic neighborhood animal names than did those in the 
D-KEFS Color-Word     
    Color Naming 26.53 3.42 26.66 3.27 26.38 3.67 113 0.43 0.67 
    Word Reading 22.66 2.41 22.83 2.54 22.46 2.28 113 0.82 0.41 
    Color-Word 50.68 7.70 48.83 7.28 52.92 7.75 113 2.92 0.004* 
    Switching 59.94 7.52 57.34 6.59 63.08 7.49 113 4.37 <.001* 
D-KEFS Trail Making     
    Scanning 21.66 3.36 22.21 3.19 21.01 3.50 113 1.92 0.06 
    Number Sequencing 31.04 4.42 32.00 4.33 30.88 4.35 113 1.38 0.17 
    Letter Sequencing 30.49 4.17 30.66 4.20 30.29 4.23 113 0.47 0.64 
    Number-Letter 
       Sequencing 
70.86 7.50 68.24 6.90 74.04 7.01 113 4.48 <.001* 
    Speed 20.62 2.17 20.97 1.64 20.21 2.47 113 1.92 0.06 
WAIS-IV DS     
    Total 27.62 2.66 27.79 2.18 27.42 3.19 113 0.73 0.47 
    DSF 10.85 1.53 10.72 1.49 10.98 1.35 113 0.98 0.33 
    DSB 7.36 1.66 7.31 2.00 7.38 2.11 113 0.18 0.86 
    DSS 8.37 1.50 8.55 1.35 8.17 1.66 113 1.35 0.18 
WMS-IV SSp 26.81 4.09 26.52 4.19 27.12 4.02 113 0.78 0.44 
*Statistically significant result at alpha-level = 0.01 
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high negative trait mood group, which suggested that less negative trait moods are associated 
with greater semantic network activation (in particular, continued intra-neighborhood search).  
The number of semantic neighborhoods explored or the number of exemplars produced within 
each neighborhood was not significantly different between groups. 
 DRM: The total number of DRM targets produced on the DRM between the low 
negative trait mood group and the high negative trait mood group were similar, suggesting 
similar verbal list-learning and memory across groups.  However, participants in the low 
negative trait mood group produced significantly more critical lures than did participants in the 
high negative trait mood group, which suggested that less negative trait moods are associated 
with greater (aberrant) semantic network activation/poorer inhibition of this activation. 
 D-KEFS: Color-Word Interference Test: Color-naming and word-reading speed was not 
significantly different between the high negative trait mood and low negative trait mood groups.  
Participants in the high negative trait mood group, however, required significantly less time to 
complete the Color-Word trial than did participants in the low negative trait mood group, which 
suggested that more negative trait moods are associated with more efficient inhibition.  
Participants in the high negative trait mood group also required significantly less time to 
complete the Switching trial compared to participants in the low negative mood group, which 
further suggested that more negative trait moods are associated with more efficient inhibition, as 
well as more efficient code-switching. 
 Trail Making: Scanning, Number Sequencing, Letter Sequencing, and Speed trials were 
not significantly different between high negative trait mood and low negative trait mood groups.  
However, participants in the high negative trait mood group required significantly less time to 
complete the Number-Letter Switching trial than did participants in the low negative trait mood 
 
 91 
group, which, similar to Color-Word Interference Test results, suggested that more negative trait 
moods are associated with more efficient inhibition and code switching. 
 WAIS-IV Digit Span:  No significant differences were observed between the high 
negative trait mood and low negative trait mood groups on DSF, DSB, DSS or DS total score, 
suggesting auditory attention and working memory were similar between groups. 
 WMS-IV Symbol Span:  SSp performance between the high negative trait mood and 
low negative trait mood groups was not significantly different, suggesting similar non-verbal 
working memory abilities between groups. 
Negative Model: Structural Equation Model 
To address Aim 3, SEM for the Negative Model data was attempted using ALSCAL in 
SPSS 25.  The analysis was conducted similarly as in the Positive Model; for the Negative 
Model, the PANAS-X negative affect scale score was used as the sole grouping variable, and the 
Animal Naming variables were entered as predictor variables.  Neither the BDI-II score nor the 
ANT variables were entered as predictor variables, because there were no significant between-
group differences in these variables (as in the Positive Model).  Similar to the Positive Model 
SEM, the Negative Model SEM also failed, and a structural equation could not be generated. 
Negative Model: Post-Hoc Analyses 
 Because the Negative Model SEM was unsuccessful, post hoc analyses as conducted in 
the Positive Model were applied to the Negative Model to address study Aim 3 and explore 
relationships among Negative Model variables. 
 Negative Model: Correlation Analyses 
 Correlation analyses were conducted between all mood and neuropsychological variables 
in the Negative Model dataset to examine any relationships among them.  Refer to Appendix 1.2 
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for all Negative Model correlation analysis results.  Statistically significant correlations are 
highlighted below. 
 The PANAS-X negative affect scale score was strongly correlated with BDI-II scores 
such that participants reporting higher negative trait moods on the PANAS-X reported more 
depressed moods on the BDI-II.  This result further suggested that participants reliably reported 
negative mood severity across the study mood measures.  Participants, again, appeared to 
reliably report their English language proficiency, as higher self-ratings were moderately 
correlated with better single-word reading on the NAART and faster word identification based 
on their definitions on the ANT. 
 The PANAS-X negative affect scale score was strongly correlated with the total Animal 
Naming score such that participants reporting less negative trait moods produced significantly 
more animal names, suggesting that less negative trait moods were associated with increased 
semantic network activation.  In addition, PANAS-X negative affect scale scores were weakly 
associated with Animal Naming average neighborhood run size, such that participants reporting 
less negative trait moods demonstrated greater sustained intra-neighborhood semantic activity.  
Similarly, the PANAS-X negative affect scale score was moderately correlated with total DRM 
critical lures such that participants reporting less negative trait moods produced more critical 
lures than participants reporting more negative trait moods, suggesting increasingly negative 
moods to be associated with less (aberrant) semantic network activation/better inhibition of this 
activation.  This was further supported by a weak correlation between BDI-II scores and DRM 




 The PANAS-X negative affect scale score was moderately correlated with D-KEFS 
Color-Word Switching scores such that higher negative trait moods were associated with shorter 
latencies to complete the reading inhibition and code switching task (i.e., better inhibition 
performance).  The PANAS-X negative affect scale score was also moderately correlated with 
D-KEFS Trail Making Number-Letter Switching, indicating higher negative traits moods were 
associated with more efficient inhibition as well. 
 Animal Naming total scores were moderately correlated with D-KEFS Color-Word 
Switching and D-KEFS Trail Making Number-Letter Switching, such that participants who 
produced more exemplars in a verbal fluency task generally demonstrated poorer inhibition 
performance.  Animal Naming mean neighborhood run size was also weakly correlated with 
DRM total hits, which, again, indicated that participants who exhibited greater intra-
neighborhood semantic network activation demonstrated better learning and memory for 
semantically-related words.  DRM critical lure responses were also moderately correlated with 
D-KEFS Color-Word Switching and Trail Making Number-Letter Switching scores, further 
suggesting greater semantic network activation to be related to poorer inhibition performance. 
 Negative Model: Factor Analyses 
 As in the Positive Model, exploratory factor analyses were conducted using the Negative 
Model data to further explore correlations between negative trait mood and neuropsychological 
variables.  The analysis was applied to describe the initial solution and the determinant and 
rotated factor solution.  The analysis was conducted using identical criteria as used in the 
Positive Model (i.e., extraction eigenvalues > 1, Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test, Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity, varimax rotation). 
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The first exploratory factor analysis for the Negative Model was applied using all mood 
and neuropsychological variables as in the Positive Model.  The all-variables factor analysis 
again failed (determinant=9.758E-6; KMO=0.435), retaining 7 factors that explained 69.03% of 
the model variance.  
A second restricted-variable exploratory factor analysis was applied, again, using the 
same 6 variables as in the Positive Model, which in the Negative Model also yielded significant 
between-groups differences.  These included semantic network activation variables (i.e., Animal 
Naming total and Animal Naming average neighborhood run size) and inhibition variables (i.e., 
D-KEFS Color Word Interference Test Color-Word trial, D-KEFS Color Word Interference Test 
Switching trial, and D-KEFS Trail Making Number-Letter Switching trial, and DRM critical 
lures).  The restricted factor analysis was successful (determinant=0.290; KMO=0.613, p=0.001) 
with no evidence of multicolinearity (r for all variables in matrix < 0.520).  The analysis retained 
2 components which accounted for 58.16% of the model variance.  The rotated factor solution 
converged in 3 iterations and showed that, similar to the Positive Model, the Negative Model 
factor analysis components were strongly related to semantic network activation (Component 1; 
Animal Naming total factor loading=0.769, Animal Naming neighborhood run size factor 
loading=0.549) and inhibition (Component 2; D-KEFS Color-Word trial factor loading=0.914, 
D-KEFS Switching factor loading=0.750, D-KEFS Number-Letter Switching trail factor 
loading=0.849, DRM critical lures factor loading=0.607). 
 Negative Model: Mediation Analyses 
 Because the Negative Model restricted factor analysis identified dichotomous 
components similar to those identified in the Positive Model, a post-hoc mediation analysis was 
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conducted to assess mediation of mood to inhibition (X-Y; c` path) through semantic network 
activity (via M; a1, b1 path) using similar criteria via Hayes’ (2017) PROCESSv3.5 SPSS macro. 
 Similar to the Positive Model, a 3x3 matrix was generated to test the 9 possible 
combinations of the semantic network activation variables as mediators of each inhibition 
variable regressed onto the independent variable mood group, and the inhibition variables as 
mediators of each semantic network activation variables regressed onto the independent variable 
mood group.  As in the Positive Model, the DRM critical lures score was entered into the 
Negative Model mediation analyses as a semantic activation variable despite loading on the 
“inhibition” component of the Negative Model factor analysis (see rationale in Positive Model: 
Mediation Analyses section above).  Also, as in the Positive Model, every iteration of the 
Negative Model simple mediation model failed (i.e., all bootstrapped confidence intervals for all 
a1 to b1 paths included 0). 
 Negative Model: Canonical Correlation Analyses 
 Canonical correlations were analyzed between the inhibition and semantic network 
activation variable sets that produced the successful Negative Model restricted-variable factor 
analysis. 
 Canonical correlation analysis indicated that on the basis of negative moods, semantic 
network activation was generally positively correlated with inhibition interference (i.e., greater 
semantic network activation was associated with more time to complete speeded tasks involving 
effortful inhibition; Wilks lambda=0.38; F=4.49; p=0.001).  The primary canonical correlation 
coefficient (r=0.56) explained 87.31% of the variance with an eigenvalue of 1.01, indicating 
adequate model fit.  Again, the primary canonical root was significant (F=4.27; p=0.001).  
Moderate-to-strong positive correlations were observed between the inhibition variable latencies 
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and the primary canonical correlate such that poorer inhibition performance was observed with 
greater semantic network activation, again, as task demands increased (rD-KEFS Trail Making Number-
Letter Switching=0.65; rD-KEFS Color Word Interference Color-Word=0.63; rD-KEFS Color Word Interference Switching=0.70; 
rDRM Critical Lures=0.66).  Similar to Positive Model findings, moderate-to-strong positive 
correlations were observed between the semantic network activation variables and the primary 
canonical correlate such that semantic network activity increased over the duration of list-
generating tasks (rAnimal Naming Total=0.69), but the increase in semantic network activity was 
smaller in focused intra-neighborhood search strategies that excluded inter-semantic 
neighborhood cluster switches (rAnimal Naming Neighborhood Run Size=0.38). 
 
Model 3: The Effect of Positive and Negative Mood (Difference Model) 
Difference Model: Participant Groups 
 To address Aims 1 and 2 of the study and evaluate the contribution of positive and 
negative trait moods to measures of executive function and semantic network activity, especially 
considering the similar findings between the Positive and Negative Models, participant groups 
were defined in a third model using both PANAS-X positive affect scale scores and negative 
affect scale scores.  As above, the PANAS-X yields positive and negative affect scales that are 
independent of one another, and because participants tend to give higher positive ratings than 
negative ratings of their moods, it is difficult to discern a mood variable that would exist along a 
single negative-to-positive mood axis as described by the circumplex model.  Similarly, 
independent positive and negative mood ratings may mask each other and cannot simply be 
collapsed into dichotomous more positive/less negative and less positive/more negative groups 
(i.e., some respondents might rate themselves high in both positive and negative emotion, low in 
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both positive and negative emotion, or any combination).  Indeed, a fourth 2x2 model was 
attempted using the median PANAS-X positive and negative mood scores from the Positive and 
Negative Models as part of the data analysis, but was not conducted due to large discrepancies in 
sample sizes among the 4 groups it generated (i.e., NHigh Positive/High Negative=9; NHigh Positive/Low 
Negative=46; NLow Positive/High Negative=47; NLow Positive/Low Negative=10; 8 participants excluded), further 
suggesting the need for a model that considered mood as a single dimension.  
To address this need, the Difference Model was constructed, which considered both the 
PANAS-X positive affect scale score and the PANAS-X negative affect scale score.  To do this, 
a difference score was generated for each participant to compare positive and negative trait mood 
ratings, by subtracting the PANAS-X negative affect scale score from the PANAS-X positive 
affect scale score.  This not only yields a single variable (termed PANAS-XDifference) that 
considers both positive and negative mood ratings, but it also reflects the magnitude of disparity 
between individuals’ positive and negative self-ratings (i.e., the absolute value of PANAS-
XDifference).  Once PANAS-XDifference scores were calculated for each participant, a single median-
split was performed on the entire study dataset to identify two groups: 1) a “positive” trait mood 
group, and 2) a “negative” trait mood group.  Participants whose PANAS-XDifference score was 
greater than the median difference score were assigned to the positive trait mood group 
(PANAS-XDifference score>11), and participants whose PANAS-XDifference score was less than the 
median difference score were assigned to the negative trait mood group (PANAS-XDifference 
score<11). Eight participants were excluded from Difference Model analyses because their 
PANAS-XDifference scores fell at the median difference score of 11 and could not be assigned to 
either the positive or negative trait mood group.  Refer to Table 1 for demographic data 
pertaining to Difference Model participant characteristics. 
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Difference Model: Mood Survey and Neuropsychological Test Results 
Descriptive statistics pertaining to the mood survey and neuropsychological test results 
are summarized in Table 4 below.  Independent samples t-tests were applied to compare means 
across the positive and negative trait mood groups across these variables and are also reflected in 
Table 4.  The implications of the results are described below. 
Table 4. Difference Model Mood and Neuropsychological Descriptive and Statistical Data 
 Entire 
Difference 




































   (Positive-Negative) 
7.60 13.18 18.89 5.72 -3.77 8.76 110 16.21 <.001* 
BDI-II 3.60 3.57 3.13 3.08 4.07 3.66 110 1.48 0.14 
NAART IQ 102.92 8.71 103.38 8.08 102.57 8.62 110 0.51 0.61 
ANT     
    Total Correct 49.81 0.62 49.76 0.69 49.93 0.20 110 1.77 0.08 
    Latency 1.31 0.25 1.29 0.25 1.34 0.22 110 1.12 0.26 
COWAT     
    FAS 44.33 5.43 44.38 5.28 44.27 5.72 110 0.11 0.92 
    Animals     
        Total 23.87 4.15 26.86 3.19 20.97 3.05 110 9.99 <.001* 
        Number 
           Neighborhoods 
4.24 0.63 4.34 0.68 4.13 0.51 110 1.85 0.07 
        Neighborhood 
            Exemplars 
6.60 0.75 6.66 0.72 6.53 0.76 110 0.93 0.35 
        Neighborhood 
            Run Size 
3.75 0.77 3.94 0.81 3.57 0.73 110 2.54 0.01* 
DRM     
    Total Correct 137.48 31.18 137.30 31.81 138.20 32.86 110 0.15 0.88 
    Critical Lures 6.14 3.12 7.86 2.68 4.53 2.86 110 6.36 <.001* 
D-KEFS Color-Word     
    Color Naming 26.49 3.25 26.31 3.24 26.30 3.25 110 0.02 0.99 
    Word Reading 22.54 2.34 22.68 2.42 22.40 2.28 110 0.63 0.53 
    Color-Word 50.71 7.56 53.17 8.27 48.77 6.65 110 3.10 0.02* 
    Switching 59.89 7.62 64.45 7.40 56.27 5.45 110 6.66 <.001* 
D-KEFS Trail Making     
    Scanning 21.49 3.30 21.07 3.37 22.13 3.25 110 1.69 0.09 
    Number Sequencing 31.36 4.32 30.79 4.23 31.93 3.26 110 1.60 0.11 
    Letter Sequencing 30.38 4.00 30.31 3.09 30.60 4.25 110 0.41 0.68 
    Number-Letter 
        Sequencing 
71.89 7.92 77.52 6.75 66.57 4.84 110 9.87 <.001* 




 BDI-II:  No significant difference was observed between the positive and negative trait 
mood groups BDI-II scores, indicating similar depressive symptomatology between groups. 
NAART: NAART estimate verbal IQ was not significantly different between the positive 
and negative trait mood groups suggesting equivalent intellectual functioning between groups. 
ANT:  No significant differences were observed between ANT total scores and average 
response latencies between the positive and negative trait mood groups, indicating similar 
semantic network access between groups. 
COWAT: Letter fluency (FAS) results were not significantly different between the 
positive and negative trait mood groups.  Participants in the positive trait mood group produced 
significantly more animal names than did participants in the negative trait mood group on the 
category fluency task (Animal Naming), which suggested again that higher positive trait moods 
are associated with greater semantic network activation.  Participants in the positive trait mood 
group also produced significantly more consecutive within-semantic neighborhood animal names 
than did those in the negative trait mood group, which additionally suggested that more positive 
trait moods are associated with greater intra-neighborhood semantic network activation.  The 
number of semantic neighborhoods explored and the average number of exemplars produced 
within them did not differ significantly between positive and negative trait mood groups. 
 DRM: Participants in the positive and negative trait mood groups produced a similar 
number of target DRM words that was not significantly different, suggesting equivalent verbal 
WAIS-IV DS     
    Total 27.78 2.51 27.82 2.78 27.73 2.27 110 0.21 0.84 
    DSF 12.59 1.39 12.45 1.27 12.73 1.31 110 1.15 0.25 
    DSB 7.62 1.62 7.34 1.75 7.89 1.29 110 1.89 0.06 
    DSS 8.39 1.42 8.03 1.40 8.50 1.30 110 1.84 0.07 
WMS-IV SSp 27.04 3.92 27.17 3.74 26.87 4.24 110 0.40 0.69 
*Statistically significant result at alpha-level = 0.01 
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list learning and memory between groups. Participants in the positive trait mood group produced 
significantly more critical lures on the DRM than did participants in the negative trait mood 
group, which suggested that more positive trait moods are associated with greater (aberrant) 
semantic network activation/poorer inhibition of this activation. 
 D-KEFS: Color-Word Interference Test: No significant differences were observed 
between the positive and negative trait mood groups’ performance on Color Naming and Word 
Reading. Participants in the negative trait mood group required significantly less time to 
complete the Color-Word trial than did participants in the positive trait mood group, which 
suggested that more negative trait moods are associated with more efficient inhibition.  Negative 
trait mood group participants also required significantly less time to complete the Switching trial 
than positive trait mood group participants, suggesting that more negative trait moods are 
associated with more efficient inhibition and code switching abilities. 
 Trail Making: Participants in the negative trait mood group required significantly less 
time to complete the Number-Letter Switching trial than did participants in the positive trait 
mood group, which also suggested that more negative moods are associated with more efficient 
inhibition and code switching.  No significant between-groups differences were observed on the 
Scanning, Number Sequencing, Letter Sequencing, and Speed trials, suggesting psychomotor 
speed and basic sequencing abilities to be similar between groups. 
 WAIS-IV Digit Span:  No significant between-groups differences were observed on 
WAIS-IV DSF, DSB, DSS, and total DS score, suggesting similar auditory attention and 
working memory across trait mood groups. 
 WMS-IV Symbol Span: No significant between-groups differences were observed on 
WMS-IV SSp, suggesting similar non-verbal working memory between trait mood groups. 
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Difference Model: Structural Equation Model 
To address Aim 3, SEM for the Difference Model dataset was attempted using ALSCAL 
in SPSS 25 using methods identical to those used in the Positive and Negative Models.  The 
PANAS-XDifference score was used as the single grouping variable, and the Animal Naming 
variables were entered as predictor variables.  Similar to the Positive and Negative Models, 
neither BDI-II scores nor ANT variables were entered as predictors in the SEM, because there 
were no significant between-group differences in these values in the Difference Model analyses.  
The Difference Model SEM also failed and did not produce a structural equation. 
Difference Model: Post-Hoc Analyses 
 Because the Difference Model SEM was unsuccessful, post-hoc analyses were applied to 
address Aim 3 and to explore relationships in the Difference Model as were conducted for the 
Positive and Negative Models. 
 Difference Model: Correlation Analyses 
 Correlation analyses were conducted between all variables in the Difference Model 
dataset to examine any relationships among them.  Refer to Appendix 1.3 for all Difference 
Model correlation analysis results.  Significant correlation analysis findings are highlighted 
below. 
 The PANAS-XDifference score was moderately correlated with BDI-II scores such that 
participants reporting more negative trait moods on the PANAS-X reported more depressed 
moods on the BDI-II.  This result suggested that, as in the Positive and Negative Models, 
participants reliably reported negative mood intensity across the study mood measures.  
Participants again appeared to reliably report their English language proficiency, as higher self-
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ratings were moderately correlated with better single-word reading on the NAART and faster 
word identification on the ANT. 
 The PANAS-XDifference score was strongly correlated with the total Animal Naming score 
such that participants reporting more positive trait moods produced significantly more animal 
names, suggesting that more positive moods were associated with increased semantic network 
activation.  In addition, PANAS-XDifference scores were weakly associated with Animal Naming 
average neighborhood run size, such that participants reporting more positive trait moods 
demonstrated greater sustained intra-neighborhood semantic activity.  Similarly, the PANAS-
XDifference score was moderately correlated with total DRM critical lures such that participants 
reporting more positive trait moods produced more critical lures than participants reporting more 
negative trait moods, again suggesting increasingly positive moods to be associated with greater 
(aberrant) semantic network activation/poorer inhibition of this activation.  This was also further 
supported by a weak correlation between BDI-II scores and DRM critical lures such that 
participants reporting more less depressed (i.e., more positive/less negative) moods produced 
more false-positive DRM responses. 
 The PANAS-XDifference scale score was moderately correlated with the D-KEFS Color-
Word Switching scores such that more negative trait moods were associated with more efficient 
inhibition and code-switching.  The PANAS-XDifference score was also moderately correlated with 
D-KEFS Trail Making Number-Letter Switching, indicating that more negative trait moods were 
associated with better inhibition performance, as well. 
 Animal Naming total scores were strongly associated with the D-KEFS Color-Word 
Switching and Trail Making Number-Letter Switching trials, such that participants who 
produced more exemplars in the verbal fluency task demonstrated poorer inhibition performance 
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across modalities.  Animal Naming mean neighborhood run size was also moderately correlated 
with DRM total hits, which, again, indicated that participants who exhibited greater intra-
neighborhood semantic network activation demonstrated better learning and memory for 
semantically-related words.  DRM critical lure responses were also moderately positively 
correlated with D-KEFS Color-Word Switching and Trail Making Number-Letter Switching 
latency scores, further suggesting that greater semantic network activation was associated with 
poorer inhibition and code-switching performance.  In addition, Animal Naming mean 
neighborhood run size was moderately correlated with ANT latency scores, such that participants 
who produced a greater number of continuous semantic clusters on a fluency task (i.e., 
demonstrated greater intra-neighborhood semantic network activation) required less time to 
identify a target word based on its definition, suggesting that semantic network access when 
given primes is more efficient in individuals exhibiting greater semantic network activation. 
 Difference Model: Factor Analyses 
 As in the Positive and Negative Models, exploratory factor analyses were applied to the 
Difference Model to describe its initial and rotated factor solutions.  The model determinant, 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin, and Bartlett sphericity were assessed; extractions were made using 
eigenvalues > 1, and varimax rotation was applied. 
The first exploratory factor analysis for the Difference Model was conducted using all 
mood and neuropsychological variables, which, similar to the factor analyses applied to the 
Positive and Negative Models, failed (determinant=2.044E-7; KMO=0.475).  The Difference 
Model analysis retained 9 factors which explained 72.64% of the model variance.  Again, as in 
the Positive and Negative Models, the Difference Model pattern of results suggested that a 
restricted analysis would increase power to identify relationships among variables of interest. 
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A second exploratory factor analysis was applied to a restricted set of variables, which 
included the same 6 variables with significant between-groups differences that were identified 
via Difference Model between-groups comparisons (and were identical to those identified by 
similar analyses applied in both the Positive and Negative Models).  These included semantic 
network activation variables (i.e., Animal Naming total, Animal Naming average neighborhood 
run size) and inhibition variables (i.e., D-KEFS Color Word Interference Test Color-Word trial, 
D-KEFS Color Word Interference Test Switching trial, and D-KEFS Trail Making Number-
Letter Switching trial, and DRM critical lures).  The restricted factor analysis was successful 
(determinant=0.272; KMO=0.606, p=0.001) without evidence of multicolinearity (r for all 
variables in matrix < 0.536).  The analysis retained 2 components which accounted for 60.19% 
of the model variance.  The rotated factor solution converged in 3 iterations and showed, similar 
to the Positive and Negative Models, the components were strongly related to semantic network 
activation (Component 1; Animal Naming total factor loading=0.723, Animal Naming 
neighborhood run size factor loading=0.651) and inhibition (Component 2; D-KEFS Color-Word 
trial factor loading=0.850, D-KEFS Color-Word Switching factor loading=0.803, D-KEFS 
Number-Letter Switching trail factor loading=0.727, DRM critical lures factor loading=0.603). 
 Difference Model: Mediation Analyses 
 Because the Difference Model restricted factor analysis identified dichotomous 
components similar to those identified in the Positive Model and the Negative Model, a similar 
post-hoc mediation analysis was conducted to assess mediation of mood to inhibition (X-Y; c` 
path) through semantic network activity (via M; a1, b1 path) to the Difference Model data.  
Analyses were applied using Hayes’ PROCESSv3.5 SPSS macro. 
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 Similar to the procedures used in the Positive Model and the Negative Model, a 3x3 
matrix was generated to test the 9 possible combinations of the semantic network activation 
variables as mediators of each inhibition variable regressed onto the independent variable mood 
group, and the inhibition variables as mediators of each semantic network activation variables 
regressed onto the independent variable mood group.  As in the Positive and Negative Models, 
the DRM critical lure total was entered into the Difference Model mediation analyses as a 
semantic activation variable despite its “inhibition” factor loading (see Positive Model: 
Mediation Analyses section above for rationale).  Also, as in the Positive and Negative Models, 
every iteration of the Difference Model simple mediation model failed (all bootstrapped 
confidence intervals for all a1 to b1 paths included 0), except for the iteration with D-KEFS 
Color-Word Switching acting as a mediator of DRM Critical Lures.  D-KEFS Color-Word 
Switching appeared to weakly mediate the relationship between mood and DRM critical lures 
(i.e., the direct effect of X on Y, mood group on DRM critical lures (c` path)=2.47; p=0.0048; 
Bootstrapped CI=0.78<x<4.15; indirect effect of X on Y, mood group on DRM critical lures via 
M, D-KEFS Color-Word Switching, (a1b1 path)=0.86; Bootstrapped CI=0.01<x<1.71). 
 Difference Model: Canonical Correlation Analyses 
 A post-hoc analysis was applied to evaluate canonical correlations between the inhibition 
and semantic network activation variable sets that produced the successful Difference Model 
restricted-variable factor analysis and identified the mediation of mood on DRM critical lures by 
D-KEFS Color-Word Switching. 
 Canonical correlation analysis indicated that on the basis of positive and negative moods, 
greater semantic network activation was generally positively correlated with greater inhibition 
interference (i.e., poorer inhibition performance; Wilks lambda=0.38; F=4.49; p=0.001).  The 
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primary canonical correlation coefficient (r=0.71) explained 95.26% of the variance with an 
eigenvalue of 1.04, indicating adequate model fit.  Again, the primary canonical root was 
significant (F=5.28; p=0.001).  Moderate-to-strong positive correlations were observed between 
the inhibition variables and the primary canonical correlate such that greater inhibition 
interference (i.e., poorer inhibition performance) was observed with greater semantic network 
activation; also, similar to the Positive Model and Negative Model findings, this effect was 
stronger as task demands increased to include code-switching (rD-KEFS Trail Making Number-Letter 
Switching=0.85; rD-KEFS Color Word Interference Color-Word=0.75; rD-KEFS Color Word Interference Switching=0.35; rDRM 
Critical Lures=0.74).  Similar to the Positive and Negative Models’ findings, moderate-to-strong 
positive correlations were also observed between the semantic network activation variables and 
the primary canonical correlate such that semantic network activity increased over the duration 
of list-generating tasks (rAnimal Naming Total=0.76), but less so in focused intra-neighborhood search 
strategies that excluded inter-semantic neighborhood switches (rAnimal Naming Neighborhood Run 
Size=0.42). 
 Post-Hoc Comparison between the Entire Study Sample and 3 Trait Mood Models 
A final post-hoc analysis was performed to evaluate the mood survey and 
neuropsychological test results between the entire study sample and the 3 study models 
generated for the analysis.  One-way ANOVA was applied to the 4 data sets at the 0.05-alpha 
level.  Results of the ANOVA are shown in Table 5 below and, importantly, indicate that no 
statistically significant differences were found between the entire study sample and the 3 study 
models on any of the mood or neuropsychological variables.  This suggests that the 4 samples 
generally well approximated each other, as would be expected, given that all 3 trait mood models 
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were generated using the entire study dataset and that all 4 datasets were of generally similar 
sample size. 
Table 5. Descriptive and Statistical Mood and Neuropsychological Data for the Total Study and 3 
Mood Model Samples 










































29.02 8.65 29.62 8.42 28.98 8.21 29.31 8.79 0.14 0.935 
PANAS-X 
Negative Affect 
21.37 7.06 20.64 6.93 22.42 7.08 21.31 7.11 1.26 0.287 
BDI-II 3.94 3.59 3.93 3.57 4.82 3.68 3.60 3.57 2.41 0.066 
NAART IQ 102.99 8.77 102.77 8.78 103.53 8.87 102.92 8.71 0.16 0.921 
ANT           
 Total Correct 49.81 0.62 49.80 0.63 49.83 0.61 49.81 0.62 0.02 0.996 
 Latency 1.32 0.24 1.32 0.25 1.33 0.25 1.31 0.25 0.12 0.946 
COWAT           
 FAS 44.39 5.46 44.34 5.47 44.49 5.50 44.33 5.43 0.02 0.996 
 Animals           
  Total 23.89 4.18 24.00 4.15 23.59 4.26 23.87 4.15 0.20 0.895 
  Number 
  Neighborhoods 
4.30 0.59 4.61 0.55 4.25 0.60 4.24 0.63 2.39 0.062 
   Neighborhood 
         Exemplars 
6.65 0.70 6.73 0.66 6.50 0.71 6.60 0.75 2.16 0.092 
  Neighborhood 
         Run Size 
3.84 0.72 4.12 0.58 3.82 0.81 3.75 0.77 2.40 0.064 
DRM           
  Total Correct 137.5 31.1 138.64 30.56 136.64 32.33 137.48 31.18 0.08 0.971 
  Critical Lures 6.60 3.21 7.12 3.36 6.14 3.15 6.14 3.12 2.44 0.064 
D-KEFS Color- 
   Word 
          
  Color Naming 26.50 3.33 26.48 3.37 26.53 3.42 26.49 3.25 0.01 1.000 
  Word Reading 22.61 2.38 22.68 2.39 22.66 2.41 22.54 2.34 0.08 0.972 
  Color-Word 50.89 7.60 51.21 7.56 50.68 7.70 50.71 7.56 0.12 0.949 
  Switching 59.92 7.58 60.88 7.63 59.94 7.52 59.89 7.62 0.47 0.703 
D-KEFS Trail 
  Making 
          
    Scanning 21.58 3.33 21.60 3.32 21.66 3.36 21.49 3.30 0.05 0.985 
    Number 
      Sequencing 
31.09 4.33 30.94 4.28 31.04 4.42 31.36 4.32 0.20 0.900 
    Letter 
      Sequencing 
30.39 4.12 30.29 4.16 30.49 4.17 30.38 4.00 0.05 0.987 
   Number-Letter 
      Sequencing 
71.54 7.88 72.48 7.64 70.86 7.50 71.89 7.92 0.89 0.447 
   Speed 20.65 2.34 20.64 2.04 20.62 2.17 20.67 3.31 0.01 0.999 
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WAIS-IV DS           
  Total 27.74 2.60 27.80 2.59 27.62 2.66 27.78 2.51 0.11 0.953 
  DSF 11.21 1.48 10.81 1.55 10.85 1.53 11.59 1.39 2.41 0.066 
  DSB 7.63 2.30 7.87 2.70 7.36 1.66 7.62 1.62 1.11 0.344 
  DSS 8.38 1.47 8.38 1.46 8.37 1.50 8.39 1.42 0.01 1.000 
WMS-IV SSp 27.13 4.09 27.61 4.36 26.81 4.09 27.04 3.92 1.69 0.168 



























Study Aims and Results 
 This study was designed with 3 specific aims: 1) to characterize the effect of trait mood 
on executive functions and other cognitive skills (Aim 1), 2) to characterize the effect of mood 
on semantic network activity (Aim 2), and 3) to evaluate the contribution of semantic network 
activity to trait mood-executive function relationships via structural equation modeling and 
exploratory analyses (Aim 3).  Participant demographic data were collected using a brief 
questionnaire that was developed for this study, and information regarding participants’ trait 
moods was collected using the PANAS-X and BDI-II.  Mood data from the PANAS-X was used 
to generate 3 study models, the Positive Model, Negative Model, and Difference Model.  Each of 
the 3 study aims was addressed for each study model.  Prior to initiation of this research, 
hypotheses for each study aim were generated. 
 To address Aim 1, a collection of standardized neuropsychological instruments was 
administered to each participant.  This included assessments of executive functions involving 
verbal fluency (i.e., the COWAT FAS and Animal Naming), verbal learning (i.e., the DRM), 
verbal attention and working memory (i.e., the WAIS-IV Digit Span subtest), non-verbal 
working memory (i.e., the WMS-IV Symbol Span subtest), and inhibition (i.e., the D-KEFS 
Color-Word Interference subtest and Trail Making subtest).  Intellectual functioning was 
estimated using a test of single-word reading (i.e., the NAART).  Hypotheses surrounding Aim 1 
stated higher negative trait moods (and/or lower positive trait moods) would be associated with 
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poorer attention, working memory, and verbal fluency, and better inhibition given prior findings 
of increased creativity and propensity for top-down, relational processing in more positive 
moods and increased bottom-up, detail-oriented processing in more negative moods (Clore & 
Huntsinger, 2007; Lee & Sternthal, 1999; Storbeck & Clore, 2005).  The most recent of these 
models extend on Clore’s “affect-as-information” approach and attribute these findings to the 
feedback that affective states provide to cognitive processes.  Huntsinger, Isbell, and Clore 
(2014) posited that relational processing styles free cognitive reserves by reducing focus on 
extraneous detail (which may also favor global versus local feature detection; see Huntsinger, 
Isbell, & Clore, 2012) and, generally, represent the default processing style in positive moods to 
facilitate conceptual access in dealing with incoming information from the environment (such as 
in priming effects and creativity).  According to this “affect-as-cognitive-feedback” model, 
negative affect signals danger or uncertainty in the environment and, subsequently, inhibits 
relational processing in favor of referential processing (or in the authors’ words, represents a 
“stop signal” to switch processing style and attend to local, bottom-up environmental features).  
While these effects are flexible and context-dependent, a main conclusion that can be drawn is 
that cognitive inhibition underlies the switch to bottom-up processing styles observed in negative 
affective states from top-down processing styles observed in positive affective states. 
 Means comparisons was conducted using independent samples t-tests for Aim 1.  In all 
three study models, there were no significant differences between mood groups on any of the 
demographic data, NAART-estimated IQ, or depressive symptoms on the BDI-II, indicating that 
participant groups generally well approximated each other.  As expected, given the study 
inclusion and exclusions criteria, participants generally ranged in age from their late teens to 
mid-twenties.  There were more Caucasian participants than those identifying with any other 
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racial/ethnic group and the majority of participants were right-hand dominant.  Most participants 
were native English-speakers and rated themselves to be as proficient (or slightly more) than the 
typical Queens College student.  These results were similar between trait mood groups in each 
study model, as well as between each model and the entire study sample. 
 Just as participant characteristics were generally similar, so too were their performances 
across most measures of executive functions.  In each study model, there were no significant 
differences between groups in basic graphomotor speed and speeded scanning and sequencing on 
the D-KEFS Trail Making and speeded color naming and word reading on the D-KEFS Color-
Word Interference Test.  Verbal attention and working memory scores were also not significantly 
different between groups in each study model on the WAIS-IV Digit Span, nor was non-verbal 
working memory on the WMS-IV Symbol Span.  This suggested minimal impact of trait mood 
on motor and mental speed, basic processing, attention, and working memory across modalities.    
There appeared to be somewhat disparate effects, however, of mood on select aspects of 
verbal skills.  Verbal list-learning and memory, as assessed by the DRM, was not significantly 
different between mood groups in each model, nor was letter fluency on the COWAT FAS.  
Interestingly, however, there were significant differences observed between mood groups on 
category fluency via Animal Naming.  Together, these differences suggest that mood may affect 
lexical activation to mentally search for related words, as opposed to lexical access processes 
needed to identify specific target words (and, thus, suggested differences between semantic 
network access and semantic network activation as indicated by Aim 2 results).  Specifically, it 
appeared that moment-to-moment semantic activation and search strategies within semantic 
neighborhoods was more efficient in more positive trait moods and less efficient in more 
negative trait moods, but no difference in strategy efficacy was observed between semantic 
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neighborhoods (i.e., there were no significant differences in the number of neighborhoods 
explored or the amount of exemplars produced belonging to each neighborhood, on average, 
over the duration of the trial).  Considered together, this indicates that mood significantly 
impacted overall category fluency performance and focused and sustained intra-neighborhood 
search, but not inter-neighborhood search. 
Significant differences between trait mood groups were also observed on measures of 
inhibition.  This included measures of basic inhibition (i.e., on the D-KEFS Color-Word 
Interference Test Color-Word trial), inhibition including code switching (i.e., on the D-KEFS 
Color-Word Interference Switching trial and the D-KEFS Trail Making Number-Letter 
Sequencing trial), and inhibition involved in suppressing aberrant semantic activity (i.e., via 
DRM critical lures).  These significant findings are consistent with prior models suggesting 
affect regulates inhibitory, and conversely, semantic priming functions (Storbeck & Clore, 
2008), which are important to concept-formation and processing style selection (Gasper & Clore, 
2002). 
 The analysis described above identified a group of 6 variables on which significant 
differences were observed between trait mood groups across all 3 study models: 1) Animal 
Naming total score, 2) Animal Naming average neighborhood run size, 3) DRM critical lures, 4) 
D-KEFS Color-Word Interference Test Color-Word trial, 5) D-KEFS Color-Word Interference 
Test Switching, and 6) D-KEFS Trail Making Number-Letter Switching.  In the Positive Model, 
participants who reported higher positive trait moods performed better on fluency variables (i.e., 
Animal Naming total score and average neighborhood run size) and worse on inhibition-related 
variables (i.e., D-KEFS inhibition variables and DRM critical lures) than those who reported 
lower positive trait moods.  Similar results were obtained in the Negative Model, such that 
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individuals who reported higher negative trait moods performed worse on category fluency 
measures and better on inhibition measures than those who reported less negative trait moods.  
This was interesting because the results were bidirectional and consistent with each other, which 
indicated that not only does trait mood significantly affect semantic fluency and inhibition, but 
that valence specifically is impactful to these executive skills.  These findings additionally 
suggested that emotional valence may be uni-axial.  Difference Model analyses revealed similar 
effects, such that those participants reporting more positive/less negative trait moods performed 
better on fluency and worse on inhibition measures than did those who reported less 
positive/more negative trait moods.  Because the Difference Model considers positive and 
negative trait moods together as opposed to either positive or negative mood features alone, it is 
assumed that the Difference Model more accurately characterized trait mood valence along a 
negative-positive axis than did either the Positive Model or the Negative Model.  Perhaps most 
importantly, the size of the effect of mood on these fluency and inhibition variables appeared to 
be greatest in the Difference Model versus the Positive Model and Negative Model, highlighting 
the effectiveness of considering positive and negative trait mood aspects together rather than as 
dichotomous, separable valences. 
 Ultimately, Aim 1 of the study was satisfied, because the results identified the effects of 
enhanced category fluency and poorer inhibition in more positive trait moods and enhanced 
inhibition and poorer category fluency in more negative trait moods.  That being said, our initial 
hypotheses were only partially supported.  While this is consistent with prior findings on fluency 
and inhibition (Chepenik et al., 2017), this research did not replicate findings of mood-related 
differences in attention, working memory, and verbal learning between trait mood groups that 
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have previously been reported (Clore & Palmer, 2019; Eich & Forgas, 2003; Gotlieb & Joorman, 
2010) in any study model. 
 Aim 2 of the study was to evaluate the effect of trait mood on semantic network access 
and activation.  Semantic network access was measured using latency scores in an auditory 
responsive naming test (i.e., the ANT).  Semantic network activation was evaluated using a 
category fluency task (i.e., the COWAT Animal Naming test).  SNAFU criteria (Zemla et al., 
2020) were applied to category fluency results, which yielded several values to characterize 
semantic network activation: 1) total number of exemplars produced, 2) total number of semantic 
neighborhoods explored over the duration of the 60-second trial, 3) the average number of 
exemplars produced within each semantic neighborhood over the duration of the 60-second trial, 
and 4) the average number of consecutive within-neighborhood exemplars produced.  The use of 
these measures allowed for semantic network activation to be more fully assessed than 
traditional fluency scores, because total network activation, inter-semantic neighborhood 
activation, and intra-semantic neighborhood activation could be characterized and compared.  
Aim 2 hypotheses stated that higher negative trait moods (and/or lower positive trait moods) 
would be associated with poorer naming performance (i.e., greater naming latency being 
indicative of reduced semantic network access) and poorer category fluency (i.e., reduced 
semantic activation as evidenced by producing fewer exemplars, exploring fewer semantic 
neighborhoods, and/or producing fewer exemplars within each semantic neighborhood 
consecutively and/or nonconsecutively on average).  These hypotheses were generated based on 
prior studies indicating increased relational processing and verbal fluency in more positive 
moods (Abele-Brehm, 1992; Clark et al., 2001), given that responsive naming and other 
linguistic abilities rely on relational symbolic decoding (Clark & Pulman, 2007; Kramsch, 2015). 
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 Similar to analyses from Aim 1, between-groups means comparisons were conducted 
using independent samples t-tests in each study model.  Analyses of Auditory Naming Test 
performance indicated that study participants generally performed well on the test and that there 
was no significant difference in naming latency between trait mood groups in each study model.  
This suggested that participants had grossly similar word knowledge/vocabulary size, that 
semantic network access was not affected by trait mood, and that targeted selection of specific 
concepts occurs at similar speeds across mood states.  However, results of analyses on semantic 
network activation, that is the non-targeted, spontaneous spread of activity from activated 
concepts to those that are closely related, clearly indicated an important effect of trait mood.  As 
above, Positive Model results revealed greater overall semantic network activation (via Animal 
Naming total score) and contemporary intra-neighborhood semantic search (via average 
neighborhood run size) in higher positive trait moods, but non-significant differences in inter-
neighborhood search (via number of semantic neighborhoods searched) or non-sustained intra-
neighborhood search (via the average number of exemplars produced within each semantic 
neighborhood).  Again, similar results were found in the Negative Model such that those 
reporting higher negative trait moods demonstrated significantly reduced overall semantic 
network activation and intra-neighborhood search but similar inter-neighborhood and non-
sustained intra-neighborhood search.  This pattern of results was reinforced by the Difference 
Model; those participants reporting more positive/less negative trait moods exhibited 
significantly enhanced overall semantic network activation and intra-neighborhood activation 
than those reporting less positive/more negative trait moods, whereas inter-neighborhood and 
non-sustained intra-neighborhood search between groups were similar.  Again, this effect 
appeared to be largest in the Difference Model than in either the Positive Model or the Negative 
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Model, which continued to support the effectiveness of considering positive and negative mood 
features together rather than either alone (or as strictly dichotomous).  Aim 2 hypotheses were 
also partially supported: overall semantic network activation did appear to be affected by mood, 
as hypothesized (and especially so regarding sustained intra-neighborhood activation), such that 
more positive trait moods were associated with enhanced category fluency and more negative 
trait moods were associated with reduced category fluency; however, semantic network access 
(i.e., ANT naming latency) was not significantly different between mood groups.  In addition, it 
should be noted that FAS total scores did not differ significantly between mood groups in any 
study model.  This suggested that there is a disparity in linguistic activity associated with 
searching for words that are not conceptually related (as in the FAS) versus those that are (as in 
Animal Naming).  Given that the category fluency measure relies on conceptual relatedness, 
whereas letter fluency does not explicitly require it (for examples pertaining to this in AD, see 
Cerhan, Ivnik, Smith, Tangalos, Petersen, & Boeve, 2010; Henry, Crawford, & Philips, 2004), 
this may explain our findings of significant between-mood-group differences in Animal Naming 
and non-significant differences in FAS total scores. 
 Aim 3 of the study sought to examine the role of semantic network activity in the 
relationship between trait mood and executive function.  Although moods have reliably been 
shown to affect various cognitive skills, the mechanism underlying these relationships remains 
unclear.  It was theorized that the informative value of moods, according to Schwarz and Clore’s 
(1983) affect-as-information hypothesis, could relate to/affect access of conceptual knowledge; 
thus, Aim 3 sought to evaluate whether semantic network activity (i.e., the selection of linguistic 
semantic knowledge) accounts for relationships between trait mood and various executive 
functions.  Therefore, it was hypothesized that Aim 2 results would show that higher negative 
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trait moods restrict semantic network activity, whereas higher positive trait moods enhance 
semantic network activity and that these effects would mediate mood-executive function 
relationships identified via Aim 1 results.  It was hoped that these effects could be identified 
using SEM, and Aim 3 also sought to further characterize additional relationships among trait 
mood, executive functions, and semantic network activity via exploratory analyses.   
 To address Aim 3, structural equation modeling was attempted for each study model.  
Unfortunately, SEM failed in every case, and a structural equation could not be produced.  It is 
not entirely clear why this procedure failed, but it is believed that, at least in part, the 
dissimilarity between the executive functions assessed in this study was sufficiently large so as to 
lead to model failure, and, in addition, there may have been issues related to multicolinearity.  
Several post-hoc analyses were applied, however, to attempt to identify a mediational role of 
semantic network activity between mood and executive function and to further explore 
relationships among the study variables. 
 Exploratory analyses were conducted in a stepwise fashion in order to identify 
relationships among study variables and to assess the role of semantic network activity in them.  
First, correlation analyses were conducted, which revealed that mood questionnaire results were 
generally consistent (i.e., those who reported less positive and/or more negative trait moods on 
the PANAS-X reported more depressed moods on the BDI-II), as were objective and subjective 
measures of vocabulary knowledge (i.e., single-word reading on the NAART was positively 
correlated with single-word identification and speed on the ANT and self-ratings of English 
proficiency).  These analyses also revealed significant correlations of varying strength between 
PANAS-X mood scores and each of the 6 variables on which significant t-test results were 
observed, which included semantic network activation measures (i.e., Animal Naming total score 
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and average neighborhood run size), inhibition measures (i.e., D-KEFS Color-Word Interference 
Test Color-Word and Switching trials and D-KEFS Trail Making Number-Letter Switching 
trial), and DRM critical lures.  No other significant correlations between any of the study 
measures were noted.  This pattern of results was noted in each study model and is described in 
greater detail below. 
Positive Model Post-Hoc Analyses 
In the Positive Model, higher positive trait moods on the PANAS-X were correlated with 
greater category fluency and intra-network search on Animal Naming and with poorer 
performance on D-KEFS inhibition tasks when compared to those who reported less positive 
trait moods.  Those reporting higher positive trait moods on the the PANAS-X also produced 
more critical lures on the DRM, as did participants who indicated less depressed self-report on 
the BDI-II.  Relationships between variables were also identified: those who produced more 
animal names demonstrated worse performance on D-KEFS inhibition tasks and produced more 
DRM critical lures (i.e., exhibited poorer suppression of non-target words).  Those who produced 
more DRM critical lures also tended to perform more poorly on D-KEFS inhibition tasks.  In 
sum, these findings suggest interrelationships among mood, semantic network activation, and 
inhibition that were included in the study hypotheses and indicated that more positive trait 
moods were associated with enhanced verbal fluency (i.e., semantic activation) and poorer 
inhibition. 
Because these relationships were identified via correlation analysis, exploratory factor 
analysis was applied to the Positive Model.  An initial factor analysis was conducted using all of 
the variables in the model; however, this analysis failed, possibly due to the number of executive 
function-related variables in the model and the extent of dissimilarity among these variables.  
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Because there appeared to be a degree of interrelatedness between mood, semantic network 
activation, and inhibition, a second factor analysis was conducted that considered only the 
semantic network activation and inhibition variables for which significant results were found.  
Interestingly, the restricted factor analysis retained two factors related to semantic activation 
(onto which Animal Naming total score and average neighborhood run size loaded) and 
inhibition (onto which D-KEFS Color-Word Interference Color-Word and Switching trials and 
Trail Making Number-Letter Switching and DRM total critical lures loaded).  The DRM critical 
lure loading suggested that, despite the DRM task’s semantic nature, increased critical lure 
provision (i.e., worse performance) was related not to increased semantic activation, per se, but 
rather to reduced suppression (i.e., inhibition) of this activity. 
An important aspect of Aim 3 was to demonstrate that semantic network activity drives 
the relationship between trait mood and executive function.  Although SEM failed in the Positive 
Model, results from correlation and factor analyses strongly suggested the existence of such a 
relationship.  Mediation analysis was conducted to evaluated whether semantic network 
activation values (gleaned from Aim 2 analyses) accounted for the effects of positive trait mood 
on inhibition (gleaned from Aim 1 analyses); however, this failed to yield a significant result.  
Therefore, canonical correlation analysis was applied to the Positive Model data to characterize 
relationships between the groups of semantic network activation variables and the inhibition 
variables that produced a successful factor analysis.  This did yield significant results, such that 
higher positive trait moods were associated with greater semantic network activation and poorer 
inhibition, whereas lower trait moods were associated with reduced semantic network activation 
and enhanced inhibition.  This expanded on the basic correlation analyses, because it provided 
direct evidence that positive trait mood did simultaneously and significantly affect semantic 
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network activation (in particular, in sustained within-semantic neighborhood search strategies) 
and global, multimodal inhibitory processes (as opposed to those associated with any single D-
KEFS inhibition task). 
Negative Model Post-Hoc Analyses 
To evaluate the effect of negative trait mood on these relationships, post-hoc analyses 
were applied to the Negative Model dataset that were identical to those applied to the Positive 
Model dataset.  Essentially, the results of these analyses were complimentary to those obtained 
using Positive Model data.  Higher negative trait moods were correlated with reduced category 
fluency and intra-neighborhood search on the Animal Naming task and with enhanced inhibition 
on the D-KEFS Color-Word Interference Test Color-Word and Switching trials and the D-KEFS 
Trail Making Number-Letter Switching trial.  Higher negative trait moods (and greater 
depressive symptomatology via greater BDI-II scores) were associated with fewer DRM critical 
lure responses (i.e., more effective suppression of aberrant semantic activity).  Fewer DRM 
critical lure responses were also associated with more effective inhibition across D-KEFS 
inhibition tasks.  As such, the initial relationships among positive trait moods, semantic network 
activation, and inhibition from the Positive Model held true and were consistent in the Negative 
Model (i.e., the Positive Model indicated more positive moods were associated with increased 
semantic network activation/fluency and poorer inhibition, whereas the Negative Model 
indicated that more negative moods were associated with reduced semantic network 
activation/fluency and enhanced inhibition).  This indicated that it was not positive moods alone 
that accounted for our findings and, further, that mood valence significantly affected these 
cognitive skills.  The strength of these correlations was similar between the Positive Model and 
the Negative Model, consistent with the notion that positive moods and negative moods 
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contributed equally to these effects or that, rather, “positive” and “negative” moods represent 
relative positions along a single emotional valence axis. 
The initial all-factors exploratory factor analysis failed in the Negative Model, but a 
similarly restricted analysis to include the variables on which significant between-groups t-test 
results were found was successful.  As in the Positive Model, the Negative Model restricted-
variable analysis factor solution retained the same components with identical sets of variables 
(i.e., a semantic activation component onto which Animal Naming total score and average 
within-neighborhood run size loaded and an inhibition component onto which the D-KEFS 
inhibition variables and DRM critical lures loaded).  This pattern of results reinforced the 
Positive Model conclusion that endorsing critical lures on the DRM was related to poorer 
inhibition rather than semantic over-activation. 
Mediation analysis was conducted for the Negative Model to evaluate whether semantic 
network activation accounted for the observed effects of negative trait moods on inhibition.  This 
analysis failed, similar to that conducted for the Positive Model.  Canonical correlation analysis 
was applied to assess relationships between the group of fluency variables and the group of 
inhibition variables with significant t-test results.  This analysis yielded results that were the 
inverse of those obtained in the Positive Model: for the Negative Model, higher negative trait 
moods were associated with poorer semantic network activation/category fluency and enhanced 
inhibition.  Similar to the post-hoc correlation analysis, the canonical correlation strength was 
similar between the Negative Model and the Positive Model.  Together, these points further 
reinforced findings from the Positive Model and the conclusion that negative trait moods and 
positive trait moods are not necessarily discrete states but represent relative positions/differences 
in emotional valence.   
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Difference Model Post-Hoc Analyses 
 Post-hoc analyses were carried out in the Difference Model that were identical to those 
applied in the Positive Model and Negative Model.  This allowed positive trait moods and 
negative trait moods to be simultaneously considered as opposed to one or the other as in the 
Positive Model and the Negative Model. Correlations similar to those from the Positive Model 
and Negative Model were observed in the Difference Model: more positive/less negative trait 
moods were associated with increased semantic network activation/category fluency on Animal 
Naming (and particularly so for intra-network rather than inter-network search) and reduced 
inhibition on D-KEFS inhibition measures and via greater number of DRM critical lures, 
whereas less positive/more negative trait moods were associated with reduced semantic network 
activation/category fluency and enhanced inhibition.  Not only did this support findings from the 
Positive Model and Negative Model, but crucially, it yielded stronger correlations between these 
variables than in both the Positive Model and Negative Model.  This suggested that it is essential 
to consider positive and negative trait mood features together when evaluating the cognitive 
effects of mood as opposed to considering either positive or negative features alone.  Similar to 
other models, indirect relationships were observed between PANAS-XDifference scores and BDI-II 
scores, and BDI-II and DRM critical lure scores, and direct relationships between DRM critical 
lures and D-KEFS inhibition trial latencies (i.e., poorer inhibition performance).  Thus, similar 
correlations between these variables were observed in the Difference Model and were generally 
notably stronger when compared to those indicated by the Positive Model and Negative Model. 
 Difference Model factor analysis failed when all model variables were entered into the 
model, but it was successful when restricted to the set of 6 variables in which significant t-test 
results were obtained.  This, again, retained two components, identical to factor analysis results 
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from the Positive Model and Negative Model: a component comprising the 2 significant 
semantic network activation variables (i.e., Animal Naming total score and average within-
neighborhood run size) and a component comprising the 4 inhibition variables (i.e., D-KEFS 
Color-Word Interference Test Color-Word and Switching trials, D-KEFS Trail Making Number-
Letter Switching trial, and DRM critical lures). 
 Mediation analysis was conducted in the Difference Model to assess whether semantic 
network activation accounted for the observed effects of mood on inhibition.  Similar to results 
from the Positive Model and Negative Model, no mediating relationships were observed, except 
for the iteration in which Color-Word trial scores from the D-KEFS Color-Word Test weakly 
and partially mediated mood-related effects on DRM critical lures.  This suggested a mediational 
role of inhibition on lexico-semantic processes, as opposed to semantic activity mediating 
inhibition (or any other executive skill) as originally hypothesized.  Interestingly, this mediating 
relationship was observed only in the Difference Model but neither in the Positive Model nor the 
Negative Model.  Thus, it appears that neglecting either negative or positive mood features 
masked this effect, which only became apparent once both features were considered 
simultaneously. 
 Difference Model canonical correlations found relationships broadly between semantic 
network activation and inhibition, as reported in the Positive Model and Negative Model.  That 
is, more positive trait moods were associated with increased semantic network 
activation/category fluency and reduced inhibition, and more negative trait moods were 
associated with reduced semantic network activation/category fluency and enhanced inhibition.  
While Difference Model results were similar to those obtained in the Positive Model and the 
Negative Model, canonical correlation strength was greater in the Difference Model compared to 
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the other models (as was similar to the univariate correlation analyses applied to each model). 
This, further, supported conclusions drawn from the Positive Model and the Negative Model that 
emotional valence represents a single dimension as opposed to comprising dichotomous positive 
and negative aspects. 
  
Significance 
 This study is innovative because it contributes to the scientific understanding of 
relationships among mood, semantic network activity, and executive functions.  Although the 
literature details various effects on executive functions across a range of moods (that naturally 
occur or are experimentally induced), researchers have failed to provide a clear mechanism that 
explains why such effects are observed.  The most compelling theory that has been put forth to 
date is Schwarz and Clore’s (1983) Cognitive Tuning Model, which states that cognitive skills 
are situationally optimized by moods that serve as alarms for what given situations require.  This 
research sought to identify the mechanism by which moods “tune” cognitive skills, as both 
negative and positive trait moods have been shown to enhance some of these skills while 
hindering others in ways that are contextually important. 
 Specifically, much of the research summarized in the Introduction indicates a very broad 
conclusion in the cognitive psychology literature, which states that positive moods generally 
enhance cognitive skills.  While this may be true for a range of abilities, such as learning and 
memory, generativity, and processing speed, it may not be for others, as indicated in research on 
false memory (Knott, Threadgold, & Howe, 2014; for a developmental perspective on this, see 
Brainerd, Holliday, Reyna, Yang, & Toglia, 2010). The present research has replicated some of 
these findings, specifically, that greater positive trait moods enhanced verbal fluency, whereas 
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higher negative trait moods yielded more effective inhibition and code-switching abilities (Gabel 
& McAuley, 2020). It must be noted, however, that mood effects described elsewhere were not 
found in this study (e.g., positive moods have been found to enhance processing speed and 
learning and memory, but these findings were not replicated; see Piccirilli, Arcelli, Baratta, & 
Ferretti, 2019 for background information and an intervention study in a healthy, aged 
population).  The present research did not meet its ultimate goal to identify the mechanism by 
which moods “tune” executive function, but, rather, it identified an association between semantic 
network activation and inhibition across trait moods that warrants further examination. 
 Literature review resulted in the hypothesis that semantic network activity includes at 
least two processes: semantic network access (i.e., the targeted spread of activity towards a target 
concept) and semantic network activation (i.e., the non-targeted spread of activity away from 
active nodes towards proximally related, non-active concepts).  It was thought that the 
mechanism by which executive functions are situationally tuned is controlled by both semantic 
network access (i.e., to ensure that necessary concepts are activated) and semantic network 
activation (i.e., to ensure that informative and important surround concepts are co-activated).  
The current analyses, however, indicated that semantic network access did not vary significantly 
between those participants reporting more negative trait moods versus those reporting more 
positive trait moods.  This finding was surprising as it suggests that conceptual access to 
semantic knowledge either is 1) at most, minimally affected by mood, 2) at most, minimally 
impactful to a broad range of executive functions, or 3) both minimally affected by mood and 
minimally impactful to executive functions.  This result, however, may be related to the 
characteristics of the task used to assess semantic network access.  The Auditory Naming Test 
involves cues for 50 words that are relatively common to individuals who are fluent in English, 
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including those without a college education, and those in urban areas (all of which being broadly 
consistent with our research sample).  The vast majority of the target words on the task represent 
generally non-activating (or distressing) concepts for most people and, therefore, may not exert 
much of an effect on semantic network access given the demands of the laboratory situation, nor 
may they exert much of an effect on mood.  In other words, more cognitively taxing (or 
distressing/arousing) situations may be necessary to induce changes (or signal “alarm”) to a 
sufficient degree to impact semantic network access such that there would be an observable 
effect on the executive skills assessed (as discussed in Cochran, Lee, & Chown, 2006).  In line 
with our hypothesis, however, semantic network activation (as measured by the COWAT Animal 
Naming test, a semantic fluency measure) did appear to be restricted in individuals reporting 
higher negative trait moods and enhanced in those reporting higher positive trait moods.  There 
also appeared to be an effect of mood on the set of executive skills that require inhibition (i.e., 
suppression of responses via the D-KEFS Color-Word Interference test, D-KEFS Trail Making 
test, and DRM), such that participants reporting higher negative trait moods more efficiently 
inhibited prepotent responses than those reporting higher positive trait moods. 
Differences in the number of critical lures produced on the DRM indicated that higher 
negative trait moods led to significantly fewer false memories and that higher positive trait 
moods led to significantly more false memories.  It could be argued that this effect relates to 
improved suppression of the spontaneous semantic network activation toward non-target critical 
lures in each DRM word-list in higher negative trait moods.  This inhibition may underlie 
retrieval-induced forgetting effects initially described by Bower, who argued that effective 
memory retrieval requires memory traces for unnecessary content to be suppressed.  It could, 
therefore, be speculated that some elements of Bower’s theory, in particular, that semantic 
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activity underlies different aspects of cognition, is not entirely inaccurate (for examples of the 
link between inhibition and retrieval-induced forgetting, see Storm & Levy, 2012; Verde, 2012; 
Williams & Zacks, 2001). 
Significant differences between trait mood groups on the D-KEFS inhibition tasks were 
also particularly interesting.  Participants reporting higher positive trait moods exhibited greater 
inhibition interference (i.e., poorer inhibition performance) in Stroop-like tasks (i.e., on the D-
KEFS Color-Word Interference test Inhibition and Switching trials), as well as on a motor set-
shifting and sequencing task (i.e., the D-KEFS Trail Making Number-Letter Switching trial) 
compared to those reporting higher negative trait moods.  This indicated that the effect of mood 
on inhibition was observed across modalities (i.e., visuo-lexical and graphomotor skills, 
respectively) and was not restricted to verbal learning and memory processes involved in the 
DRM.  The presence of a multimodal effect of mood on inhibition suggests that it is exerted on 
global inhibitory processes, as opposed to otherwise unaccounted factors that might exist within 
a specific modality.  In addition, it is possible that this global inhibiting process is responsible for 
the differences observed in semantic network activation, such that suppressed activation noted in 
higher negative trait mood groups represents a form of non-effortful inhibition.  This potentially 
drives the mediating effect observed in the Difference Model in which semantic activation 
appeared to be weakly mediated by some aspect of inhibition, as opposed to inhibition being 
mediated by semantic activity as originally hypothesized. 
It is unfortunate that the analyses did not confirm a mediating effect of semantic network 
activation on the mood-executive (or mood-inhibition) relationship as theorized.  Although a 
relatively large sample was included in the research, it is likely that the study was underpowered 
to identify such a relationship given the sheer number of within-subject and environmental 
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factors that are likely to contribute to cognitive test performance. It is also possible that the size 
of the effect of mood on semantic network activity and on executive functions is relatively small, 
at least within naturally occurring trait moods and/or within a laboratory setting.  To account for 
these factors, exploratory analyses were restricted to variables on which significant effects were 
observed.  While not ideal, this is a valid method to assess potential between-variable 
relationships, because it improves the signal-to-noise ratio that could otherwise mask genuine 
effects (Gilula & Haberman, 1986; Oort, 1992).  This approach allowed relationships between 
semantic network activation and inhibition to be identified.  Interestingly, canonical correlation 
analyses in the Positive Mood Model, Negative Mood Model, and Difference Model supported a 
direct relationship between semantic network activation and inhibition interference, such that 
those reporting higher positive trait moods (or lower negative trait moods) demonstrated 
significantly greater semantic network activation and inhibition interference (i.e., poorer 
inhibition performance) than those who reported higher negative trait moods (or lower positive 
trait moods).  This finding, as well as evidence of a mediating relationship between these 
variables across trait moods from the Difference Model, indicates that future studies are needed 
to clarify this relationship. 
 
Model Comparison 
Because the PANAS-X considers positive trait moods and negative trait moods 
independently, analyses were conducted in a step-wise fashion to assess the effect on semantic 
network activity and executive functions by 1) self-reported positive trait moods alone (i.e., the 
Positive Model), 2) self-reported negative trait moods alone (i.e., the Negative Model), and 3) 
the difference between self-reported positive and negative trait moods (i.e., the Difference 
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Model).  Although a structural equation model could not be produced in any trait mood model, 
post-hoc analyses allowed for the comparison of the contributions of positive and negative trait 
moods to semantic network activity and executive functioning in each model. 
T-tests applied in the Positive Model showed that individuals reporting higher positive 
trait moods demonstrated increased category fluency and greater inhibition interference 
compared to those reporting lower positive trait moods.  Importantly, the converse was shown in 
the Negative Model; individuals reporting higher negative trait moods demonstrated reduced 
category fluency and less inhibition interference than those reporting lower negative trait moods.  
Together, these findings suggest that the effects of trait mood valence on semantic network 
activation and on inhibition are dynamic and bidirectional, which would support Russell’s (1980) 
theory that valence represents a single dimension of mood.  Therefore, any trait mood state is 
expected to fall at some location along a valence spectrum ranging from most negative to most 
positive, further suggesting that positive and negative trait moods are not necessarily dissociable 
as implied by the PANAS-X scoring system.  It also stands to reason that the effect of positive 
trait mood and the effect of negative trait mood, if truly bidirectional, work to “cancel each other 
out.”  If so, the most appropriate experimental model would be one that considers both positive 
and negative trait moods. Indeed, the Difference Model relied on difference scores between the 
PANAS-X positive and negative affect scales, which would more accurately approximate the 
position of participants’ trait moods along the emotional valence spectrum than when positive or 
negative trait moods are considered alone.  This is additionally supported by the unreported 2x2 
trait mood model given that the large majority of participants included in that model rated their 
trait positive and negative moods dichotomously (i.e., gave ratings that were classified as high 
positive/low negative or low positive/high negative) rather than similarly (i.e., gave ratings that 
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were classified as high positive/high negative or low positive/low negative; 83% of the model 
sample rated their trait moods as high positive/low negative or low positive/high negative versus 
17% of the sample rated their trait moods as high positive/high negative or low positive/low 
negative).  Importantly, the Difference Model accounted for more variance than did the Positive 
and Negative Models, and additionally, revealed the mediational relationship between inhibition 
and semantic network activation that was not observed in either the Positive Model or Negative 
Model, further indicating it to be the superior of the three.   
 
Considerations and Other Limitations 
Mood Dimensionality and Other Problematic Aspects of the PANAS-X 
 This research yielded evidence that trait mood does significantly contribute to semantic 
network activation and inhibition.  As above, these findings lend support to Russell’s circumplex 
model, specifically, that the valence, or “pleasantness,” of an emotional state exists along a 
single dimension.  However, unique mood states of similar valence are thought to exist along this 
dimension and represent unique experiences.  For example, positive moods reflecting happiness 
may differ in their valence: from calm (i.e., somewhat pleasant but not far from neutral), to 
content (i.e., more pleasant and somewhat farther from neutral), to ecstatic (i.e., very pleasant 
and quite far from neutral), to manic (i.e., extremely pleasant and farthest from neutral, to the 
point of representing pathological happiness).  The PANAS-X scoring system, however, appears 
problematic because it collapses these differences by summing subjective ratings of similarly 
valenced traits.  At the same time, the scoring system may introduce redundancy (e.g., summing 
ratings of the extent to which a participant is “sad” and “blue”) and may reduce internal validity 
(e.g., assuming that “shy” is negatively valenced).   
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Perhaps, more importantly, the PANAS-X does not account for arousal, the second 
dimension of emotion described by Russell’s model, which refers to the extent to which an 
emotional state is activating.  Using the example above, the ecstatic and manic states would be 
considered significantly more arousing than would be calm and content states.  Prior research has 
shown that the arousal component of emotional states is extremely important to human 
experience (Gerber, Posner, Gorman, Colibazzi, Kensinger, & Corkin, 2004; Kuperman et al., 
2014; Vogt et al., 2008; Yu, et al., 2008; for a critical view, see Weaver & McNeill, 1992). As 
natural external stimuli serve as alarms to problematic or dangerous elements of the 
environment, the resultant emotional state primes decision-making and action (e.g., approach 
versus avoidance and fight versus flight).  Theoretically, there exists an arousal threshold 
necessary for such signaling.  It is difficult to induce super-threshold arousal states in 
experimental paradigms (Barret & Russell, 1999) and is beyond the scope of the current project; 
however, it is, at least, plausible that self-reported trait moods reflect low-level arousal states.  
This may have led to significant findings between trait mood groups on fewer cognitive tasks 
than expected.  Specifically, it is possible that naturally-occurring emotional states that are 
observed in the laboratory may not have been arousing enough to exert a sufficiently large effect 
to be detected given the statistical power and research procedures associated with the current 
study.  Several other models of emotion extend beyond Russell’s 2 dimensions (Bailen, Green, & 
Thompson, 2019; Barrett, 2010; Trnka, Lacev, Belcar, Kuska, & Tavel, 2016), which suggests 
that there may be factors other than valence (and arousal) which contribute to these relationships 
in meaningful ways yet remain elusive. 
 Unfortunately, the PANAS-X scoring system yields scores for positive affect and 
negative affect using terms most closely associated with valence rather than arousal (or other 
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emotional dimensions).  The redundancy in select PANAS-X items hints toward differences in 
valence intensity, but these differences may be too subtle to be differentiated by respondents 
(and examiners administering the test).  For example, among other descriptors, respondents are 
asked to independently rate the extent to which they feel “sad,” “blue,” and “downhearted,” in 
general. While it could be argued that these terms semantically represent negative emotions of 
different valences, those differences may be too small to be fully appreciated.  Further, 
respondents who endorse these negative emotions might believe them all to reflect a singular 
state and, therefore, rate each of these items similarly rather than discern any notable difference 
among them (e.g., a respondent may be more likely to perceive herself or himself to be 
adequately described by both “blue” and “downhearted” rather than think to herself or himself, 
“While I do feel ‘blue,’ I am in no way ‘downhearted,’” while providing responses).  In instances 
in which the PANAS-X uses several synonyms reflective of a common positive or negative 
mood state, positive or negative scale scores (or, in fact, both) may be inflated. 
Category Fluency as a Measure of Semantic Network Activation 
 Significantly poorer category fluency performance was observed in individuals reporting 
higher negative trait moods compared to those reporting higher positive trait moods.  Although 
category fluency is often used to measure semantic network activity (Avery & Jones, 2018; 
Kenett, 2018; Martinez-Nicolas, Carro, Llorente, & Garcia Meilan, 2019), fluency may be 
reduced in some individuals for reasons beyond spontaneous network activation.  These could 
include reduced vocabulary size, reduced English-language proficiency, reduced knowledge of 
category exemplars (e.g., a layperson would be expected to underperform compared to a 
zoologist in an animal-naming task), and negative/traumatic lifetime interactions with category 
exemplars (e.g., a person who was viciously attacked by a dog in her or his youth may refuse, 
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consciously or unconsciously, to utter the word “dog,” or conversely, remain atypically 
entrenched in that set and search only for the names of dog breeds and/or dog-related animal 
names such as “dingo” or “wolf”). Clearly, this list of confounds is extensive and includes those 
that are psychological and non-psychological.  It must be stated that the cognitive sequelae of 
psychological defense mechanisms, such as those cited in the latter two examples above, have 
been described throughout the 20th century and beyond (Smith & Solms, 2018; Weinstein & 
Kahn, 1950), but have largely fallen out of favor for neurologically-based explanations 
(Heilman, 2014). 
With these points noted, however, the current findings suggest that our category fluency 
results were genuinely reflective of semantic network activation.  No significant differences 
between negative and positive trait mood groups were observed in single-word reading of 
irregular words on the NAART, single-word identification on the ANT, the number of exemplars 
on the COWAT letter fluency trials, or on depressive symptomatology measured via the BDI-II.  
This suggests that intellect, word familiarity, and vocabulary size did not differ appreciably 
among groups, nor did depressive mood features that might contribute to psychological denial or 
repression that could affect fluency performance.  Similarly, analyses of the semantic 
neighborhood search methods between trait mood groups revealed that those reporting higher 
negative trait moods searched a similar number of semantic neighborhoods than their higher 
positive trait mood counterparts, but that they produced fewer exemplars from each semantic 
neighborhood searched.  This finding indicates that negative trait moods may be associated with 
reduced intra-semantic network activation, despite similar inter-semantic network activation.  
This is significant because it further suggests that category fluency is a valid measure of 
semantic network activation, which has been cited more frequently in various neuropsychiatric 
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groups, as opposed to healthy individuals similar to those included in this study (D’Agostino et 
al., 2017; Ho & Nation, 2018; Stoll, de Wit, Middleton & Buxbaum, 2019).  Similarly, these 
earlier studies have largely relied on techniques that evaluate verbal fluency performance using a 
restricted set of exemplars (rather than on the entire list of exemplars produced), which precludes 
a full analysis of neighborhood search strategies (see Salmon, Butters, & Chan [1999] for a 
classic example). The differences between inter- and intra-network search also provide useful 
information on the complexities of semantic search strategies, which has generally been 
neglected in prior research on healthy individuals. 
The current study identified clear differences between intra-neighborhood semantic 
activation, which appeared dampened in higher negative trait moods compared to higher positive 
trait moods, and inter-neighborhood activation, in which no significant differences between trait 
mood groups were observed.  Notably, this finding reinforces those that associate reduced intra-
neighborhood search with frontal-lobe lesions, neurodegenerative disorders, and schizophrenia, 
whereas enhanced intra-neighborhood search (as found in higher positive trait mood groups) has 
been associated with increased intellect and creativity in neurologically-healthy individuals (but 
may be associated with pathological perseveration observed in some neuropsychiatric 
conditions) (Benedek, Kenett, Umdasch, Anaki, Faust, & Neubauer, 2016; Paster, Parra 
Rodriguez, Salmon, & Jacobs, 2018; Vonk et al., 2019). 
The Complexity of Semantic Network Activation 
 The spontaneous spread of semantic network activity is complex and not adequately 
understood.  Some authors suggest that it is responsible for cognitive priming effects because 
accessed concepts lead to co-activation of (or toward) closely related semantic nodes.  According 
to Rosch’s (1973, 1975a, 1975b) theory, this activity leads to the mental construction of 
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cognitive prototypes in early life (akin to Piaget’s [1952] mental representation sensorimotor 
substage) and is essential to the organization of semantic networks.  This makes sense from a 
basic learning standpoint: when information is committed to memory, it must fit within an 
existing framework (similar to Piagetian assimilation; see Piaget, 1952) for proper organization 
and future access.  This leads to common prototypes, for example, apples being red and sweet as 
opposed to green and sour.  However, this example highlights the fact that semantic networks 
(and the prototypic nodes represented within them) must be flexible to access important non-
prototypic information that everyday situations require (Eshrag & Mamdani, 1979; Fodor & 
Lepore, 1996; Goguen, 1969; Zadeh, 1965).  Semantic activity of these “fuzzy sets” allows for 
adaptation to ever-changing environments and novel information (or in Piaget’s terms, 
accommodation; see Piaget, 1952). 
 Superior fluency performance requires semantic activity to spread within a sufficiently 
fuzzy conceptual category, but it also requires that spread to be restricted.  For example, when 
producing animal names, sufficient fuzziness allows activation to spread from “cow” to “pig” to 
“deer,” but not to “beef,” “pork,” or “venison.”  Because these animal-as-food names are closely 
related to potential target nodes, it could be expected that there is some degree of spontaneous 
co-activation within and between exemplars belonging to related semantic neighborhoods.  Thus, 
some level of inhibition is necessary in fluency tasks, as it allows for accurate intra-
neighborhood search and inter-neighborhood changes (say from farm animals, to house pets, to 
ocean animals, but not to mythical creatures). 
 It would appear, then, that verbal fluency is not entirely dissociable from inhibition and 
several other executive processes.  Indeed, common fluency errors, such as repetitions and 
intrusions, may represent inefficient working memory, self-monitoring, and error detection.  
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Together, executive control comprises these functions (and others) and is essential to cognitive 
flexibility and set-maintenance upon which successful fluency performance relies (including in 
bilinguals and aphasia; for examples, see Carpenter, Rao, Penaloza, & Kiran, 2020; Patra, Bose, 
& Marinis, 2020; Rao, 2016).  These functions have been shown to activate medial and 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortices (Dolcos, LaBar & Cabeza, 2004; Lane, Chua & Dolan, 1999), 
which have also been implicated in verbal generativity, even to the extent that these executive 
skills can accurately and reliably predict category fluency performance (Amunts, Camilleri, 
Eickhoff, Patil, Heim & Weis, 2020).  With all of these points considered, category fluency—
and by extension, semantic network activation—should not be considered fully semantically or 
linguistically-based, because effective (i.e., non-aberrant) spreading of activation appears to 
involve priming effects (e.g., via the examiner’s instructions to provide “names of all the animals 
you can think of, including animals from a farm, animals from the jungle, animals from the 
ocean, and animals you keep as a house pet,” and via inter-nodal activation from exemplar to 
exemplar during task performance) and restriction via inhibitory processes (i.e., to maintain set 
and ensure accurate inter-neighborhood switches).  This may also be reflected in the present 
DRM critical lure results derived from our post-hoc factor analyses.  While it was not surprising 
that the restricted factor analyses—that included 1) category fluency (i.e., semantic activation) 
measures and 2) inhibition measures—retained exactly those factors (which further supported the 
procedure’s accuracy), the fact that DRM critical lures loaded onto the inhibition factor rather 
than the semantic activation factor was surprising.  This implies that the production of critical 
lures was related to reduced effectiveness of the inhibitory functions that restrict aberrant 
semantic activity as opposed to processes that are strictly linguistic (as might be expected given 
the linguistic nature of the DRM procedure).  The latter of these could be explained by priming-
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like inter-nodal effects that characterize features of fluency performance that are commonly 
observed (e.g., runs of nested subordinates within a superordinate such as “…bird, finch, 
cardinal, blue jay, owl, screech owl, barn owl…”  or semantically related/similar exemplars such 
as “dog, cat, mouse…,”, “dog, wolf, coyote…,”, or “cat, rat, bat…”).  Thus, verbal fluency may 
involve the push and pull of priming and inhibition, and it may not be entirely orthogonal to 
these executive functions. 
The Complexity of Inhibition 
 Clearly, as supported by the current findings, inhibition is essential to semantic network 
activity.  Similar to semantic activation, inhibitory processes may be significantly more complex 
than originally assumed.  Inhibition is typically thought to serve as a cognitive brake pedal to 
slow and/or stop neural activity associated with prepotent responding to increase cognitive 
efficacy.  However, it must be considered that the inhibition tasks used in this research reflect the 
fact that inhibition may be effortful in some cases and non-effortful in others.  For example, the 
D-KEFS Color-Word Interference Test Color-Word and Switching trials require respondents to 
selectively read words or identify colors, and the D-KEFS Trail Making test Number-Letter 
Switching trial asks respondents to sequence and alternate between stimuli.  This form of 
inhibition requires conscious effort to ensure task rules are followed, implying that we can 
consciously “switch off” our neurologically based impulses, which has implications for more 
complex human behaviors (e.g., making healthy food choices by inhibiting the impulse for fatty 
and sweet foods in the goal-oriented behavior of dieting).  Crucially, however, inhibition may 
also occur unconsciously and non-effortfully, such as that driving effective verbal fluency 
performance (i.e., by restricting the spread of semantic activation toward non-target exemplars 
described above).  Traditional fluency paradigms, such as that used in this study, are, therefore, 
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likely to be insufficient to assess non-effortful versus effortful inhibition in linguistic functions 
(which may both be involved in the paradigm by maintaining set and avoiding repetitions, 
respectively).  Updated fluency methods do involve trials in which examinees alternate between 
multiple categories (such as in the D-KEFS), which may be useful to tease apart executive 
contributions to verbal fluency; however, these methods rely on code switching, which is likely 
to represent an executive function somewhat dissimilar to (and more complex than) simple, 
effortful inhibition (as might be effectively measured by other procedures, such as the Hayling 
task; see Cipolotti, Spano, Healy, Tudor-Sfetea, Chan, White et al., 2016; De Deyne, Navarro, 
Perfors, & Storms, 2016).  Future research efforts should focus on developing methods to clarify 
the contribution of effortful inhibition to verbal fluency (such as a fluency task that asks 
participants to “Name all the animals you can think of except for different types of birds.”). 
 
Conclusions 
In sum, this research identified an interesting relationship among mood, inhibition, and 
semantic network activation, such that individuals reporting higher positive trait moods exhibited 
greater inhibition interference and overall verbal fluency, whereas individuals reporting higher 
negative trait moods exhibited less inhibition interference and overall verbal fluency.  Those 
reporting higher positive trait moods demonstrated greater intra-neighborhood semantic search 
when compared to those reporting higher negative trait moods, while inter-neighborhood 
semantic search was similar across trait mood groups.  It also appeared that semantic network 
activation involves inhibitory processes and, indeed, according to our Difference Model results, 
may be mediated by it.  Findings also suggested that negative and positive trait mood features are 
not dissociable in discrete states, suggesting that mood questionnaires may more adequately 
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reflect these states when negative and positive mood traits are considered together rather than 
when considered separately. 
The relationships between semantic network activation and inhibition identified in this 
research are believed to be dynamic, complex, and very likely inseparable.  The complex nature 
of semantic network activity and of inhibition are not fully understood, and their relationship 
warrants further investigation.  While not without limitations, this work expands on the scientific 
understanding of these cognitive abilities, and, as previously suggested, their relationship may 
contribute to complex facets of the human experience, such as creativity, experiential openness, 
distractibility, and processing styles.  Although the mechanism by which cognitive skills are 
optimized by situational factors could not be definitively identified, the linguistic aspects of 
cognitive thought are implicated.  It is hoped that this study will serve as the basis of future 
research aimed to better understand the contribution of language to various cognitive skills and 






















Appendix 1.1. Positive Model Mood and Neuropsychological Test Correlations 
 
Measure 1   Measure 2    df r p-value 
English Proficiency Rating  PANAS Positive Affect  115 0.123 0.186  
BDI-II     115 0.081 0.385 
    NAART IQ    115 0.282 0.002* 
    ANT Total    115 0.174 0.061 
    ANT Latency    115 0.285 0.002* 
    FAS     115 0.179 0.053 
    Animals Total    115 0.146 0.116 
    Animals Number Neighborhoods 115 0.152 0.102 
    Animals Neighborhood Exemplars 115 0.174 0.061 
    Animals Neighborhood Run Size 115 0.101 0.279  
    DRM Total    115 -0.013 0.889 
    DRM Critical Lures   115 0.009 0.923  
    D-KEFS Color Naming  115 0.004 0.966 
    D-KEFS Word Reading  115 0.100 0.283 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   115 0.007 0.940 
    D-KEFS Switching   115 0.152 0.102 
D-KEFS Scanning   115 0.022 0.814 
 D-KEFS Number Seq.  115 0.030 0.748 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   115 0.028 0.764 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  115 0.018 0.847 
    D-KEFS Speed   115 0.111 0.233 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   115 0.092 0.324 
    WAIS-IV DSF   115 0.094 0.313  
    WAIS-IV DSB   115 0.086 0.357 
    WAIS-IV DSS   115 0.090 0.335 
    WMS-IV SSp    115 0.115 0.217 
PANAS Positive Affect BDI-II     115 -0.337 0.021*  
    NAART IQ    115 0.004 0.966 
    ANT Total    115 0.018 0.847 
    ANT Latency    115 0.152 0.102 
    FAS     115 0.164 0.077 
    Animals Total    115 0.441 0.001* 
    Animals Number Neighborhoods 115 0.178 0.055 
    Animals Neighborhood Exemplars 115 0.166 0.074 
    Animals Neighborhood Run Size 115 0.185 0.046*   
    DRM Total    115 0.155 0.952 
    DRM Critical Lures   115 0.332 0.001* 
    D-KEFS Color Naming  115 0.152 0.102 
    D-KEFS Word Reading  115 0.144 0.121 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   115 0.180 0.052 
    D-KEFS Switching   115 0.201 0.030*  
* Result significant at p < 0.05 
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Measure 1   Measure 2    df r p-value 
D-KEFS Scanning   115 0.009 0.923  
 D-KEFS Number Seq.  115 0.011 0.234 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   115 0.008 0.932 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  115 0.320 0.001* 
    D-KEFS Speed   115 0.013 0.889 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   115 0.012 0.898 
    WAIS-IV DSF   115 0.166 0.074 
    WAIS-IV DSB   115 -0.115 0.217 
    WAIS-IV DSS   115 -0.171 0.065 
    WMS-IV SSp    115 -0.156 0.093 
BDI-II    NAART IQ    115 0.003 0.974 
    ANT Total    115 0.008 0.932 
    ANT Latency    115 0.130 0.162 
    FAS     115 -0.011 0.234 
    Animals Total    115 -0.013 0.889 
    Animal Number Neighborhoods 115 -0.166 0.074 
    Animals Neighborhood Exemplars 115 -0.090 0.335 
    Animals Neighborhood Run Size 115 -0.010 0.915 
    DRM Total    115 -0.112 0.229 
    DRM Critical Lures   115 -0.225 0.047*  
    D-KEFS Color Word   115 0.011 0.234 
    D-KEFS Word Reading  115 0.156 0.093 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   115 0.012 0.898 
    D-KEFS Switching   115 0.004 0.966  
    D-KEFS Scanning   115 0.008 0.931 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  115 0.164 0.077 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   115 0.092 0.324 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  115 0.156 0.093 
    D-KEFS Speed   115 0.130 0.162 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   115 0.011 0.234 
    WAIS-IV DSF   115 -0.037 0.692 
    WAIS-IV DSB   115 0.041 0.661 
    WAIS-IV DSS   115 0.029 0.756 
    WMS-IV SSp    115 -0.005 0.957 
NAART IQ   ANT Total    115 0.171 0.065 
    ANT Latency    115 0.118 0.205 
    FAS     115 0.018 0.847 
    Animals Total    115 0.111 0.233 
    Animals Number Neighborhoods 115 0.109 0.242 
    Animals Neighborhood Exemplars 115 0.094 0.313 
    Animals Neighborhood Run Size 115 0.101 0.279 
    DRM Total    115 0.005 0.957 
    DRM Critical Lures   115 0.051 0.585 
    D-KEFS Color Naming  115 0.068 0.466 
* Result significant at p < 0.05     
 
 142 
Measure 1   Measure 2    df r p-value 
D-KEFS Word Reading  115 0.062 0.507 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   115 0.049 0.600 
    D-KEFS Switching   115 0.073 0.434 
    D-KEFS Scanning   115 0.029 0.756 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  115 0.016 0.864 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   115 0.008 0.932 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  115 -0.033 0.724 
    D-KEFS Speed   115 -0.004 0.966 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   115 0.085 0.362 
    WAIS-IV DSF   115 0.044 0.638 
    WAIS-IV DSB   115 0.039 0.676 
    WAIS-IV DSS   115 0.032 0.732 
    WMS-IV SSp    115 0.021 0.822 
ANT Total   ANT Latency    115 0.155 0.095 
    FAS     115 0.162 0.081 
    Animals Total    115 0.140 0.132 
    Animals Number Neighborhoods 115 0.067 0.473 
    Animals Neighborhood Exemplars 115 0.038 0.684 
    Animals Neighborhood Run Size 115 0.019 0.839 
    DRM Total    115 0.056 0.549 
    DRM Critical Lures   115 0.048 0.607 
    D-KEFS Color Naming  115 0.103 0.269 
    D-KEFS Word Reading  115 0.112 0.229 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   115 0.068 0.466 
    D-KEFS Switching   115 0.059 0.527 
    D-KEFS Scanning   115 0.013 0.889 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  115 0.036 0.700 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   115 0.042 0.653 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  115 0.078 0.403 
    D-KEFS Speed   115 -0.003 0.974 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   115 0.089 0.340 
    WAIS-IV DSF   115 0.091 0.329 
    WAIS-IV DSB   115 0.076 0.415 
    WAIS-IV DSS   115 0.070 0.453 
    WMS-IV SSp    115 0.057 0.542 
ANT Latency   FAS     115 -0.103 0.269 
    Animals Total    115 -0.133 0.153 
    Animals Number Neighborhoods 115 -0.165 0.754 
    Animals Neighborhood Exemplars 115 -0.142 0.127  
    Animals Neighborhood Run Size 115 -0.168 0.070 
    DRM Total    115 0.043 0.645 
    DRM Critical Lures   115 -0.133 0.887 
    D-KEFS Color Naming  115 0.100 0.283 
    D-KEFS Word Reading  115 0.108 0.246 
* Result significant at p < 0.05 
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Measure 1   Measure 2    df r p-value 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   115 0.077 0.409 
    D-KEFS Switching   115 0.069 0.460 
    D-KEFS Scanning   115 0.099 0.288 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  115 0.132 0.156 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   115 0.140 0.132 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  115 -0.158 0.089 
    D-KEFS Speed   115 0.019 0.839 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   115 0.076 0.415 
    WAIS-IV DSF   115 0.070 0.453 
    WAIS-IV DSB   115 0.081 0.385 
    WAIS-IV DSS   115 0.086 0.357 
    WMS-IV SSp    115 0.014 0.881 
FAS    Animals Total    115 0.157 0.091 
    Animals Number Neighborhoods 115 0.098 0.293 
    Animals Neighborhood Exemplars 115 0.132 0.156 
    Animals Neighborhood Run Size 115 0.163 0.079 
    DRM Total    115 0.069 0.460 
    DRM Critical Lures   115 0.022 0.814 
    D-KEFS Color Naming  115 0.015 0.872 
    D-KEFS Word Reading  115 0.014 0.881 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   115 0.006 0.949 
    D-KEFS Switching   115 0.009 0.923 
    D-KEFS Scanning   115 -0.006 0.949 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  115 0.019 0.839 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   115 0.016 0.864 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  115 0.004 0.966 
    D-KEFS Speed   115 0.014 0.881  
    WAIS-IV DS Total   115 0.093 0.319 
    WAIS-IV DSF   115 0.089 0.340 
    WAIS-IV DSB   115 0.098 0.293 
    WAIS-IV DSS   115 0.102 0.274 
    WMS-IV SSp    115 0.077 0.409  
Animals Total   Animals Number Neighborhoods 115 0.111 0.233 
    Animals Neighborhood Exemplars 115 0.120 0.197 
    Animals Neighborhood Run Size 115 0.153 0.100 
    DRM Total    115 0.019 0.839 
    DRM Critical Lures   115 0.004 0.966 
    D-KEFS Color Naming  115 0.018 0.847 
    D-KEFS Word Reading  115 0.025 0.789 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   115 0.173 0.062 
    D-KEFS Switching   115 0.352 0.015*  
    D-KEFS Scanning   115 0.045 0.630 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  115 0.112 0.229 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   115 0.115 0.217 
* Result significant at p < 0.05 
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Measure 1   Measure 2    df r p-value 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  115 0.396 0.011*   
    D-KEFS Speed   115 0.008 0.932 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   115 0.044 0.638 
    WAIS-IV DSF   115 0.046 0.622 
    WAIS-IV DSB   115 0.036 0.700 
    WAIS-IV DSS   115 0.039 0.676 
    WMS-IV SSp    115 0.028 0.764 
Animals No. Neighborhoods Animals Neighborhood Exemplars 115 0.166 0.074 
    Animals Neighborhood Run Size 115 0.176 0.058 
    DRM Total    115 0.046 0.622 
    DRM Critical Lures   115 0.036 0.700 
    D-KEFS Color Naming  115 0.029 0.756 
    D-KEFS Word Reading  115 0.031 0.740 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   115 0.014 0.881 
    D-KEFS Switching   115 0.016 0.864 
    D-KEFS Scanning   115 0.026 0.781 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  115 0.034 0.716 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   115 0.049 0.600 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  115 0.020 0.831 
    D-KEFS Speed   115 0.022 0.814 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   115 0.103 0.269 
    WAIS-IV DSF   115 0.111 0.233 
    WAIS-IV DSB   115 0.120 0.197 
    WAIS-IV DSS   115 0.124 0.183 
    WMS-IV SSp    115 0.063 0.500 
Animals Nei. Exemplars Animals Neighborhood Run Size 115 0.164 0.077 
    DRM Total    115 0.086 0.357 
    DRM Critical Lures   115 0.032 0.732 
    D-KEFS Color Naming  115 0.012 0.898 
    D-KEFS Word Reading  115 0.013 0.889 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   115 0.041 0.661 
    D-KEFS Switching   115 0.050 0.592 
    D-KEFS Scanning   115 0.015 0.872 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  115 0.015 0.872 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   115 0.009 0.923 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  115 0.031 0.740 
    D-KEFS Speed   115 0.011 0.906 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   115 0.102 0.273 
    WAIS-IV DSF   115 0.110 0.237 
    WAIS-IV DSB   115 0.154 0.097 
    WAIS-IV DSS   115 0.163 0.079 
    WMS-IV SSp    115 0.144 0.121 
Animals Nei. Run Size DRM Total    115 0.170 0.067 
    DRM Critical Lures   115 0.497 0.001*  
* Result significant at p < 0.05 
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Measure 1   Measure 2    df r p-value 
    D-KEFS Color Naming  115 0.164 0.077 
    D-KEFS Word Reading  115 0.063 0.500 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   115 0.013 0.889 
    D-KEFS Switching   115 0.002 0.983 
    D-KEFS Scanning   115 0.031 0.740 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  115 0.011 0.906 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   115 0.015 0.872 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  115 0.109 0.242 
    D-KEFS Speed   115 0.024 0.797 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   115 0.099 0.288 
    WAIS-IV DSF   115 0.095 0.308 
    WAIS-IV DSB   115 0.085 0.362 
    WAIS-IV DSS   115 0.105 0.260 
    WMS-IV SSp    115 0.111 0.233 
DRM Total   DRM Critical Lures   115 0.120 0.197 
    D-KEFS Color Naming  115 -0.006 0.949 
    D-KEFS Word Reading  115 -0.012 0.898 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   115 0.021 0.822 
    D-KEFS Switching   115 0.017 0.856 
    D-KEFS Scanning   115 -0.028 0.764 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  115 -0.031 0.740 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   115 -0.045 0.630 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  115 0.011 0.906 
    D-KEFS Speed   115 -0.047 0.615 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   115 0.086 0.357 
    WAIS-IV DSF   115 0.051 0.585 
    WAIS-IV DSB   115 0.072 0.440 
    WAIS-IV DSS   115 0.049 0.600 
    WMS-IV SSp    115 0.094 0.313 
DRM Critical Lures  D-KEFS Color Naming  115 0.010 0.915 
    D-KEFS Word Reading  115 0.024 0.797 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   115 0.180 0.052 
    D-KEFS Switching   115 0.497 0.001* 
    D-KEFS Scanning   115 0.110 0.238 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  115 0.116 0.213 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   115 0.142 0.127 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  115 0.522 0.001*  
    D-KEFS Speed   115 0.066 0.480 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   115 0.122 0.190 
    WAIS-IV DSF   115 0.088 0.345 
    WAIS-IV DSB   115 0.068 0.466 
    WAIS-IV DSS   115 0.091 0.329 
    WMS-IV SSp    115 0.054 0.563 
D-KEFS Color Naming D-KEFS Word Reading  115 0.169 0.069 
* Result significant at p < 0.05 
 
 146 
Measure 1   Measure 2    df r p-value 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   115 0.107 0.251 
    D-KEFS Switching   115 0.103 0.269 
    D-KEFS Scanning   115 0.172 0.064 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  115 0.169 0.069 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   115 0.155 0.095 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  115 0.122 0.190 
    D-KEFS Speed   115 0.142 0.127 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   115 0.089 0.340 
    WAIS-IV DSF   115 0.044 0.638 
    WAIS-IV DSB   115 0.056 0.549 
    WAIS-IV DSS   115 0.060 0.520 
    WMS-IV SSp    115 0.048 0.607 
D-KEFS Word Reading D-KEFS Color-Word   115 0.155 0.095 
    D-KEFS Switching   115 0.085 0.362 
    D-KEFS Scanning   115 0.112 0.229 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  115 0.097 0.298 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   115 0.086 0.357 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  115 0.051 0.585 
    D-KEFS Speed   115 0.140 0.132 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   115 0.046 0.622 
    WAIS-IV DSF   115 0.023 0.801 
    WAIS-IV DSB   115 0.092 0.324 
    WAIS-IV DSS   115 0.104 0.264 
    WMS-IV SSp    115 0.080 0.391 
D-KEFS Color-Word  D-KEFS Switching   115 0.166 0.074 
    D-KEFS Scanning   115 0.044 0.637 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  115 0.028 0.764 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   115 0.035 0.708 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  115 0.170 0.067 
    D-KEFS Speed   115 0.031 0.740 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   115 0.088 0.345 
    WAIS-IV DSF   115 0.061 0.514 
    WAIS-IV DSB   115 0.045 0.630 
    WAIS-IV DSS   115 0.057 0.542 
    WMS-IV SSp    115 0.079 0.397 
D-KEFS Switching  D-KEFS Scanning   115 0.058 0.534 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  115 0.072 0.440 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   115 0.080 0.391 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  115 0.173 0.062 
    D-KEFS Speed   115 0.043 0.645 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   115 0.006 0.949 
    WAIS-IV DSF   115 0.018 0.847 
    WAIS-IV DSB   115 0.016 0.864 
    WAIS-IV DSS   115 0.022 0.814 
* Result significant at p < 0.05 
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Measure 1   Measure 2    df r p-value 
  WMS-IV SSp    115 0.005 0.957 
D-KEFS Scanning  D-KEFS Number Seq.  115 0.154 0.097 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   115 0.163 0.079 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  115 0.108 0.246 
    D-KEFS Speed   115 0.171 0.065 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   115 0.033 0.724 
    WAIS-IV DSF   115 0.054 0.563 
    WAIS-IV DSB   115 0.088 0.345 
    WAIS-IV DSS   115 0.075 0.422 
    WMS-IV SSp    115 0.046 0.622 
D-KEFS Number Seq. D-KEFS Letter Seq.   115 0.112 0.229 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  115 0.053 0.570 
    D-KEFS Speed   115 0.111 0.233 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   115 0.016 0.864 
    WAIS-IV DSF   115 0.038 0.684 
    WAIS-IV DSB   115 0.008 0.932 
    WAIS-IV DSS   115 0.009 0.923 
    WMS-IV SSp    115 0.028 0.764 
D-KEFS Letter Seq.  D-KEFS Number-Letter  115 0.033 0.724 
    D-KEFS Speed   115 0.105 0.260 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   115 0.041 0.661 
    WAIS-IV DSF   115 0.022 0.814 
    WAIS-IV DSB   115 0.017 0.856 
    WAIS-IV DSS   115 -0.003 0.974 
    WMS-IV SSp    115 0.058 0.534 
D-KEFS Number-Letter D-KEFS Speed   115 0.032 0.732 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   115 0.011 0.906 
    WAIS-IV DSF   115 0.022 0.814 
    WAIS-IV DSB   115 0.018 0.847 
    WAIS-IV DSS   115 0.024 0.797 
    WMS-IV SSp    115 0.143 0.124 
D-KEFS Speed  WAIS-IV DS Total   115 0.015 0.872 
    WAIS-IV DSF   115 0.020 0.831 
    WAIS-IV DSB   115 0.041 0.661 
    WAIS-IV DSS   115 0.038 0.684 
    WMS-IV SSp    115 0.013 0.889 
WAIS-IV DS Total  WAIS-IV DSF   115 0.169 0.069 
    WAIS-IV DSB   115 0.158 0.089 
    WAIS-IV DSS   115 0.161 0.083 
    WMS-IV SSp    115 0.154 0.097 
WAIS-IV DSF  WAIS-IV DSB   115 0.167 0.072 
    WAIS-IV DSS   115 0.155 0.095 
    WMS-IV SSp    115 0.130 0.162 
WAIS-IV DSB  WAIS-IV DSS   115 0.178 0.055 
* Result significant at p < 0.05 
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Measure 1   Measure 2    df r p-value 
    WMS-IV SSp    115 0.165 0.075 











































* Result significant at p < 0.05 
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Appendix 1.2. Negative Model Mood and Neuropsychological Test Correlations 
 
Measure 1   Measure 2    df r p-value 
English Proficiency Rating PANAS Negative Affect  113 0.021 0.824 
BDI-II     113 0.013 0.890 
    NAART IQ    113 0.336 0.014* 
    ANT Total    113 0.180 0.054 
    ANT Latency    113 -0.347 0.011* 
    FAS     113 0.158 0.092 
    Animals Total    113 0.178 0.057 
    Animals Number Neighborhoods 113 0.113 0.229  
    Animals Neighborhood Exemplars 113 0.121 0.198 
    Animals Neighborhood Run Size 113 0.169 0.071 
    DRM Total    113 0.058 0.538 
    DRM Critical Lures   113 0.034 0.718 
    D-KEFS Color Naming  113 -0.019 0.840 
    D-KEFS Word Reading  113 -0.023 0.807 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   113 -0.036 0.704 
    D-KEFS Switching   113 -0.043 0.648 
    D-KEFS Scanning   113 -0.015 0.874 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  113 -0.019 0.840 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   113 -0.030 0.750 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  113 -0.017 0.857 
    D-KEFS Speed   113 -0.022 0.815 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   113 0.101 0.282  
    WAIS-IV DSF   113 0.089 0.344  
    WAIS-IV DSB   113 0.110 0.242 
    WAIS-IV DSS   113 0.113 0.229 
    WMS-IV SSp    113 0.076 0.420 
PANAS Negative Affect BDI-II     113 -0.484 0.001* 
    NAART IQ    113 0.022 0.815 
    ANT Total    113 0.044 0.641 
    ANT Latency    113 0.118 0.209 
    FAS     113 0.166 0.076 
    Animals Total    113 -0.567 0.001*  
    Animals Number Neighborhoods 113 -0.177 0.058 
    Animals Neighborhood Exemplars 113 -0.156 0.096 
    Animals Neighborhood Run Size 113 -0.281 0.018* 
    DRM Total    113 -0.017 0.857 
    DRM Critical Lures   113 -0.352 0.010* 
    D-KEFS Color Naming  113 0.011 0.907 
    D-KEFS Word Reading  113 0.006 0.949 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   113 -0.180 0.054 
    D-KEFS Switching   113 -0.313 0.013* 
    D-KEFS Scanning   113 0.092 0.328 
* Result significant at p < 0.05 
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Measure 1   Measure 2    df r p-value 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  113 0.107 0.255 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   113 0.091 0.333 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  113 -0.479 0.004*  
    D-KEFS Speed   113 -0.118 0.209 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   113 -0.163 0.082 
    WAIS-IV DSF   113 -0.147 0.117 
    WAIS-IV DSB   113 -0.155 0.098 
    WAIS-IV DSS   113 -0.168 0.073 
    WMS-IV SSp    113 0.077 0.413 
BDI-II    NAART IQ    113 0.035 0.710 
    ANT Total    113 0.008 0.932 
    ANT Latency    113 -0.011 0.907 
    FAS     113 -0.091 0.333 
    Animals Total    113 -0.164 0.080 
    Animal Number Neighborhoods 113 -0.087 0.355 
    Animals Neighborhood Exemplars 113 -0.023 0.807 
    Animals Neighborhood Run Size 113 -0.102 0.278 
    DRM Total    113 -0.114 0.225 
    DRM Critical Lures   113 -0.409 0.012* 
    D-KEFS Color Word   113 0.063 0.503 
    D-KEFS Word Reading  113 0.048 0.610 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   113 0.148 0.114 
    D-KEFS Switching   113 0.132 0.160 
    D-KEFS Scanning   113 0.085 0.366 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  113 0.015 0.874 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   113 0.005 0.958 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  113 0.103 0.273 
    D-KEFS Speed   113 0.038 0.687 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   113 0.012 0.899 
    WAIS-IV DSF   113 -0.032 0.734  
    WAIS-IV DSB   113 0.055 0.559 
    WAIS-IV DSS   113 0.080 0.395 
    WMS-IV SSp    113 0.062 0.510 
NAART IQ   ANT Total    113 0.126 0.180 
    ANT Latency    113 -0.079 0.401 
    FAS     113 0.043 0.648 
    Animals Total    113 0.094 0.318 
    Animals Number Neighborhoods 113 0.022 0.815 
    Animals Neighborhood Exemplars 113 0.030 0.750 
    Animals Neighborhood Run Size 113 0.077 0.413 
    DRM Total    113 0.016 0.865 
    DRM Critical Lures   113 0.008 0.932 
    D-KEFS Color Naming  113 0.059 0.531 




Measure 1   Measure 2    df r p-value 
    D-KEFS Word Reading  113 0.067 0.477 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   113 0.027 0.775 
    D-KEFS Switching   113 0.035 0.710 
    D-KEFS Scanning   113 0.083 0.378 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  113 0.113 0.229 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   113 0.105 0.264 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  113 0.066 0.483 
    D-KEFS Speed   113 0.018 0.849 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   113 0.026 0.783 
    WAIS-IV DSF   113 0.005 0.958 
    WAIS-IV DSB   113 0.013 0.890 
    WAIS-IV DSS   113 0.033 0.726 
    WMS-IV SSp    113 0.135 0.150 
ANT Total   ANT Latency    113 -0.045 0.632 
    FAS     113 0.109 0.246 
    Animals Total    113 0.177 0.058 
    Animals Number Neighborhoods 113 0.156 0.096 
    Animals Neighborhood Exemplars 113 0.112 0.233 
    Animals Neighborhood Run Size 113 0.172 0.066 
    DRM Total    113 0.060 0.524 
    DRM Critical Lures   113 0.043 0.648 
    D-KEFS Color Naming  113 0.027 0.775 
    D-KEFS Word Reading  113 0.038 0.687 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   113 0.007 0.941 
    D-KEFS Switching   113 0.012 0.899 
    D-KEFS Scanning   113 0.067 0.477 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  113 0.072 0.444 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   113 0.114 0.225 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  113 0.050 0.596 
    D-KEFS Speed   113 0.103 0.273  
    WAIS-IV DS Total   113 0.068 0.470 
    WAIS-IV DSF   113 0.084 0.372 
    WAIS-IV DSB   113 0.169 0.071 
    WAIS-IV DSS   113 0.178 0.057 
    WMS-IV SSp    113 0.162 0.084 
ANT Latency   FAS     113 -0.065 0.490 
    Animals Total    113 -0.059 0.531 
    Animals Number Neighborhoods 113 -0.028 0.766 
    Animals Neighborhood Exemplars 113 -0.009 0.924 
    Animals Neighborhood Run Size 113 -0.014 0882 
    DRM Total    113 0.005 0.958 
    DRM Critical Lures   113 0.030 0.750 
    D-KEFS Color Naming  113 0.143 0.127 




Measure 1   Measure 2    df r p-value 
    D-KEFS Word Reading  113 0.128 0.173 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   113 0.088 0.350 
    D-KEFS Switching   113 0.067 0.477 
    D-KEFS Scanning   113 0.112 0.233 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  113 0.105 0.264 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   113 0.138 0.141 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  113 0.095 0.313 
    D-KEFS Speed   113 0.147 0.117 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   113 0.064 0.497 
    WAIS-IV DSF   113 -0.055 0.559 
    WAIS-IV DSB   113 -0.089 0.344 
    WAIS-IV DSS   113 -0.079 0.401 
    WMS-IV SSp    113 -0.052 0.581 
FAS    Animals Total    113 0.167 0.074 
    Animals Number Neighborhoods 113 0.158 0.091 
    Animals Neighborhood Exemplars 113 0.177 0.584 
    Animals Neighborhood Run Size 113 0.169 0.071 
    DRM Total    113 0.141 0.134 
    DRM Critical Lures   113 0.120 0.201 
    D-KEFS Color Naming  113 -0.006 0.950 
    D-KEFS Word Reading  113 -0.012 0.899 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   113 0.132 0.160 
    D-KEFS Switching   113 0.150 0.110 
    D-KEFS Scanning   113 -0.020 0.832 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  113 -0.008 0.932 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   113 -0.018 0.849 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  113 0.103 0.273 
    D-KEFS Speed   113 -0.028 0.766 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   113 0.129 0.169 
    WAIS-IV DSF   113 0.177 0.584 
    WAIS-IV DSB   113 0.103 0.273 
    WAIS-IV DSS   113 0.111 0.238 
    WMS-IV SSp    113 0.101 0.283 
Animals Total   Animals Number Neighborhoods 113 0.141 0.133 
    Animals Neighborhood Exemplars 113 0.157 0.094 
    Animals Neighborhood Run Size 113 0.176 0.060 
    DRM Total    113 0.127 0.176 
    DRM Critical Lures   113 0.170 0.069 
    D-KEFS Color Naming  113 0.105 0.264 
    D-KEFS Word Reading  113 0.098 0.297 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   113 0.178 0.057 
    D-KEFS Switching   113 0.378 0.002*   
    D-KEFS Scanning   113 0.092 0.328 




Measure 1   Measure 2    df r p-value 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  113 0.087 0.355 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   113 0.100 0.288 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  113 0.479 0.001*  
    D-KEFS Speed   113 0.090 0.339 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   113 0.052 0.581 
    WAIS-IV DSF   113 0.032 0.734 
    WAIS-IV DSB   113 0.016 0.865 
    WAIS-IV DSS   113 0.021 0.824 
    WMS-IV SSp    113 0.042 0.656 
Animals No. Neighborhoods Animals Neighborhood Exemplars 113 0.114 0.225 
    Animals Neighborhood Run Size 113 0.123 0.190 
    DRM Total    113 0.101 0.283 
    DRM Critical Lures   113 0.154 0.100 
    D-KEFS Color Naming  113 0.033 0.726 
    D-KEFS Word Reading  113 0.023 0.807 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   113 0.019 0.840 
    D-KEFS Switching   113 0.009 0.924 
    D-KEFS Scanning   113 0.036 0.702 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  113 0.058 0.538 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   113 0.076 0.420 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  113 -0.120 0.201 
    D-KEFS Speed   113 0.070 0.457 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   113 0.138 0.141 
    WAIS-IV DSF   113 0.088 0.350 
    WAIS-IV DSB   113 0.072 0.444 
    WAIS-IV DSS   113 0.066 0.483 
    WMS-IV SSp    113 0.017 0.857 
Animals Nei. Exemplars Animals Neighborhood Run Size 113 0.180 0.054 
    DRM Total    113 0.055 0.559 
    DRM Critical Lures   113 0.138 0.141 
    D-KEFS Color Naming  113 0.102 0.278 
    D-KEFS Word Reading  113 0.095 0.313 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   113 0.130 0.166 
    D-KEFS Switching   113 0.135 0.150 
    D-KEFS Scanning   113 0.089 0.344 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  113 0.072 0.444 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   113 0.077 0.413 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  113 0.148 0.144 
    D-KEFS Speed   113 0.070 0.457 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   113 0.122 0.194 
    WAIS-IV DSF   113 0.108 0.251 
    WAIS-IV DSB   113 0.102 0.278 
    WAIS-IV DSS   113 0.100 0.287 




Measure 1   Measure 2    df r p-value 
    WMS-IV SSp    113 0.069 0.464 
Animals Nei. Run Size DRM Total    113 0.113 0.229 
    DRM Critical Lures   113 0.411 0.001* 
    D-KEFS Color Naming  113 0.012 0.899 
    D-KEFS Word Reading  113 0.020 0.832 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   113 0.115 0.221 
    D-KEFS Switching   113 0.130 0.166 
    D-KEFS Scanning   113 0.028 0.766 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  113 0.021 0.824 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   113 0.038 0.687 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  113 0.129 0.169 
    D-KEFS Speed   113 0.026 0.783 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   113 0.045 0.633 
    WAIS-IV DSF   113 0.086 0.361 
    WAIS-IV DSB   113 0.104 0.269 
    WAIS-IV DSS   113 0.138 0.141 
    WMS-IV SSp    113 0.083 0.378 
DRM Total   DRM Critical Lures   113 0.161 0.086 
    D-KEFS Color Naming  113 0.035 0.710 
    D-KEFS Word Reading  113 0.049 0.603 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   113 0.147 0.117 
    D-KEFS Switching   113 0.176 0.060 
    D-KEFS Scanning   113 0.051 0.588 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  113 0.039 0.679 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   113 0.062 0.510 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  113 0.159 0.090 
    D-KEFS Speed   113 0.046 0.625 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   113 0.093 0.323 
    WAIS-IV DSF   113 0.067 0.477 
    WAIS-IV DSB   113 0.078 0.407 
    WAIS-IV DSS   113 0.044 0.641 
    WMS-IV SSp    113 0.103 0.273 
DRM Critical Lures  D-KEFS Color Naming  113 0.031 0.742 
    D-KEFS Word Reading  113 0.038 0.687 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   113 0.181 0.053 
    D-KEFS Switching   113 0.438 0.001* 
    D-KEFS Scanning   113 0.046 0.625 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  113 0.033 0.726 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   113 0.079 0.401 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  113 0.513 0.001* 
    D-KEFS Speed   113 0.098 0.297 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   113 0.113 0.229 
    WAIS-IV DSF   113 0.065 0.490 




Measure 1   Measure 2    df r p-value 
    WAIS-IV DSB   113 0.078 0.407 
    WAIS-IV DSS   113 0.087 0.355 
    WMS-IV SSp    113 0.145 0.122 
D-KEFS Color Naming D-KEFS Word Reading  113 0.179 0.056 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   113 0.130 0.166 
    D-KEFS Switching   113 0.148 0.114 
    D-KEFS Scanning   113 0.182 0.052 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  113 0.167 0.074 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   113 0.172 0.066 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  113 0.124 0.187 
    D-KEFS Speed   113 0.169 0.071 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   113 0.158 0.092 
    WAIS-IV DSF   113 0.077 0.413 
    WAIS-IV DSB   113 0.121 0.198 
    WAIS-IV DSS   113 0.135 0.150 
    WMS-IV SSp    113 0.180 0.054 
D-KEFS Word Reading D-KEFS Color-Word   113 0.122 0.194 
    D-KEFS Switching   113 0.109 0.246 
    D-KEFS Scanning   113 0.173 0.064 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  113 0.162 0.084 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   113 0.179 0.056 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  113 0.115 0.221 
    D-KEFS Speed   113 0.171 0.068 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   113 0.105 0.264 
    WAIS-IV DSF   113 0.088 0.350 
    WAIS-IV DSB   113 0.044 0.641 
    WAIS-IV DSS   113 0.053 0.574 
    WMS-IV SSp    113 0.110 0.242 
D-KEFS Color-Word  D-KEFS Switching   113 0.171 0.068 
    D-KEFS Scanning   113 0.133 0.156 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  113 0.108 0.251 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   113 0.124 0.187 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  113 0.165 0.078 
    D-KEFS Speed   113 0.112 0.233 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   113 0.076 0.420 
    WAIS-IV DSF   113 0.040 0.671 
    WAIS-IV DSB   113 0.056 0.552 
    WAIS-IV DSS   113 0.064 0.497 
    WMS-IV SSp    113 0.069 0.464 
D-KEFS Switching  D-KEFS Scanning   113 0.119 0.205 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  113 0.134 0.153 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   113 0.138 0.141 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  113 0.181 0.053 
* Result significant at p < 0.05 
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Measure 1   Measure 2    df r p-value 
  D-KEFS Speed   113 0.116 0.217 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   113 0.034 0.718 
    WAIS-IV DSF   113 0.022 0.816 
    WAIS-IV DSB   113 0.014 0.882 
    WAIS-IV DSS   113 0.018 0.849 
    WMS-IV SSp    113 0.047 0.618 
D-KEFS Scanning  D-KEFS Number Seq.  113 0.170 0.069 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   113 0.165 0.078 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  113 0.103 0.273 
    D-KEFS Speed   113 0.174 0.063 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   113 0.156 0.096 
    WAIS-IV DSF   113 0.104 0.269 
    WAIS-IV DSB   113 0.111 0.237 
    WAIS-IV DSS   113 0.123 0.190 
    WMS-IV SSp    113 0.150 0.110 
D-KEFS Number Seq. D-KEFS Letter Seq.   113 0.168 0.073 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  113 0.148 0.114 
    D-KEFS Speed   113 0.157 0.094 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   113 0.144 0.125 
    WAIS-IV DSF   113 0.064 0.497 
    WAIS-IV DSB   113 0.070 0.457 
    WAIS-IV DSS   113 0.082 0.384 
    WMS-IV SSp    113 0.130 0.166 
D-KEFS Letter Seq.  D-KEFS Number-Letter  113 0.128 0.173 
    D-KEFS Speed   113 0.166 0.076 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   113 0.179 0.056 
    WAIS-IV DSF   113 0.121 0.198 
    WAIS-IV DSB   113 0.110 0.242 
    WAIS-IV DSS   113 0.115 0.221 
    WMS-IV SSp    113 0.162 0.084 
D-KEFS Number-Letter D-KEFS Speed   113 0.169 0.071 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   113 0.076 0.420 
    WAIS-IV DSF   113 0.068 0.470 
    WAIS-IV DSB   113 0.036 0.702 
    WAIS-IV DSS   113 0.044 0.641 
    WMS-IV SSp    113 0.109 0.246 
D-KEFS Speed  WAIS-IV DS Total   113 0.113 0.229 
    WAIS-IV DSF   113 0.045 0.632 
    WAIS-IV DSB   113 0.055 0.559 
    WAIS-IV DSS   113 0.062 0.510 
    WMS-IV SSp    113 0.104 0.269 
WAIS-IV DS Total  WAIS-IV DSF   113 0.097 0.302 
    WAIS-IV DSB   113 0.077 0.413 




Measure 1   Measure 2    df r p-value 
    WAIS-IV DSS   113 0.060 0.524 
    WMS-IV SSp    113 0.116 0.217 
WAIS-IV DSF  WAIS-IV DSB   113 0.110 0.242 
    WAIS-IV DSS   113 0.114 0.225 
    WMS-IV SSp    113 0.066 0.483 
WAIS-IV DSB  WAIS-IV DSS   113 0.177 0.058 
    WMS-IV SSp    113 0.042 0.656 





































* Result significant at p < 0.05 
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Appendix 1.3. Difference Model Mood and Neuropsychological Test Correlations 
 
Measure 1   Measure 2    df r p-value 
English Proficiency Rating PANAS Difference   110 0.006 0.950 
  BDI-II     110 0.025 0.794 
    NAART IQ    110 0.332 0.012* 
    ANT Total    110 0.373 0.009* 
    ANT Latency    110 -0.105 0.271 
    FAS     110 0.110 0.248 
    Animals Total    110 0.083 0.384 
    Animals Number Neighborhoods 110 0.115 0.227 
    Animals Neighborhood Exemplars 110 0.103 0.280 
    Animals Neighborhood Run Size 110 0.164 0.084 
    DRM Total    110 0.053 0.579 
    DRM Critical Lures   110 0.046 0.630 
    D-KEFS Color Naming  110 0.032 0.738 
    D-KEFS Word Reading  110 0.079 0.408 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   110 0.100 0.294 
    D-KEFS Switching   110 0.096 0.314 
    D-KEFS Scanning   110 0.033 0.730 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  110 0.054 0.572 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   110 0.076 0.426 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  110 0.028 0.769 
    D-KEFS Speed   110 0.014 0.884 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   110 0.009 0.925 
    WAIS-IV DSF   110 0.022 0.818 
    WAIS-IV DSB   110 0.038 0.691 
    WAIS-IV DSS   110 0.032 0.738 
    WMS-IV SSp    110 0.020 0.834 
PANAS Difference  BDI-II     110 -0.106 0.266 
    NAART IQ    110 0.045 0.638 
    ANT Total    110 0.086 0.367 
    ANT Latency    110 -0.066 0.498 
    FAS     110 0.174 0.067 
    Animals Total    110 0.671 0.001* 
    Animals Number Neighborhoods 110 0.119 0.211 
    Animals Neighborhood Exemplars 110 0.108 0.257 
    Animals Neighborhood Run Size 110 0.293 0.024* 
    DRM Total    110 0.160 0.092 
    DRM Critical Lures   110 0.373 0.004* 
    D-KEFS Color Naming  110 0.097 0.309 
    D-KEFS Word Reading  110 0.089 0.351 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   110 0.126 0.186 
    D-KEFS Switching   110 0.319 0.011* 
    D-KEFS Scanning   110 0.077 0.420 
* Result significant at p < 0.05 
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Measure 1   Measure 2    df r p-value 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  110 0.103 0.280 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   110 0.084 0.379 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  110 0.470 0.001* 
    D-KEFS Speed   110 0.072 0.451 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   110 0.096 0.314 
    WAIS-IV DSF   110 0.088 0.356 
    WAIS-IV DSB   110 0.109 0.253 
    WAIS-IV DSS   110 0.119 0.211 
    WMS-IV SSp    110 0.133 0.162 
BDI-II    NAART IQ    110 0.026 0.786 
    ANT Total    110 0.031 0.746 
    ANT Latency    110 0.017 0.859 
    FAS     110 -0.046 0.630 
    Animals Total    110 -0.071 0.457 
    Animal Number Neighborhoods 110 -0.039 0.683 
    Animals Neighborhood Exemplars 110 -0.062 0.516 
    Animals Neighborhood Run Size 110 -0.090 0.345 
    DRM Total    110 -0.055 0.564 
    DRM Critical Lures   110 -0.262 0.018* 
    D-KEFS Color Word   110 0.023 0.810 
    D-KEFS Word Reading  110 0.029 0.761 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   110 -0.105 0.271 
    D-KEFS Switching   110 -0.092 0.335 
    D-KEFS Scanning   110 0.043 0.653 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  110 0.017 0.859 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   110 0.008 0.933 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  110 -0.010 0.917 
    D-KEFS Speed   110 0.003 0.975 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   110 -0.029 0.761 
    WAIS-IV DSF   110 -0.046 0.630 
    WAIS-IV DSB   110 0.022 0.818 
    WAIS-IV DSS   110 -0.006 0.950 
    WMS-IV SSp    110 0.027 0.777 
NAART IQ   ANT Total    110 0.167 0.784 
    ANT Latency    110 0.071 0.457 
    FAS     110 0.154 0.105 
    Animals Total    110 0.177 0.062 
    Animals Number Neighborhoods 110 0.120 0.208 
    Animals Neighborhood Exemplars 110 0.109 0.253 
    Animals Neighborhood Run Size 110 0.169 0.075 
    DRM Total    110 0.039 0.683 
    DRM Critical Lures   110 0.043 0.653 
    D-KEFS Color Naming  110 0.035 0.714 




Measure 1   Measure 2    df r p-value 
    D-KEFS Word Reading  110 0.049 0.608 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   110 0.023 0.810 
    D-KEFS Switching   110 0.016 0.867 
    D-KEFS Scanning   110 0.028 0.769 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  110 0.038 0.691 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   110 0.026 0.785 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  110 0.041 0.668 
    D-KEFS Speed   110 0.009 0.925 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   110 0.067 0.483 
    WAIS-IV DSF   110 0.081 0.396 
    WAIS-IV DSB   110 0.112 0.240 
    WAIS-IV DSS   110 0.102 0.285 
    WMS-IV SSp    110 0.130 0.172 
ANT Total   ANT Latency    110 0.015 0.875 
    FAS     110 0.087 0.362 
    Animals Total    110 0.076 0.426 
    Animals Number Neighborhoods 110 0.068 0.476 
    Animals Neighborhood Exemplars 110 0.099 0.299 
    Animals Neighborhood Run Size 110 0.113 0.236 
    DRM Total    110 0.062 0.516 
    DRM Critical Lures   110 0.090 0.345 
    D-KEFS Color Naming  110 0.041 0.668 
    D-KEFS Word Reading  110 0.029 0.761 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   110 0.035 0.714 
    D-KEFS Switching   110 0.066 0.489 
    D-KEFS Scanning   110 0.051 0.593 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  110 0.022 0.818 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   110 0.029 0.761 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  110 0.074 0.438 
    D-KEFS Speed   110 0.020 0.834 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   110 0.083 0.384 
    WAIS-IV DSF   110 0.049 0.608 
    WAIS-IV DSB   110 0.057 0.551 
    WAIS-IV DSS   110 0.068 0.476 
    WMS-IV SSp    110 0.092 0.335 
ANT Latency   FAS     110 0.083 0.384 
    Animals Total    110 0.023 0.810 
    Animals Number Neighborhoods 110 0.016 0.867 
    Animals Neighborhood Exemplars 110 0.029 0.761 
    Animals Neighborhood Run Size 110 -0.377 0.004* 
    DRM Total    110 0.042 0.660 
    DRM Critical Lures   110 0.033 0.730 
    D-KEFS Color Naming  110 0.134 0.159 




Measure 1   Measure 2    df r p-value 
    D-KEFS Word Reading  110 0.152 0.110 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   110 0.106 0.266 
    D-KEFS Switching   110 0.119 0.211 
    D-KEFS Scanning   110 0.160 0.092 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  110 0.151 0.112 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   110 0.159 0.094 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  110 0.102 0.285 
    D-KEFS Speed   110 0.172 0.069 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   110 0.088 0.356 
    WAIS-IV DSF   110 0.032 0.738 
    WAIS-IV DSB   110 0.054 0.572 
    WAIS-IV DSS   110 0.071 0.457 
    WMS-IV SSp    110 0.096 0.314 
FAS    Animals Total    110 0.159 0.094 
    Animals Number Neighborhoods 110 0.104 0.275 
    Animals Neighborhood Exemplars 110 0.139 0.144 
    Animals Neighborhood Run Size 110 0.170 0.073 
    DRM Total    110 0.080 0.402 
    DRM Critical Lures   110 0.163 0.086 
    D-KEFS Color Naming  110 0.038 0.691 
    D-KEFS Word Reading  110 0.043 0.653 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   110 0.082 0.390 
    D-KEFS Switching   110 0.097 0.309 
    D-KEFS Scanning   110 0.036 0.706 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  110 0.051 0.593 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   110 0.073 0.444 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  110 0.108 0.257 
    D-KEFS Speed   110 0.065 0.496 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   110 0.030 0.754 
    WAIS-IV DSF   110 0.021 0.826 
    WAIS-IV DSB   110 0.025 0.794 
    WAIS-IV DSS   110 0.019 0.842 
    WMS-IV SSp    110 0.078 0.414 
Animals Total   Animals Number Neighborhoods 110 0.177 0.062 
    Animals Neighborhood Exemplars 110 0.162 0.088 
    Animals Neighborhood Run Size 110 0.180 0.056 
    DRM Total    110 0.067 0.483 
    DRM Critical Lures   110 0.168 0.077 
    D-KEFS Color Naming  110 0.045 0.638 
    D-KEFS Word Reading  110 0.029 0.761 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   110 0.175 0.065 
    D-KEFS Switching   110 0.349 0.010* 
    D-KEFS Scanning   110 0.034 0.722 




Measure 1   Measure 2    df r p-value 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  110 0.061 0.523 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   110 0.048 0.615 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  110 0.500 0.001* 
    D-KEFS Speed   110 0.059 0.537 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   110 0.076 0.426 
    WAIS-IV DSF   110 0.082 0.390 
    WAIS-IV DSB   110 0.060 0.530 
    WAIS-IV DSS   110 0.047 0.623 
    WMS-IV SSp    110 0.091 0.340 
Animals No. Neighborhoods Animals Neighborhood Exemplars 110 0.109 0.253 
    Animals Neighborhood Run Size 110 0.127 0.182 
    DRM Total    110 0.116 0.223 
    DRM Critical Lures   110 0.130 0.172 
    D-KEFS Color Naming  110 0.011 0.908 
    D-KEFS Word Reading  110 0.026 0.786 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   110 0.118 0.215 
    D-KEFS Switching   110 0.133 0.162 
    D-KEFS Scanning   110 0.013 0.892 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  110 0.035 0.714 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   110 0.020 0.834 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  110 0.114 0.231 
    D-KEFS Speed   110 0.027 0.777 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   110 0.058 0.544 
    WAIS-IV DSF   110 0.036 0.706 
    WAIS-IV DSB   110 0.059 0.537 
    WAIS-IV DSS   110 0.049 0.608 
    WMS-IV SSp    110 0.077 0.420 
Animals Nei. Exemplars Animals Neighborhood Run Size 110 0.173 0.068 
    DRM Total    110 0.154 0.105 
    DRM Critical Lures   110 0.168 0.077 
    D-KEFS Color Naming  110 0.071 0.457 
    D-KEFS Word Reading  110 0.058 0.544 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   110 0.102 0.285 
    D-KEFS Switching   110 0.123 0.196 
    D-KEFS Scanning   110 0.044 0.645 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  110 0.055 0.564 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   110 0.038 0.691 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  110 0.109 0.253 
    D-KEFS Speed   110 0.061 0.523 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   110 0.073 0.444 
    WAIS-IV DSF   110 0.113 0.236 
    WAIS-IV DSB   110 0.088 0.356 
    WAIS-IV DSS   110 0.052 0.586 
    WMS-IV SSp    110 0.120 0.208 
* Result significant at p < 0.05 
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Measure 1   Measure 2    df r p-value 
Animals Nei. Run Size DRM Total    110 0.438 0.001* 
    DRM Critical Lures   110 0.161 0.899 
    D-KEFS Color Naming  110 0.021 0.826 
    D-KEFS Word Reading  110 0.029 0.761 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   110 0.093 0.329 
    D-KEFS Switching   110 0.105 0.271 
    D-KEFS Scanning   110 0.036 0.706 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  110 0.055 0.565 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   110 0.070 0.463 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  110 0.160 0.092 
    D-KEFS Speed   110 0.028 0.769 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   110 0.080 0.402 
    WAIS-IV DSF   110 0.044 0.645 
    WAIS-IV DSB   110 0.050 0.601 
    WAIS-IV DSS   110 0.067 0.483 
    WMS-IV SSp    110 0.075 0.432 
DRM Total   DRM Critical Lures   110 0.045 0.638 
    D-KEFS Color Naming  110 0.010 0.917 
    D-KEFS Word Reading  110 0.024 0.802 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   110 0.036 0.706 
    D-KEFS Switching   110 0.064 0.503 
    D-KEFS Scanning   110 0.018 0.851 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  110 0.027 0.777 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   110 0.051 0.593 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  110 0.049 0.608 
    D-KEFS Speed   110 0.009 0.925 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   110 0.073 0.444 
    WAIS-IV DSF   110 0.059 0.537 
    WAIS-IV DSB   110 0.042 0.660 
    WAIS-IV DSS   110 0.060 0.530 
    WMS-IV SSp    110 0.090 0.345 
DRM Critical Lures  D-KEFS Color Naming  110 0.106 0.266 
    D-KEFS Word Reading  110 0.121 0.204 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   110 0.181 0.056 
    D-KEFS Switching   110 0.458 0.001* 
    D-KEFS Scanning   110 0.137 0.150 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  110 0.140 0.141 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   110 0.129 0.175 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  110 0.426 0.001* 
    D-KEFS Speed   110 0.115 0.227 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   110 0.108 0.257 
    WAIS-IV DSF   110 0.077 0.420 
    WAIS-IV DSB   110 0.083 0.384 
    WAIS-IV DSS   110 0.098 0.304 
* Result significant at p < 0.05 
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    WMS-IV SSp    110 0.111 0.244 
D-KEFS Color Naming D-KEFS Word Reading  110 0.184 0.052 
    D-KEFS Color-Word   110 0.161 0.090 
    D-KEFS Switching   110 0.143 0.133 
    D-KEFS Scanning   110 0.170 0.073 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  110 0.155 0.103 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   110 0.117 0.219 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  110 0.095 0.319 
    D-KEFS Speed   110 0.172 0.070 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   110 0.080 0.402 
    WAIS-IV DSF   110 0.053 0.579 
    WAIS-IV DSB   110 0.049 0.608 
    WAIS-IV DSS   110 0.041 0.668 
    WMS-IV SSp    110 0.094 0.324 
D-KEFS Word Reading D-KEFS Color-Word   110 0.102 0.285 
    D-KEFS Switching   110 0.110 0.248 
    D-KEFS Scanning   110 0.169 0.075 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  110 0.173 0.068 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   110 0.162 0.088 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  110 0.135 0.156 
    D-KEFS Speed   110 0.179 0.059 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   110 0.087 0.362 
    WAIS-IV DSF   110 0.050 0.601 
    WAIS-IV DSB   110 0.039 0.683 
    WAIS-IV DSS   110 0.047 0.623 
    WMS-IV SSp    110 0.099 0.299 
D-KEFS Color-Word  D-KEFS Switching   110 0.183 0.053 
    D-KEFS Scanning   110 0.100 0.294 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  110 0.126 0.186 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   110 0.139 0.143 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  110 0.176 0.063 
    D-KEFS Speed   110 0.086 0.367 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   110 0.076 0.426 
    WAIS-IV DSF   110 0.040 0.675 
    WAIS-IV DSB   110 0.061 0.523 
    WAIS-IV DSS   110 0.070 0.463 
    WMS-IV SSp    110 0.079 0.408 
D-KEFS Switching  D-KEFS Scanning   110 0.113 0.236 
    D-KEFS Number Seq.  110 0.101 0.289 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   110 0.092 0.335 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  110 0.179 0.059 
    D-KEFS Speed   110 0.163 0.086 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   110 0.077 0.420 
    WAIS-IV DSF   110 0.025 0.794 
* Result significant at p < 0.05 
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    WAIS-IV DSB   110 0.045 0.638 
    WAIS-IV DSS   110 0.069 0.470 
    WMS-IV SSp    110 0.084 0.379 
D-KEFS Scanning  D-KEFS Number Seq.  110 0.171 0.071 
    D-KEFS Letter Seq.   110 0.164 0.084 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  110 0.093 0.329 
    D-KEFS Speed   110 0.181 0.056 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   110 0.065 0.496 
    WAIS-IV DSF   110 0.030 0.754 
    WAIS-IV DSB   110 0.048 0.615 
    WAIS-IV DSS   110 0.060 0.530 
    WMS-IV SSp    110 0.088 0.356 
D-KEFS Number Seq. D-KEFS Letter Seq.   110 0.175 0.065 
    D-KEFS Number-Letter  110 0.103 0.280 
    D-KEFS Speed   110 0.168 0.077 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   110 0.099 0.299 
    WAIS-IV DSF   110 0.066 0.489 
    WAIS-IV DSB   110 0.053 0.579 
    WAIS-IV DSS   110 0.087 0.362 
    WMS-IV SSp    110 0.115 0.227 
D-KEFS Letter Seq.  D-KEFS Number-Letter  110 0.106 0.267 
    D-KEFS Speed   110 0.173 0.068 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   110 0.080 0.402 
    WAIS-IV DSF   110 0.073 0.444 
    WAIS-IV DSB   110 0.061 0.523 
    WAIS-IV DSS   110 0.090 0.345 
    WMS-IV SSp    110 0.122 0.200 
D-KEFS Number-Letter D-KEFS Speed   110 0.093 0.329 
    WAIS-IV DS Total   110 0.056 0.558 
    WAIS-IV DSF   110 0.033 0.730 
    WAIS-IV DSB   110 0.049 0.608 
    WAIS-IV DSS   110 0.067 0.483 
    WMS-IV SSp    110 0.071 0.457 
D-KEFS Speed  WAIS-IV DS Total   110 0.020 0.834 
    WAIS-IV DSF   110 0.031 0.746 
    WAIS-IV DSB   110 0.018 0.851 
    WAIS-IV DSS   110 0.012 0.900 
    WMS-IV SSp    110 0.047 0.623 
WAIS-IV DS Total  WAIS-IV DSF   110 0.146 0.125 
    WAIS-IV DSB   110 0.152 0.110 
    WAIS-IV DSS   110 0.139 0.144 
    WMS-IV SSp    110 0.106 0.266 
WAIS-IV DSF  WAIS-IV DSB   110 0.155 0.103 
    WAIS-IV DSS   110 0.142 0.135 
* Result significant at p < 0.05 
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    WMS-IV SSp    110 0.082 0.390 
WAIS-IV DSB  WAIS-IV DSS   110 0.181 0.056 
    WMS-IV SSp    110 0.100 0.294 
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